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PHILANTHROPY – AN ELUSIVE AND CHANGING CONCEPT
This special issue on the evolving state of philanthropy in Southeast Asia provides 
an overview of the trends and tensions in this sector, which is being shaped by 
often conflicting notions of charity, development, and business.
Philanthropy is viewed as an age-old practice, yet not many are familiar with 
the term (Payton & Moody, 2008) and even fewer know its etymological origin 
from ancient Greek, literally meaning ‘love to humankind’. Classic definitions 
describe philanthropy as a private initiative for the public good (as cited by Gardner 
in McCully, 2008) or a voluntary action for the public good (Payton, 1988) aiming 
at improvement in the quality of human life (Bremner, 1988). These definitions, 
however, are quite broad and leave open to interpretation what philanthropy 
actually implies in specific contexts and settings. In trying to operationalize the 
concept, practitioners tend to take a narrower view of philanthropy centered on 
its financial dimension as implying a donation or investment of private capital 
for the public good. They further distinguish its purpose from that of ‘char-
ity’ in that philanthropy is meant to focus on the prevention and elimination 
of the roots causes of social problems rather than merely alleviating the suf-
fering caused by those same social problems. While charity is seen as directed 
at meeting immediate needs, philanthropy is expected to be ‘problem-solving’ 
and persistent in addressing society’s challenges. Its efforts do not provide 
immediate reprieve, but aim to enable disadvantaged people to gain the skills to 
improve their conditions while also creating opportunities for them to advance 
in society. In the words of Steve Gunderson, former President and CEO of the 
Council of Foundations: “Charity tends to be a short-term, emotional, immedi-
ate response, focused primarily on rescue and relief, whereas philanthropy is 
much more long-term, more strategic, focused on rebuilding” (The Melvin and 
Bren Simon Foundation, 2015).
This juxtaposition is inspired by the early Anglo-American philanthropists in 
the 20th century, foremost Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919) and John D. Rockefeller 
(1839-1937), and in successive years, Henry Ford (1863-1947). The private foun-
dations they, and successive generations of US philanthropists, established 
with substantial endowments and generous tax deductions for their donations, 
aim to address the root causes of social ills (Bremner, 1988; McCully, 2008; 
Zunz, 2010). As Rockefeller himself stated: “The best philanthropy is constantly 
in search of the finalities – a search for a cause, an attempt to cure evils at their 
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source” (Rockefeller, 1984; Seim, 2016 p. 54). US foundations working internationally, 
such as Ford, Charles Stewart Mott, Rockefeller, and W.K. Kellogg, have traditionally 
also confided in the “power and potential of philanthropy to address problems as well 
as to strengthen civil society and democracy” worldwide (Ambrose, 2005, p. 2). 
In this philanthropic model, the allocation of endowed resources is institutional-
ized and professionalized, with foundation officers strategically granting to selected 
organizations whose concerted funded actions are meant to address a specific issue 
and bring about societal change in a context-specific and synergic manner. Going 
beyond spontaneous individual giving from one to another person or to a particular 
cause – which still constitutes the majority of giving in the US and elsewhere in the 
world – philanthropic resources are channeled through institutions to other institu-
tions, mostly non-government and civil society groups. Here, a distinction is made 
between private and public foundations, the first being established with donations 
of philanthropist individuals or families, and the second being funded from various 
sources, including private donations and public funding. On the ground, this trans-
lates into a multitude of foundations of various sizes and modalities. The Foundation 
Center estimated that in the US alone in 2012 there were 86,192 foundations with 
USD 715 billion in assets and USD 52 billion in giving. The largest of these and the 
highest number (78,582) were independent foundations established by individual 
donors or families. The remaining could be classified as corporate, operational, and 
community foundations (Foundation Center, 2014, p. 3; see Table 1). If other kinds 
of organizations with an official non-profit status are included, the number reaches 
1.4 million in the same year (Statista, 2017). Outside of the US, reliable numbers are 
lacking, also because legal systems and public opinion do not always distinguish the 
scope of foundation work from that of the larger nonprofit or civil society sector and 
different tax systems do not incentivize and thus also do not monitor philanthropic 
foundations. However, it is generally assumed that the third or non-profit sector is 
large and growing and home-grown philanthropy is expanding (Ambrose, 2005, p. 3; 
“Homegrown Philanthropy”, 2014). 
Table 1. A typology of (philanthropic) foundations (Adapted from Foundation Center, 2014, 
p. 3; Martens & Seitz, 2015, p. 9)
Independent Established by individual donors or donor 
families as separate legal entities are mainly 
engaged in grant-making activities
Operating Primarily run their own programs, but some 
also make grants. Generally established by 
individual donors or donor families
Corporate Established by businesses ranging from major 
corporations to family owned shops, as sepa-
rate or semi-independent entities
Community Raise funds from the public. Engage in 
grant-making primarily within a defined geo-
graphic area
ASEAS 10(2) | 131
Rosalia Sciortino
Interestingly, the modality of foundations as non-profit is today being challenged 
by new conceptualizations of philanthropy that do no longer see this as one of the 
defining criteria. The rise in the last two decades of a more universalist, technocratic, 
and market-oriented approach in philanthropy – triggered by the establishment of 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) – has emphasized the view that the 
commercial sector can serve as a model for the third sector in devising ‘global’ solu-
tion to development problems and that positive social and environmental outcomes 
as well as monetary gains can be pursued simultaneously. In the so-called venture 
philanthropy, branded by critics as ‘philanthrocapitalism’, donations or loans are 
given to organizations applying a commercial model like social enterprises and so-
called social impact investments are made to seek social benefits as well as financial 
returns (Heude, 2010; Sciortino, this issue). While increasingly hailed by its propo-
nents as the philanthropic model of the future, in contrast to the ‘traditional’, purely 
non-profit model of early foundations, this mixing of business and social purposes 
leaves open the question in how far 'private gain' can be considered ‘a public good’ for 
society and its most vulnerable groups (Kvangraven, 2016). More pragmatically it can 
be questioned in how far tax incentives that have been granted by states, particularly 
the US and North European countries, to incentivize charitable and philanthropic 
donations and to promote the establishment of non-profit foundations and organi-
zations as recipients, should still apply. This at a time when as the Economist states 
“The idea that the state should subsidise giving to good causes is resilient, but not 
easily justified” (“Sweetened charity”, 2012).
The growing diversity of paradigmatic positions with its inherent tensions adds 
to the complexity of finding common ground among “private initiatives for the pub-
lic good as diversely practiced around the globe” (Harvey, 2011). Societies show a wide 
range of “types and modes of philanthropy, of scope and funding purposes” often in 
contexts with poor differentiation of charity vis-à-vis philanthropy and the overall 
non-profit sector and with limited infrastructure and tax incentives, wherein “‘orga-
nized’ foundations are just one means for giving” (Ambrose, 2005, p. 1; Sciortino, this 
issue). To take this variety into account implies again an expansion of the conceptual 
boundaries to allow for an all-encompassing definition of 'global philanthropy' that:
incorporates both giving and doing and includes both the traditional and 
non-traditional, the formal and informal, the religious and the secular. [This 
definition] recognizes that, across the planet, diverse kinds of philanthropic prac-
tice emerge out of a particular set of factors: cultural, social, religious, economic, 
political, legal and more. All are valuable, and all are ‘philanthropy’. (Harvey, 2011)
Beside referring to the fast expansion of home-grown ‘local’ or ‘indigenous’ phil-
anthropic practices worldwide in its various forms, global philanthropy is also com-
monly understood, especially among US-based organizations, to indicate that funds 
are directed at addressing causes across national borders either to international orga-
nizations operating overseas or to local organizations in foreign countries (Harvey, 
2011). The increased use in the last decade of this term in its multiple interpretations 
is a reflection of an increasing recognition of the role of foundations, both interna-
tional and ‘indigenous’ in international development. 
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A GLOBAL DISCOURSE ON PHILANTHROPY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
In recent years, we have seen the emergence of a global discourse on the growing influ-
ence of philanthropic actors in international cooperation (Grady, 2014; OECD, 2017). 
Donor nations confronted with financial crises and taxpayers who have a diminished 
appetite for shouldering the costs of overseas aid, have started to take a closer look 
at the rapid increase of private flows from aid-donor countries to developing coun-
tries, in order of volume investments, remittances and philanthropy, and their actual 
and potential contribution to development. These private flows were estimated to 
account in 2014 for 85% of the overall economic interaction with “government aid 
represent[ing] only 15 percent of the total engagement, the reverse of some 40 years 
ago” (Hudson Institute, 2016). Convinced that “remittances and philanthropy con-
tinue to thrive and are important lifelines to the world’s poorest people” (Hudson 
Institute 2016, 2017), donor countries have welcomed private foundations as partners 
in international development efforts (Center for Global Prosperity & Hudson Institute, 
2013; Grady, 2014; Hénon, 2014; OECD, 2014, 2017). Their governments have stressed 
the value of public-private partnerships, and argued that philanthropic foundations 
have comparative advantages of operational flexibility, consistency, innovation, and 
capacity to leverage funding. We are also reminded that that philanthropy should not 
be seen merely as “a ‘gap filler’ for ODA”, but should be appreciated for its concern for 
“under-funded sectors like social inclusion, human rights, and gender equality”, its 
building of new fields and networks, and for its added value to the non-profit sector 
“through the creation of grant-making portfolios that help build communities of prac-
tice, disciplinary fields, and social movements for positive change” (Grady, 2014, p. 5). 
Among these rising expectations, philanthropic actors have been enlisted to con-
tribute to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted at the 2015 UN 
Summit and to help realize the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aiming 
to “end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all” (United Nations 
[UN], 2015). OECD analysis based on current sectoral funding trends of North-South 
flows expects philanthropic resources to significantly contribute in helping develop-
ing countries achieve SDG 3 (good health and well-being), SDG 4 (quality education), 
and SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions (OECD, 2017). 
The turn to private foundations and global philanthropy in international develop-
ment has been prompted by the international work of foundations from OECD coun-
tries, especially from the U.S. The lion’s share of attention goes to the BMGF, whose 
endowment of USD 40.3 billion (BMGF, 2017) overshadows those of such older foun-
dations with overseas interests as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, which have 
endowments of USD 12 billion (Ford Foundation, 2017) and assets just above USD 
4 billion (Rockefeller Foundation, 2017) respectively. According to OECD (2017), in 
the period 2013-2015, BMGF contributed 60% of the total USD 19.5 billion in phil-
anthropic giving from OECD countries to developing countries with over 11 billion 
in grants mostly in the health, population, and agriculture sectors, followed by the 
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, CIFF (4%), the Dutch Postcode Lottery (3%), 
the Ford Foundation (3%), and the IKEA Foundation (2%). American foundations 
were the large majority, with only 19% of the total originating from Europe and the 
remaining from India, Japan, Brazil, and Mexico. 
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The available data, skewed toward Western countries, underrepresent founda-
tions in other parts of the world and fail to include philanthropic initiatives in lesser 
affluent locations. Yet the global discourse on philanthropy and development counts 
on the growing pool of local philanthropists in emerging economies to supply “a 
potentially better attuned and more sustainable income source for local humanitar-
ian and development needs” (“Homegrown Philanthropy”, 2014). The expansion of 
home-grown philanthropy due to the greater economic concentration and polariza-
tion of wealth globally, changing fiscal spaces, and more integrated global systems 
is seen as a bonus at a time when the role of governments is changing and many are 
implementing austerity measures and downsizing the provision of social services. 
There is hope that these local sources will supplement or compensate for diminish-
ing overseas aid assistance, while also providing more context-sensitive support. 
Global interest mainly focuses on China, India, and other countries at a similar stage 
of newly advanced economic development, but more and more there is also attention 
for poorer countries with well-off elites, especially in Africa. 
This growing role of philanthropy in development, while hailed by governments 
and multi-lateral institutions and corporations, is not without critics. Most recently, 
the president of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Barbara Unmüßig (2017), asked: “[the] 
narrative of the well-meaning philanthropist taking on the world’s troubles may seem 
attractive, but should we accept it unquestioned?” She set alarm bells ringing about 
the global development agenda being decided by private donors who promote a “mar-
ket-based approach, relying primarily on technical solutions to complex problems” 
that benefit the corporate sector, and make top-down decisions without engagement 
of civil society and local people and experts. She argues that governments should do 
more for public good and generate the revenues they need trough taxation to fulfil 
their responsibilities, including to “provide multi-lateral organizations with enough 
resources to fulfil their missions” in order not to become dependent on private, unac-
countable, funding (Unmüßig, 2017; see also Martens & Seitz, 2015). 
Worries also extend to home-grown philanthropy, as local donors show a ten-
dency to write off a social change approach and, so far, seem inclined to avoid human 
rights and social justice and stay away from advocacy work and civil society (Ambrose, 
2005; “Homegrown Philanthropy”, 2014). As this issue will show, such observations 
are also of relevance to Southeast Asia.
FOCUS ON AN OVERLOOKED REGION
This special issue of the Austrian Journal for South-East Asian Studies (ASEAS) high-
lights the unprecedented growth of institutionalized giving in Southeast Asia, a region 
rarely included in the global discussion of philanthropy, from both an academic and 
a practitioner’s perspective. In the opening overview article, I reflect on the evolving 
state of philanthropy in Southeast Asia driven by global and local factors and by often 
conflicting notions of charity, development, and business and ask “on whether insti-
tutionalized private giving combined or in substitution of public funding can help 
address developmental gaps or, at the very least, protect the most vulnerable groups”. 
(Sciortino, this issue, p. 139). Philanthropic trends and their implications are examined, 
including the decrease of presence and changing funding practices of international 
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foundations, the family-centered ‘indigenization’ of philanthropy, the advent of a 
business-oriented model of philanthropy, and the consolidation of faith-related giving. 
This analysis points to the need for a more emancipatory brand of Southeast Asian 
philanthropy if indeed it is to contribute to more inclusive and equitable development. 
The other articles deepen the key issues signaled in the overview by providing cases of 
specific foundations and countries. More particularly, Mary S. Zurbuchen in her article on 
legacies of cultural philanthropy focuses on the Ford Foundation, one of the major inter-
national actor in the region because of its long-lasting field presence, volume of direct 
funding to local organizations, and support of home-grown philanthropy. In her paper, 
she briefly sketches the history of the Ford Foundation work in the arts and humanities 
in Asia and its sustained support for building capacity and knowledge. She shows the 
changes the program has undergone over time and how its most recent rendition may 
compromise the ‘unique leverage’ of a grant-making tradition that is implemented by 
staff and offices embedded in country contexts and enlightened by grounded insights.
The focus then shifts to country-specific contexts. Natalie Phaholyothin discusses 
the evolution of charitable giving in Thailand and how the increase in local giving 
does not necessarily imply a full transformation to full-fledged philanthropy. The phil-
anthropic sector could, in her view, be best defined as “a home-grown repertoire of 
socially conscious forms of giving” (Phaholyothin, this issue, p. 185). Next, the early 
development of philanthropy, particularly corporate giving in Myanmar as a country 
with an entrenched culture of giving is explored by Cavelle Dove. She raises ques-
tions about such ‘generous’ practices and wonders whether they should be examined 
in the context of the failure of the state to pursue development objectives and provide 
social services to the population. Finally, two articles focus on Indonesia and the rise 
of Islamic philanthropy. Amelia Fauzia in her article positions Islamic philanthropy 
as part of broader social trends in Indonesian society, particularly modernization and 
Islamization, and reflects on whether faith-based philanthropy can play a role in sup-
porting civil society and promoting social justice and a pluralist society. Hilman Latief 
reflects on similar issues from a somewhat different angle, by examining the operation 
of the main Islamic philanthropic foundation, Dompet Dhuafa and its overseas efforts 
in Hong Kong. Adding a theological dimension, the article shows how religious con-
cepts are reinterpreted to meet development purposes and better serve underprivi-
leged groups, in this case Indonesian migrant women workers residing in Hong Kong. 
In closing, an interview is presented that gives a flavor of the new international 
philanthropic actors in Southeast Asia. Mary Joy Pigozzi, Executive Director of 
Educate a Child, an initiative of the Education Above All Foundation of Qatar speaks 
about the foundation’s efforts to reach out-of-school children of Southeast Asia. The 
issue also profiles SEA Junction, a knowledge center and public venue on Southeast 
Asia that has recently opened in Bangkok, Thailand and is founded collectively by 
so-called ‘founding partners’ who share the same vision and interest.
This initial work on philanthropy in Southeast Asia hopes to inspire more in-
depth follow-up studies. Academic analysis and public scrutiny becomes more urgent 
now that philanthropic practices are expanding and gaining more relevance for devel-
opment and growth. For future initiatives, other countries of Southeast Asia should 
be included and more attention given to technological giving practices through elec-
tronic platforms and crowd funding among other topics.
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EULOGY TO AN EARLY PRACTITIONER IN ASIA
Besides the desire to contribute to an emerging body of knowledge on philanthropy 
and development, our collective effort was sustained by the wish to pay tribute to 
a pioneer of international philanthropy in Asia. This issue is dedicated to Peter F. 
Geithner, who has played a key role in the Ford Foundation’s programs and in the 
support for local philanthropy in the region and who died on July 2016 at the age of 
84. Geithner started working at the Ford Foundation in the 1960s and in the course 
of its almost 30 year-employment acted as deputy representative for India in New 
Delhi, representative for Southeast Asia in Bangkok, as program officer for developing 
country programs, as the foundation’s first representative for China, in Beijing, and as 
Regional Director of the Asia Programs in New York. He was also an adviser to other 
institutions with an interest in Asia including the Asia Center at Harvard University, 
the China Medical Board, the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, and 
the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (Sidel, 2017). In 2000, he provided inputs for the 
establishment of the Asia Office of the Rockefeller Foundation in Bangkok and in 
successive years he contributed to the formulation of the Learning Across Boundaries 
in the Greater Mekong Subregion (LAB) regional program (Sciortino, 2016). 
The philanthropic model that Geithner represented and promoted operated 
through field offices staffed with program officers knowledgeable of the languages 
and socio-political dynamics in their coverage areas so as to be able to define and 
implement context-specific grant-making strategies responsive to local development 
priorities. The approach further emphasized building the individual and institutional 
capacity needed to address development challenges in priority sectors. In Southeast 
Asia, Geithner helped shape programs in rural development; community forestry; 
population and women’s rights and sexual and reproductive health; governance and 
civil society, arts and humanities (as described in this issue by Zurbuchen); and peace 
and security (Geithner, 2008). In implementing the mission and values of the Ford 
Foundation, Geithner showed acumen and sensitivity:
In his own right, Peter was an extraordinary philanthropic programmer. He 
understood and deployed the catalytic role that an organization like Ford 
could play, with exquisite sensitivity to national priorities, customs and insti-
tutions. He worked both to build institutions, and to support and strengthen 
individual capacity, always making links between the two. His extraordinary 
ability to really listen to people, and his flexibility, integrity, political sense and 
the decentralized nature of Ford’s work, made him the leading philanthropic 
programmer of his era in Asia of any nationality. Peter understood very early 
that philanthropy could build upon the long traditions of giving across Asia 
towards developing newer philanthropic institutions and practices. Long be-
fore most philanthropic colleagues, he deployed Ford assets to build philan-
thropic and non-profit institutions and infrastructure in the region. Today 
Asia is studded with foundations and non-profits and philanthropy has en-
tered a period of rapid growth. These developments owe much to institutions 
at local, national and regional levels, for many of which Peter Geithner was the 
inspiration". (Sidel, 2017) 
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The contribution of Geithner is felt to this day through the many organizations 
he helped establish and the work of all those he inspired, as this issue dedicated to 
him testifies. I was among those who benefited from his mentoring when I became a 
Ford Foundation program officer in Indonesia and the Philippines and from his con-
tinued advice when regional director of the Rockefeller Foundation and later IDRC. 
Today, I and others who continue to share his vision and programming approach, 
miss his leadership as well as his advocacy of a philanthropy that is “responsive to 
differences”, that is “helpful to those who can make a significant contribution” in 
the target countries, and for which “humility and not hubris is necessary” (Geithner, 
2008, p. 194). These are all values that can no longer be taken for granted in today’s 
climate as this issue’s articles indicate. 
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This article presents an overview of the evolving state of philanthropy in Southeast Asia, 
driven by global and local stimuli and shaped by often conflicting notions of charity, de-
velopment, and business. Despite the lack of a strong enabling environment, new, ‘home-
grown’ foundations and local forms of institutionalized giving continue to emerge. At 
the same time, changes in the donor landscape and shifts in philanthropic paradigms 
towards business-like and technocratic approaches affect how development causes are 
funded. In the process, gaps have begun to appear in how work by civil society organi-
zations on human rights and social justice is funded; this may jeopardize more equitable 
and inclusive development.
Keywords: Charity; Development; Development Financing; Philanthropy; Southeast Asia

INTRODUCTION
Southeast Asia’s economic growth since the 1970s has been so impressive that 
foreign aid donors have felt justified in reducing their assistance, declaring that 
these countries ‘have graduated’. Yet poverty remains widespread, socio-economic 
gaps persist and are widening, and economic progress has failed to lead to sus-
tainable social and environmental paths for the countries to follow. Encouraged 
by the growing role of philanthropic actors in international development coop-
eration and as partners in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
agenda (see also Sciortino, this issue) some have argued that in Southeast Asia 
philanthropy also has a role to play in fostering more inclusive growth. In this 
view, institutionalized private giving combined or in substitution of public 
funding can help address developmental gaps or, at the very least, protect the 
most vulnerable groups. Others, however, contend that such giving practices are 
irrelevant to development needs and are in fact inherently linked to personal 
values and self-interest, create new dependencies, and are less accountable and 
transparent than government spending (Hayling, Sciortino, & Anand, 2014).
This debate on the benefits of philanthropy for development in Southeast 
Asia acquires particular relevance in view of the unprecedented accumulation of 
private wealth among elites and the growing public expectation that they contrib-
ute to society. As a greater number of more diverse philanthropic organizations 
are being established, there is interest in learning how these organized private 
sources are contributing to development and to what degree the early modern 
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philanthropists’ differentiation of philanthropy from charity as “improving opportu-
nity rather than relieving immediate suffering” (Development Assistance Committee, 
2003, p. 15) is pertinent to local giving practices. The rise in the last two decades of 
venture philanthropy with an emphasis on technocratic and business solutions to 
development problems through the likes of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
social entrepreneurship, and social impact investment, also poses questions about 
the degree of their adoption in Southeast Asia.1 In a region where the demarcation of 
private giving and business has traditionally been blurred, how do corporate interests 
intersect with aspirations for social improvement in home-grown philanthrophy? 
This article delves into these issues by giving an overview of local philanthropy 
in Southeast Asia, the global and local stimuli driving it, and the often contrasting 
notions of charity, development, and business that shape it. In examining the envi-
ronment of philanthropy, I draw on literature as well as my own personal experience 
as a development practitioner in the region.2 The emergence of local philanthropic 
institutions, their characteristics and ways of operating are discussed before high-
lighting the implications of shifting paradigms of philanthropy and the evolving 
donor landscape for development causes, and the beneficiaries associated with them. 
I conclude that gaps have begun to appear in the funding of civil society organiza-
tions working on human rights and social justice; this may jeopardize more equitable 
development and fostering inclusive societies.
A CULTURE OF GIVING 
Southeast Asian cultures are supportive of giving and showing concern for others in a 
multitude of forms. In rural Thailand, for instance, water jars are traditionally placed 
outside people’s homes for thirsty passersby, and shelter may be provided (Asia Pacific 
Philanthropy Consortium [APPC], 2001). The concept of mutual aid is also deep-
ly ingrained in the cultural discourse of Indonesia and the Philippines, where it is 
called gotong royong and bahaniyan respectively and includes contributions of goods, 
services, and cash to others in times of need as well as of celebration (Velasco, 1996). 
Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia also emphasize the spirit of gotong royong as part 
of their cultures and national identities (Remember Singapore, 2013). Vietnam has 
a long tradition of volunteering, providing mutual aid and communal assistance, as 
in the folk saying, “whole leaves wrap torn leaves” (Ninh, 2011). Remarkably, even 
as early as the 15th century, the royal court had introduced tax reductions for rich 
people who helped the poor. Later, the Nguyen dynasty called for private contri-
butions to families affected by crop losses. Such good deeds were then recorded 
for posterity in monuments and posts granted by the courts (Vietnam Asia Pacific 
1 Social entrepreneurship refers to both non-profit and profit organizations that apply commercial strate-
gies to attain social and environmental outcomes such as microfinance, fair trade, ‘triple bottom line’ com-
panies that besides economic gains also pursue social and environmental benefits, and, especially in Asia, 
cooperatives. Social impact investing is a new subset of the venture capital market that provides expansion 
capital to seek social impact and financial return (see further United Nations Global Compact, 2012) 
2 I served as program officer in the Ford Foundation’s Jakarta and Manila offices, regional director of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s Southeast Asia Office in Bangkok, and as regional director for Southeast and East 
Asia at the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Singapore. 
ASEAS 10(2) | 141
Rosalia Sciortino
Economic Center [VAPEC] & Asia Foundation, 2011). Philanthropy also had an early 
start in what is now Singapore, where in the 18th century Chinese immigrants to 
Malaya provided funding for schools, health facilities, and religious institutions to 
help successive waves of migrants from extended kinship networks at a time when 
no government services were available (Coutts, 2014).
Across the centuries, religion has proven a powerful source of inspiration for peo-
ple to donate. Zakat,3 a religious tax in the form of alms-giving and sadaqah or volun-
tary donations, have been practiced since the arrival of Islam in Southeast Asia. In the 
19th century, Arab immigrants who travelled in the region as merchants and spread 
their faith established waqf, or perpetual bequests of land or other assets, for religious, 
educational, or charitable purposes (Chung, Nasution, & Brown, 2010). Christian 
teachings have encouraged charitable behavior in the Philippines and Timor Leste 
since colonial time (Goh, 2005; Velasco, 1996). To this day, Buddhist believers locat-
ed predominantly in mainland Southeast Asia strive to accumulate merit by giving 
donations to faith-based institutions and alms to the poor, while Hindu Balinese 
communities subscribe to the concept of social contributions or datrta datrtva (Public 
Interest Research and Advocacy Center, 2002, p. 8; Swearer, 2010).
State ideologies, too, inspire altruism. In Vietnam, nationalist calls mobilize pri-
vate resources through government channels to address the needs of the country 
(VAPEC & Asia Foundation, 2011). In Thailand, loyalty to the king and his family 
fosters giving to royal foundations and development projects (APPC, 2001). More 
generally, across Southeast Asia people give for a variety of reasons: expressing a 
sense of belonging, strengthening ethnic and religious identities, manifesting social 
cohesion, enhancing social status, or building patronage and social networks. 
The combination of these diverse factors results in high levels of generosity, 
as the World Charity Index has computed since 2010, employing three indicators: 
1) helping a stranger, 2) giving money to a good cause, and 3) volunteering time. In 
2016, of the seven Southeast Asian countries among the 140 countries surveyed, 
Myanmar topped the overall index for the fourth year in the row (see also Dove, 
this issue). It also ranked the highest in terms of monetary giving, with 91% of peo-
ple who donated money in the last month. Indonesia was second globally with 
75%, while Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia, ranked among the top twenty-five 
countries, with percentages of more than half of the population having given for a 
good cause (Charities Aid Foundation [CAF], 2016). It is interesting to note that dona-
tion levels do not seem to be a direct reflection of a country’s economic conditions, 
with Myanmar being among the least developed countries of Southeast Asia, and 
Indonesia being less wealthy than Thailand, Malaysia, or Singapore.
Local surveys confirm a widespread willingness to volunteer and donate, and 
a general preference for giving to individuals rather than organizations. However, 
patterns are dynamic and differentiate along socio-cultural lines. The biannual 
Individual Giving Survey (IGS) in Singapore found a decrease in the rate of people 
making donations in the previous year from 83% in 2014 to 76% in 2016, but a dou-
bling of donations to institutions. Age and ethnicity were significant differentials, 
3 There is a dissenting opinion that, being an obligatory taxation, zakat should not be categorized as 
charity or philanthropy (see Cogswell, 2002)
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with Malay citizens more likely to donate and middle-aged people being the most 
prevalent donors (National Volunteer & Philanthropy Center [NVPC], 2015). In the 
Philippines, a 2006 study on individual giving found that 99% of the population had 
donated to various causes in some form (Venture for Fund Raising & Social Weather 
Station, 2006).4 Interestingly, a greater proportion of the poor gives than the rich and 
this in higher percentages (Burgos & Quismundo, 2011). This is in line with findings 
in Malaysia and other parts of the region, as well as beyond, including the US and UK 
(Anderson, 2015; Cogswell, 2002; Ward, 2001). Not only are a country’s economic 
development level and a person’s income level poor predictors of individual dona-
tions in Southeast Asia, but – against a common expectation among philanthropy 
experts and practitioners – the norms and practices related to giving are hardly the 
product of enabling legal, fiscal, or regulatory systems, nor have they led to the for-
mation of such comprehensive systems, at least for now. 
AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT FOR PHILANTHROPY
The institutionalization of giving, or philanthropization, is a recent phenomenon 
in Southeast Asia. Most governments have started only in the last two decades to 
legislate efforts to give, allocate, receive, and report donations and regularize the 
non-profit sector, including philanthropic and charitable institutions, with the less 
developed countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Timor-Leste at an initial 
stage of experimentation. An exception is the Philippines, which stands apart for its 
very early appreciation of the role of the private non-profit sector in national devel-
opment. Foundations were already acknowledged under Philippine law in 1906 while 
the country was an American colony, and later endorsed as part of democratizing 
reforms: Unique in the region, the 1987 Philippine constitution expressly recogniz-
es the contribution of non-government organizations (NGOs) and other non-profit 
organizations, pledges financing to those that promote social welfare, and provides 
incentives for philanthropic contributions. Since then, fiscal schemes have been 
established to grant tax breaks for donations made to private foundations and other 
bodies devoted to non-profit causes, whether religious, scientific, or promoting wel-
fare (Velasco, 1996). Receiving organizations also benefit from various exemptions, 
such as from income tax, duties, charges on foreign donations, and from donor’s gift 
tax. These provisions are particularly generous for those who have acquired donee 
status from the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC). 
Fiscal incentives together with attention to professional standards and non-profit 
organizations’ autonomy and influence in formulating public policy have led to a highly 
professional philanthropic sector in the Philippines. Notable are umbrella organiza-
tions like the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), which was founded in 1970 
and today comprises more than 260 member businesses that collectively fund devel-
opment interventions. Experienced bodies, such as the Association of Foundations and 
the League of Corporate Foundations, advocate for the interests of their members, and 
programs and networks strengthen the field and corroborate emerging philanthropic 
4 Remarkably, the Philippines did not do well in the last World Giving Index (CAF, 2016), but in view 
of the nature of the studies it is not possible to determine if such difference is due to methodology or the 
different time period.
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approaches. For instance, the Institute for Social Entrepreneurship in Asia (ISEA) and 
the Philippine Social Enterprise Network (PHILSEN) were established in the late 1990s 
with the rise of the social entrepreneurship movement (British Council, 2015).
Recently, Singapore, and to a lesser extent also Indonesia, have followed the 
Philippines in emphasizing the relevance of philanthropy and corporate engagement 
in development. Since the early 2000s, the Singaporean government has systemat-
ically worked to reduce its role as the largest funder of the non-profit sector either 
directly or indirectly through government-backed foundations, instead encouraging 
its growing concentration of billionaires to donate to service organizations. Policy 
innovations include giving tax deductions to government-selected charities and 
matching funds for donations in education and the arts. The government has also 
built support infrastructure, such as bank advisory services and capacity-building 
entities. The main ones are the National Volunteer and Philanthropy Center estab-
lished in 1999 to promote and coordinate volunteering and philanthropy, and the 
Community Foundation of Singapore founded in 2008 to connect local donors with 
needy communities in the city-state.
Aware of burgeoning wealth in neighboring countries, the Singaporean govern-
ment has promoted the city as a regional philanthropic center, building on its status 
as Southeast Asia’s financial hub. Attractive conditions have been created to draw in 
international charities active elsewhere in Asia to establish their offices in Singapore, 
and for foreign individual donors to use the city-state’s financial services. In 2011, 
SymAsia – an umbrella foundation managed by Credit Suisse – was granted charitable 
status for Asia’s wealthy to channel their donations to elected causes (Sharma, 2013). 
Financially savvy Singapore has also been quick to adopt venture philanthropy and 
to promote it regionally. The Asian Venture Philanthropy Network (AVPN) and Impact 
Investing Exchange (IIX) Asia are among an increasing number of impact investment 
firms and funds that aim to “connect the Wall Streets of the world to the backstreets 
of underserved communities” (Impact Investment Exchange [IIX], 2017) through 
financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Asia that pursue positive social 
and environmental outcomes as well as monetary gains (Šoštaric, 2015). Planning for 
the future, in 2016 the government together with the Tote Board Foundation founded 
the Singapore Centre for Social Enterprise (raiSE) to promote social enterprises and 
impact investments.
The Indonesian government has also taken new steps to capitalize on rising cor-
porate wealth and incentivize private contributions to development initiatives. In 
2007, Indonesia was among the first countries globally and the only in Southeast 
Asia to make CSR mandatory with Law 40/2007 on Limited Liability Companies, 
which obliges corporations exploiting natural resources to assign a percentage of 
their profits to charity or CSR-related projects (Gentile, 2014). In the same year, Law 
25/2007 specified the corporate responsibilities of foreign investors, and a ministerial 
regulation set the percentage that state-owned enterprises ought to direct to nine 
sustainable development sectors, including partnership and financial aid (Tanaya, 
Gunawan, Pusaka, & Nugroho, 2016). Since 2010 the Indonesian government has also 
required listed companies to report on the effects of their activities on society and 
the environment. To sweeten these obligations, which a large part of the business 
sector sees as burdensome, Government Regulation 93/2010 provides annual tax 
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deductions up to a maximum of 5% of net revenue earned during the previous fiscal 
year for spending in fields like disaster management, research, sports, education, and 
social infrastructure (Assegaf Hamzah & Partners [AHP], 2012).
Legislative reforms also extend to religious giving. Building on Law 38/1999, 
which first stipulated the management of zakat and validated the organizations, 
semi-public and private, to collect it, Law 23/2011 sought to exert greater govern-
ment’s control over financial flows and help semi-governmental bodies better exploit 
the zakat to achieve improved welfare in the country (Saidurrahman, 2013).
Such innovations are spreading throughout the whole region. For instance, 
encouraged by Indonesia’s bold approach, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are 
now attempting to institutionalize CSR by working to overcome companies’ resist-
ance to government interference. The ASEAN CSR Network (ACN) was also established 
in 2011 to promote CSR as an integral part of development in the region (ASEAN 
CSR Network, 2017). Other regional venues launched in the last decade to discuss 
emerging philanthropic approaches include the Philanthropy in Asia Summit, the 
AVPN Conference, and the Southeast Asia International Islamic Philanthropy Conference.
These advancements, however, have yet to create a comprehensive fiscal and 
legal environment for philanthropy. A recent study of the high- and middle-level 
economies of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, acknowledges 
recent positive efforts and the possibility that the charitable sector in the region can 
progress in ways not even yet imagined, but somberly states: 
Overall, this study finds the environment for philanthropy in the region to be 
quite challenging. Tax policies are either neutral or ineffective in incentivizing 
philanthropy; opportunities for the charitably-minded to gain the skills neces-
sary to address complex social problems are lacking; partnerships between civil 
society organizations and funders that enable the capabilities of each other are 
rare; and the data that would assist the nascent field in quickly prototyping and 
innovating are non-existent and to some extent resisted. (Anand, 2014, p. 7)
In particular, several constraints were identified: poor data availability and 
transparency; inadequate benefits related to income and inheritance taxes; ambig-
uous legal definitions and lack of policies specific to the sector, including no legal 
distinction between grant-giving and grant-seeking foundations (true even in the 
Philippines); poor enforcement of laws when they exist (as in the case of mandatory 
CSR in Indonesia); and limited learning opportunities for donors. The generally 
mixed attitude of philanthropists towards NGOs seen as playing an oppositional role, 
and government restrictions in controlling them, have also affected the development 
of the philanthropic sector, since NGOs are the typical grant recipients. As an exam-
ple, most NGOs are unable to register as charities in Singapore and, therefore, remain 
excluded from the privileges tied to charity status, foremost being exemption from 
income taxes and being allowed to raise funds publicly (Anand, 2014). 
These observations are echoed in the Index of Philanthropy Freedom 2015, the 
first-ever global report on legal and regulatory incentives and barriers to giving 
(Adelman, Barnett, & Russell, 2015). With the exception of the Philippines, all coun-
tries of Southeast Asia – as also in the rest of Asia – scored below the global average 
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on the three main indicators: 1) ease of registering and operating civil society organi-
zations; 2) tax policies for deductions, credits, and exemptions; and 3) ease of sending 
and receiving cash and in-kind goods across borders. The report points to the limited 
space for human rights groups and other NGOs to operate due to elaborate admin-
istrative and legal barriers, and to limitations on public gatherings and freedom of 
expression. For instance, Malaysia shows a tendency to employ domestic security 
and counter-terrorism laws against NGOs, while Vietnam makes it impossible for 
organizations working on human rights, anti-corruption, or other sensitive issues 
to register. Improvements were only recorded in Myanmar, where in 2014, revisions 
to the Association Registration Law liberalized the country’s regulations for civil 
society groups. In a climate of renewed authoritarianism and shrinking civil society 
space across the region (Amnesty International, 2017), such restrictions can only be 
expected to become tighter. Rules and regulations also do not encourage cross-bor-
der (including intra-regional) philanthropy. The most apparent case is Singapore 
which, in spite of its eagerness to attract international organizations and donors, has 
an 80:20 ratio rule that prescribes that 80% of funds raised from the public must 
be used locally (Hayling et al., 2014). More generally, the report concludes that the 
environment for philanthropy in the region is underdeveloped and does not provide 
a favorable fiscal space for promoting donations or developing the nonprofit sector 
(Adelman, Barnett, & Russell, 2015).
EXOGENOUS PROMOTION OF LOCAL PHILANTHROPY: THE PARADIGM SHIFT
In spite of the uncertain environment and the enduring dominance of individual 
donations, home-grown foundations and other forms of institutionalized giving 
are multiplying. This is especially apparent in the wealthier countries of Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, but even in the poorer countries, 
the philanthropic sector is gradually emerging. Proliferation drivers for local philan-
thropy include: ever increasing amounts of accumulated wealth; public awareness of 
growing socio-economic disparities; mounting pressure on the better off and corpo-
rations to contribute to sustainable development; government’s backing down from 
providing public services and instead seeking partnerships with the private sector; 
and civil society groups’ search for alternatives to the declining support of foreign do-
nors (Johnson, Johnson, & Kingman, 2015). Most recently, new revenue opportunities 
promised by venture philanthropy have generated an unprecedented buzz for social 
engagement in the region. 
An enabling role has historically been played by international, especially American, 
donors and foundations – foremost among them the Ford Foundation – that have 
promoted local philanthropy in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world since 
the 1980s. These foundations supported initiatives to build the philanthropic sector 
in the countries where they worked in the belief that “philanthropy has an impor-
tant role to play in addressing human challenges and strengthening civil society” and 
that ultimately it would be more sustainable than foreign funding to tackle devel-
opment issues (Johnson et al., 2015, p. 4; Johnson & Simmons, 2003). In later years, 
lower international aid levels earmarked for Asia (Bhattacharjee, Culshaw & Anand, 
2004) strengthened the motivation to support local funding sources that could 
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continue nurturing the non-profit sector after foreign donors withdraw (Alliance 
Magazine, 1998). Eventually, the focus became more normative as foundations shift-
ed their emphasis “from encouraging a culture of philanthropy per se to promot-
ing philanthropy that advances social change” (Johnson et al., 2015, p. 8). The Ford 
Foundation and like-minded foundations, for instance, increasingly promoted social 
justice philanthropy in which grant-making is directed at systemic or institutional 
change and the overcoming of economic and environmental inequities to expand 
opportunities for disadvantaged populations (see also Fauzia, this issue).
Along with these philanthropic concepts, practices and institutions originating in 
the West were also spread, as American foundations tended to replicate their expe-
rience. In Southeast Asia, like in other parts of the world, they aimed to create the 
conditions that, based on their own history, were considered necessary for local phi-
lanthropy to take off, including a clear legal framework, a tax structure providing 
incentives, an accountability system for grant-givers and grantees, sufficient insti-
tutional capacity, and sufficient resources (Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker 
Support, 2013). To realize this vision, they funded a wide variety of programs ranging 
from capacity building, research, and cross-country exchanges to the enactment of 
fiscal and regulatory reforms for the non-profit sector, the development of accredita-
tion systems (such as PCNC), and the establishment of indigenous foundations and 
foundation-like entities.
Favored institutional models included community foundations that were con-
sidered suitable vehicles to connect local needs to resources, and – often as part of 
a donor’s exit strategy – endowed grant-making foundations similar to American 
foundations working internationally. They were thus expected to be fully devoted to 
grant-making, to be operated by professional officers, and governed by an independ-
ent board. Their expenditures would be covered by gains from investing endowment 
funds, and their grants would operationalize a structured program strategy that would 
pursue specific development goals and would privilege civil society organizations as 
recipients of support. Telling examples include endowed foundations established 
in the 1990s through grants and debt-for-development swaps under bilateral pro-
grams with the US, Canada, and other partners, like the Foundation for Philippine 
Environment (FPE) and the Foundation for Sustainable Societies (FSS) in the Philippines; 
the Indonesian Biodiversity Foundation (Kehati) in Indonesia; and the Development 
Cooperation Foundation (DCF) in Thailand (Baron, 1997; Ong, 2010; Sabio & Jaegal, 
2010). Later, governments in the region also initiated grant-making foundations 
with public funds, but operated and managed semi-independently by private boards 
of trustees. Even if these hybrid foundations do not fit the classic definition, it will 
become clear below that they have established nevertheless a significant presence in 
Southeast Asia and in the way they operate to this day best represent the imported 
prototype, including in their funding of NGOs, where governments allow it.
International agencies also spearheaded the creation of national and regional net-
works, of which the most important was the Manila-based Asia Pacific Philanthropy 
Consortium (APPC). Building on a series of conferences, the APPC was launched in 
1995 with the support of the Ford Foundation and other private and corporate donors 
in Australia, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. As a network 
of grant-making institutions, the APPC aimed to promote local philanthropy and 
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strengthen indigenous grant-making entities within each country. Activities includ-
ed a human resources program run by PBSP; a research program entrusted to the Asia 
Foundation; and a program of networking and exchanges for staff and principals of 
philanthropic organizations (Alliance Magazine, 1998).
The exogenous strengthening of local philanthropy, with all its intended and unin-
tended upshots, was eventually transformed by a drastic paradigmatic shift in the early 
2000s with the establishment of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and 
the global rise of venture philanthropy. Its business-derived and technocratic paradigm 
dismissed “the cultural, humanistic, and political sides of the equation” (Anft, 2015) 
directing grants towards technical aspects of agriculture, health, agriculture, entre-
preneurship, and microfinance, instead of towards the ‘soft’ and less quantifiable 
fields, such as human rights, humanities, culture, and the arts (Feinstein, 2012). 
Following Thomas Friedman's (2005) view of the world as “flat”, development prob-
lems and solutions were now conceived as ‘global’ and managed from headquarters. 
This challenged the kind of socially-engaged and contextual grant-making practiced 
in Southeast Asia by American and, to a lesser extent, by Japanese foundations such 
as the Toyota, Japan, and Nippon foundations. Even if these ‘traditional’ foundations 
did not fully adopt the more ideological tenets of the new paradigm and often kept 
to the old rhetorics, their modalities changed. Increasingly field offices had to relin-
quish their functions, and if not shut down in the name of efficiency (as was the case 
of the Ford Foundation closing its Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam offices and 
leaving only that in Indonesia open), they have been left providing little more than 
logistical support with limited responsive grant-making in Southeast Asia (with the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s regional office in Bangkok being a case in point.) With this 
reduced presence, direct grant-making to local, especially civil society organizations 
suffered as the new foundations not only had other priorities, but also chose to fund 
from a distance and through intermediary grantees in their countries of origin. This 
bias clearly emerges from a quick scan of the BMGF’s grant database, which shows a 
scarcity of local institutions among grantees in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, 
and Cambodia.5 Moreover, as Feinstein (2010, p. 92) summarizes:
There is a corresponding devaluing of certain modalities of foundation sup-
port that were a hallmark of the old foundations, but do not fit well with the 
results-driven approach. These include, for instance, support for individual 
fellowships and scholarships, for which the Rockefeller and Ford foundations 
were famous; the building up of academic fields and departments; capaci-
ty-building grants including operational support for local institutions; and 
support for developing local philanthropy. None of these have great attraction 
in the new approach.
Direct promotion of home-grown philanthrophy diminished, and this affected 
organizations on the ground, including some high-profile associations like APPC, 
which was absorbed into the Asia Foundation’s giving program Give2Asia in 2011 
and eventually became inactive. Some organizations in countries where field offices 
5 An exception in Southeast Asia is Vietnam, where the government received substantial amounts. 
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have survived may still receive funding, but at the lower level and for participation 
in global initiatives. For example, the Philanthropy Association of Indonesia (IPA), 
established in 2003 with Ford Foundation’s funding, has come to represent Indonesia 
as one of the four pilot countries for the implementation of the SDG Philanthropy 
Platform, spearheaded by the Ford Foundation to foster greater local philanthropic 
involvement in the achievement of the SDGs (Filantropi Indonesia, 2017). An excep-
tion to this declining trend, deserving greater analysis, is the regional expansion 
of the Open Society Foundation (OSF) and its continued funding of those local 
foundations  it helped establish such as the TIFA Foundation of Indonesia in 2000 
(Darmawan Triwibowo, Director of TIFA, March 2017).
As old and new paradigms exist alongside each other, cross-fertilization of ideas 
and practices has become more diversified. Funding streams in the region originate 
from a wider range of international foundations including those subscribing to a more 
business- and less social justice-oriented model of philanthropy. Resources are chan-
neled through more assorted layers of intermediaries, and for-profit organizations play 
a greater role in fostering local philanthropy of a different kind. In the late 1990s, CSR 
was introduced to Southeast Asia by locally-based multinational companies (MNCs) to 
ameliorate environmental and social damage caused by mining and the exploitation of 
natural resources. They, and Western-based MNCs through their local supply chains, 
served as a model for CSR programs of local companies in the region, to the extent that 
some have described them as “Western mimicry” (Amran & Siti-Nabiha, 2009, p. 358). 
The concept of venture philanthropy that originated in the UK and US has also found 
fertile ground in Southeast Asia, as exemplified in the previously mentioned Singapore-
based AVPN, which is modeled after the European Venture Philanthropy Association 
(EVPA) and shares with it the same founder chairman (Asian Venture Philanthropy 
Network, 2017). More and more international banks, such as Credit Suisse and LGT 
Capital Partners, provide locally based services to philanthropists and impact investors 
and fund research on the philanthropic sector in Southeast Asia. 
As part of the paradigm shift, social enterprises or simply enterprises that promise 
financial as well as social returns are now the privileged partners of external donors, 
and NGOs, when funded, are expected to provide operational services rather than 
advocating for social change. In parallel, efforts to promote home-grown philanthro-
phy no longer target givers of all financial means and backgrounds. Taking center stage 
now are the extremely rich – starting from ‘High Net Worth Individuals’ (HNWI), who 
have more than USD 1 million in liquid financial assets, onwards up to local billion-
aires, such as in The Giving Pledge, which was initiated by Bill and Melinda Gates and 
Warren Buffet in 2010 in the US and later expanded to emerging economies. Despite 
criticism as a public relations stunt culturally inappropriate for Asia (Wilkson, 2013), 
two Southeast Asian billionaires, Dato Tahir, chairman and CEO of the Mayapada 
Group and the Tahir Foundation in Indonesia, and Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, founder 
of Berjaya Group Berhad and chairman of Better Malaysia Foundation in Malaysia, have 
responded to the call to donate the majority of their wealth to philanthropic causes 
(The Giving Pledge, 2017). In 2013, the Gates and Tahir foundations made a joint 
commitment of USD 65 million each to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria, with 75% earmarked for Indonesia (Morrison & Bliss, 2013). This part-
nership continued in 2014 with the launch of the Indonesia Health Fund to attract 
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private and corporate donations during the subsequent five years for better health 
care in the country, in collaboration with eight Indonesian “philanthropist tycoons” 
who pledged to donate USD 5 million each (Anh Ton, 2014). These developments 
are a strong indication of how much personal wealth has been accumulated in the 
region, and how it is being increasingly harnessed for philanthropy.
FAMILY-CENTERED ‘INDIGENIZATION’ OF PHILANTHROPY
As capacity-building efforts from outside the region wane, the process of indige-
nization is accelerating regionally and nationally. For instance, after the demise of 
the APPC in 2015 Singaporean philanthropists Stanley Tan and Laurence Lien and 
Indonesian philanthropist Cherie Nursalim founded the Asian Philanthropy Circle 
(APC). This private membership platform aims to “advance a distinct Asian brand of 
philanthropy to accelerate the public good in Asia” and foster peer learning and col-
laboration among Asian philanthropists in order to maximize impacts (Coutts, 2015). 
What this ‘distinct brand’ implies for Southeast Asia still needs to be fleshed out, 
but as noted in the previous section, it does not seem to require all of the key regulato-
ry and fiscal elements generally considered necessary for local philanthropy to grow. It 
also appears that most home-grown organizations have not followed the path interna-
tional foundations initially envisioned. As hinted above, most of the region’s endowed 
foundations are government-backed rather than privately funded institutions, while 
individual and family donors generally operate through informal or corporate chan-
nels. Already in 1997, a study by the Asia Foundation identified these conditions as 
specific to philanthropy in East Asian, including Southeast Asian countries:
•	 There is great diversity in the types of philanthropic institutions and founda-
tion-like entities in East Asia. Unlike the U.S., however, there are still very few 
private foundations based on individual or family wealth. . . .
•	 Most philanthropic entities in the region are corporate foundations or, even 
more commonly, corporate giving programs funded on an annual basis rather 
than endowed. . . .
•	 The emergence of several new kinds of grant-making foundations, which are 
at the interface of the public and private domains – those which are endowed 
with public funds but managed by at least semi-private boards of trustees. 
(Baron, 1997) 
In relation to the scarcity of individual foundations, it has been argued that their 
establishment has been discouraged by cultural values that inhibit displays of wealth. 
Rich individuals are expected to be communal and prioritize their families, clans, or 
patronage networks to justify as well as build their social position rather than endow 
an independent organization (Baron, 1997). The fact that wealth is concentrated in 
the hands of ethnic Chinese, who must be cautious in the face of varying degrees of 
discrimination throughout Southeast Asia, may also have acted as a deterring factor, 
although it may also have had the opposite result of driving them towards philan-
thropy in order “to secure a social license to operate” (Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade [DFAT], 2015, p. 23). 
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In the less frequent occasions when foundations are formally established, they 
are mostly family ventures, with funds coming from members of a single, often 
multi-generational family with strong ties to the family business. The UBS-INSEAD 
study on family philanthropy in Asia, which included Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, identified “ensuring the continuity of family 
values or creating a lasting legacy” as the most common cause for establishing a foun-
dation (UBS Philanthropy Services & INSEAD, 2012, p. 17). Other considerations seen 
as key to the foundation as well as to the underlying business were developing family 
cohesion and enhancing leadership and management capabilities of younger gen-
erations. Less commonly enunciated pragmatic reasons were exerting influence for 
political or business purposes; patronage; and increasing standing in the community. 
Like the unstructured giving of prosperous individuals, these family foundations are 
also meant to meet communal expectations and, if in diaspora, maintain a connection 
to the country of origin, most often China (Hayling et al., 2014; UBS Philanthropy 
Services & INSEAD, 2012).
The institutionalization of what still remains a minority of philanthropic initia-
tives is a recent process. Of the 203 family foundations surveyed in the UBS-INSEAD 
study more than 75% were legally established after 1980, and about 60% after 1990. In 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, about 50% were only founded after 2000. This is 
in line with observations that intergenerational change is occurring and the younger 
generation is more inclined toward institutionalized philanthropy (UBS Philanthropy 
Services & INSEAD, 2012, pp. 13, 42). In this initial stage, Southeast Asian family 
foundations are operationally oriented and mix grant-making activities with direct 
implementation of programs. They also raise funds from other sources for their pro-
jects, thus becoming competitors with the very organizations they could be funding. 
When grants are provided, they tend to be ad hoc and given to persons and institu-
tions known to the family. Often personnel and administrative systems from family 
business are used to simplify processes and economize resources. Some foundations 
will also make use of company profits and not only personal wealth for philanthropic 
engagements. Such was the case of 22% of the family foundations surveyed in the 
UBS-INSEAD (2012, p. 23) study, which reports:
One has to be cognizant of the fact that in Asia it is hard to establish degrees 
of separation between family philanthropy and company philanthropy/CSR. 
Often what is seen as individual or family giving is ‘company giving’ now prac-
ticed through the establishment of company foundations and trusts. Funds 
flowing into these foundations include those of owners, investors, employees, 
and other stakeholders. 
This intertwining of family foundations with family business is unsurprising in a 
region where “the family continues to be an exceptionally strong locus for business 
and philanthropic activities” (UBS Philanthropy Services & INSEAD, 2012, p. 16). 
Moreover it reflects a more general bias of the philanthropy sector in Southeast Asia 
towards corporate entities and giving programs and business-derived approaches. 
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CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY PERVADES THE LANDSCAPE
Institutional models reflecting the complex relationship between philanthropy and 
business vary from complete fusion to separation of business and philanthropic func-
tions as can be seen in Table 1, with the great majority maintaining close connections 
between brand, funding, management, and focus of giving.
Table 1. Philanthropy and Business. (UBS Philanthropy Services & ISEAD, 2012, p. 4).
PHILANTHROPY AND BUSINESS INTERRELATIONSHIP MODEL
Mode Mode of Action Example
Complete 
Fusion
The business is conceived 
and runs with the objective of 
social impact, but operates as a 
for-profit entity.
Today, in India, a family group runs an extensive network 
of for-profit educational and healthcare facilities that 
have made a substantial contribution to higher education 
in India. The group’s corporate foundation also supports 
thousands of young Indians with scholarships.
Close 
Connection
Brand
The family brand is leveraged 
across the business, social, and 
political sectors.
The Ayala Foundation is a foundation funded by the 
Ayala Corporation, the principal holding company of one 
of the largest Philippine family groups. The Foundation 
also solicits funds from other Ayala Group companies 
and from third parties. It also benefits from bearing the 
well-known family name.
Funding
Profits from the business sus-
tain the philanthropic activi-
ties on a systematic basis.
The Tunaram Group in Singapore is involved in fast 
moving, consumer goods, and energy and infrastructure 
projects. Profits are used to support Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and family philanthropic initiatives 
in Singapore, other parts of Asia, and Africa
Management
The philanthropic activity is 
actively managed with the 
support of business executives.
One of the companies run by Thailand’s Chearavanont 
family – the Magnolia Corporation – has a CSR program 
that is largely administered by company executives, who 
are also integral parts of the business side.
Contributions
The focus of giving is closely 
tied to the focus of business.
The founder of Bigfoot Entertainment – a film and media 
group with the most substantial operations in the Philip-
pines – has established a foundation which provides 
education in villages in the Philippines through the use 
of film and new media.
Partial 
Separation
Formal Separation, Crossover 
Benefits
The philanthropic activity is 
separately funded and man-
aged, but may enjoy crossover 
benefits from the business.
Yusuf Achmed, the Chairman and Managing Director of 
one of the leading pharmaceutical companies in India, 
contributes to health care in developing countries.
Formal Separation, Minimal 
Benefits
The philanthropic activity is 
separately funded and man-
aged, and crossover benefits 
are minimized.
A major Thai family is extremely private about its 
substantial philanthropic activities. The philanthropy 
venture does not receive funds from the business, has its 
own management, and is named differently from both 
the family name and the business name.
Complete 
Separation
Principled Delinking
As a matter of principle, 
philanthropic and business 
activities are kept completely 
apart.
The personal foundation of an established Singaporean 
entrepreneur in the fashion, hospitality, and luxury 
industries operates on a distinct grant-making agenda 
while her business invests in CSR and sustainability 
initiatives.
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The rare corporate foundations that are established as separate entities still 
continue to promote brand loyalty and strengthen the corporate reputation of the 
‘mother company’ through the use of logos and brand names and by engaging in pro-
ject areas relevant to their corporate interests. Not many have endowments or year-
ly budgets, and resources are often allocated following requests from the company 
management and board members. This, compounded by the lack of public disclosure 
laws, makes it difficult to estimate their size, but it appears that most initiatives are 
in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. A few, however, have annual funding budg-
ets in the millions of dollars (see Table 2), with some of the largest even surpassing 
those of locally based international foundations. For instance, the Ford Foundation’s 
budget for Indonesia in 2015 was USD 14 million, and thus less than that of the Tahir 
Foundation and the Chairul Tanjung Foundation, which each had budgets of USD 
19.7 million in that financial year (DFAT, 2015, p. 5)6. 
In spite of their growing significance in the home-grown philanthropy sector, 
corporate foundations still do not match the resources and reach of religious and 
faith-based institutions (see section below). Moreover, they generally have less spend-
ing capacity than government-backed yet autonomous grant-making foundations, 
which, as previously mentioned, feature prominently in Southeast Asia. For instance, 
in Singapore, the two largest operations are the government-backed Tote Board, 
which was established in 1988 and gives out annual grants from gaming surpluses 
ranging between USD 357 million and USD 714 million per year to vulnerable com-
munities, and the Community Chest, with annual funding of about USD 57 million 
to voluntary welfare organizations. Only then comes the largest private founda-
tion, the Lee Foundation of the Lee Group, which since its creation in 1952 through 
2015 donated a total of about USD 714 million to various causes (Chan, 2015). In the 
Philippines and Indonesia, the already mentioned environmental foundations based 
on debt swaps are among the largest grant-givers, with endowments topping millions 
6 Figures in this section are given for indication purposes only.
Indonesia Tahir Foundation USD 19.7 million (FY 2015
Chairul Tanjung Foundation USD 19.7 million (FY 2015)
Sampoerna Foundation USD 14.9 million (FY 2015)
Philippines The Ramon Aboitiz Foundation USD 11.7 million (FY 2014)
Ayala Foundation USD 8.4 million (FY 2015)
Vietnam Kind Heart Foundation of Vina Group USD 11.4 million (FY 2015)
Table 2. Annual Funding Budgets of the Largest Company-Related/Company-Owned (Mostly 
Family-Based) Foundations in Selected Southeast Asian Countries FY 2015 or FY 2014. 
(DFAT, 2015, p. 5).
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of dollars and a large grantee base mostly composed of NGOs. In Thailand, the Thai 
Health Promotion Foundation, an “autonomous government agency”, has annual reve-
nue of about USD 120 million derived from a 2% surcharge on excise taxes on tobacco 
and alcohol (ThaiHealth, 2017), which makes it the largest funder, especially of civil 
society organizations, in the country.
In assessing the financial relevance of corporate philanthropy, we should 
also note that the bulk of it is channeled through a wide range of often informal 
business-related philanthropic initiatives undertaken by the company itself. An 
increasing number of local companies have adopted CSR as a model of philanthropy 
that is also effective for risk management purposes and as a branding and marketing 
tool, and this includes the numerous state-owned enterprises expected by law or 
society to follow responsible business practices. Conducive factors have been the 
greater availability of training and support, having to comply with global market 
requirements, and, in some countries, pressure from NGOs. Government interven-
tion has also been crucial. In Indonesia, after the enactment of the CSR Law, self-re-
ported engagement increased from 27% of 376 listed companies in 2008 to 94% of 
486 listed companies in 2013 (Tanaya et al., 2016). In Thailand, fiscal incentives have 
been a primary motive for Thai companies to adopt CSR, followed by cost manage-
ment and government pressure. As early as 2003 it was noted that their level of CSR 
penetration was higher than among international companies in the country and in 
comparison to domestic companies in neighboring countries (Chambers, Chapple, 
Moon, & Sullivan, 2003) – a trend still observable today. Whether due to carrots or 
sticks, between 2001 and 2013, CSR boomed in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand while it started to grow in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. At 
the time, Myanmar was out of the picture, but after its opening to the outside world 
CSR has been gaining ground there, too (see Dove, this issue; Liong, 2013). This 
expansion, however, says nothing of the quality of reporting, performance, or the 
comprehensive nature of the approach. A recent review of CSR in Asian, including 
Southeast Asian, economies observed an inclination to ‘give back’ to communities 
through financial donations and non-cash contributions, with too little attention 
being paid to accountability and the enactment of gender, ethical, employment, and 
environmental standards in business practices (Sharma, 2013). This resonates with 
a recent regional baseline study on the topic that concluded: “Unfortunately, the 
existing trends of CSR in Southeast Asia (e.g., ‘voluntary’, ‘top-bottom’, and ‘philan-
thropic’) are insufficient means for businesses to respect human rights” (Thomas & 
Chandra, 2014, p. 7).
Social entrepreneurship and social impact investment are also proving pop-
ular in Southeast Asia, especially among younger generations of philanthropists 
(UBS Philanthropy Services & ISEAD, 2012, p. 52). The number of social enterpris-
es initially started as non-profit organizations and now operating as businesses is 
growing. Long-standing examples in Thailand include the Population and Community 
Development Association, which provides diversified services from environmental 
and health programs to microcredit, and the Doi Tung Development Project, which is 
involved in high-end tourism, handicrafts, and organic food. Their footsteps are fol-
lowed by a myriad of small and medium businesses concerned with the environment, 
fair trade, and healthy lifestyles (Chhina, Petersik, Loh, & Evans, 2014).
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Gradually, new-generation social enterprises have emerged that are fully for-profit, 
but committed to pursuing social goals. In business speak this is presented as aiming 
for a double (financial and social) or even triple (financial, social, and environmental) 
bottom line. For instance, the Social Enterprise Quality Index (SEQI) developed 
by PHILSEN in 2009 set out criteria for “doing well” in terms of business perfor-
mance, “doing good” in terms of social performance, and “doing just” in upholding 
the environment, cultural soundness, and gender equity (Ballesteros & Llanto, 2017). 
Although it is still to be proven the degree to which this multiple bottom line can be 
achieved and to what extent social enterprises can be accountable, effective, and prof-
itable, they have gained the trust of venture philanthropists, foreign and local private 
investors, and corporate foundations (DFAT, 2015). A sign of widespread regional 
interest was the launching of the USD 36 million DBS Foundation in Singapore in 
2015 to mark the city-state’s 50th anniversary with the official mandate to champion 
social entrepreneurship. Since then, it has provided capital to 80 social enterprises in 
Singapore, India, Indonesia, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (DBS Foundation, n.d.)
Through these various philanthropic forms, a multitude of causes are funded. 
Generally, giving by corporate and family foundations concentrates on education 
(especially to construct buildings or provide scholarships) and, to a lesser extent, 
on medical care, preferably hospital buildings and helping to provide treatment for 
underprivileged groups, on community development in the area surrounding the 
company, and on ad hoc responses to disasters or community events. Contributions 
to arts and culture, human rights, gender equity, and the environment are minimal, 
although younger philanthropists seem more interested in such causes than their 
parents. CSR activities do support arts and culture, but more generally focus on mit-
igating environmental impacts and meeting social needs. Compelled to deliver that 
multiple bottom line, social enterprises opt to provide services or undertake other 
profit-making social welfare activities in their field of choice. A 2014 study in Singapore 
found that 56% of social enterprises provided services (including business-related), 
10% were engaged in food and beverage, 10% in education, 8% in trade, and 6% in 
other fields (Prakash & Tan, 2014, p. 13).
Irrespective of the focus, there are few cases of the kind of philanthropy oriented 
towards structural change, as US foundations used to promote in local philanthropy. 
Among the few examples active in the public arena is the Singaporean Lien Foundation’s 
‘radical philanthropy’, which explicitly aims to get at the roots of problems in elder 
care and end-of-life care, child education, and water (Lien Foundation, 2017). The 
majority of foundations, CSR initiatives, and social enterprises are willing to work 
on ameliorating social and environmental problems with some intervention in 
economic processes, but they avoid engagement in political processes, policy reforms, 
or governance and human rights support. As a recent report concluded: “One find-
ing that can be generalized across the region is that few philanthropic organizations 
engage in policy-related discussions or activities” (DFAT, 2015, p. 7).
Some relate this stand to a heightened concern for reputational risks and poten-
tial conflict with the government and other parties that may also affect their business 
interests. As a result, NGOs may not be funded or may see their funds decline if they 
engage in advocacy for structural change. This was the case for two leading women’s 
organizations in Malaysia that lost corporate funding for women’s health and shelter 
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when they started challenging human rights abuses and advocating for socio-economic 
reforms (Cogswell, 2002, p. 118). Others note that philanthropists’ hesitancy does not 
extend to using personal influence and connections, and at times funding, to advance 
their own agenda or the priorities of their company. Still others argue that the mixing 
of corporate and social development purposes may not always serve the public interest 
as illustrated by the philanthropic activities of tobacco companies and related foun-
dations, like the Sampoerna Foundation in Indonesia (Sciortino, 2015; Tandilittin & 
Luetge, 2015), and that it may even obstruct needed reforms:
Elites’ control of political, economic, social and cultural power can also be a bar-
rier to change. In countries like the Philippines and Indonesia, a small group of 
families control large sections of economic activity, which means they provide 
many millions of jobs. But they may also restrict access to resources, such as 
land ownership, through their efforts to protect their business interests. Some 
of the most significant philanthropic contributors may also be those standing 
in the way of important economic and political reforms. (DFAT, 2015, p. 7)
These and other possible reservations about the genuine motivations of CSR and 
more generally corporate philanthropy contrast with the broad trust enjoyed by reli-
gious organizations and their being upheld as the ‘good Samaritan’ in society, though 
they may not necessarily be more transparent in their practices.
IN BETWEEN CHARITY AND PHILANTHROPY
Religious institutions can be seen as the precursors of institutionalized giving in 
Southeast Asia. As early as the 16th century, the Catholic Church launched its char-
itable legacy in the Philippines. During the Spanish occupation, gifts received from 
the wealthy were channelled to obras pias or charitable foundations for the sick or 
for orphans, as well as to finance maritime trade and other activities that would 
benefit the Church and its endeavours. Centuries later, during the American colonial 
period, Protestant missions started charitable activities and funded orphanages, hos-
pices, hospitals, schools, and universities, at times with substantial support from 
American philanthropists like John D. Rockefeller (Angara, 2016). Christian charities 
and their networks of hospices, hospitals, and schools were also established in other 
parts of the region following the spread of European mercantile and colonial inter-
ests (Goh, 2005). In Muslim Southeast Asia, the early waqf funds established in the 
19th century contributed not only to the building of mosques and burial grounds but 
also to the construction of urban infrastructure still visible today, as in Malaysia’s 
Georgetown and Singapore (Brown, 2013; Nagaoka, 2016). 
This faith-based giving tradition continues to figure prominently in Southeast 
Asia in terms of numbers of religious organizations, the level of donations they 
receive, and the extent of the funded and implemented activities. In Singapore, of the 
2,217 registered charities in 2015 more than the half, or 1,290, were religious charities, 
trailed by charities promoting welfare (383), health (134), education (121), arts and 
heritage (137), community (87), and sports (59) (Ministry of Culture, Community, and 
Youth, 2016). In the Philippines, the Catholic Church and its religious orders form the 
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largest non-profit organization in the country with an unmatched network of fund-
ed or affiliated organizations including health and educational institutions, schools, 
media agencies, and community groups (Cariño, Fernan III, Martinez, Barlis, & Tupas, 
2001; Fernan, 2002). In Thailand, for the majority Buddhist population temples are 
the locus of philanthropy both in terms of giving as well as receiving, distributing a 
large part of the collected donations to a variety of social causes, including care to 
AIDS patients and for community development activities (Wattanasiritham, 2007). 
Mosques play a similar function in Muslim communities across Southeast Asia. 
They collect and distribute donations, religious taxes, and manage the assets of waqf 
endowments for assistance to surrounding communities, also in countries where 
Islam is a minority religion. For instance, in Singapore there are more than 100 reg-
istered waqf, and in Thailand, diverse Muslim ethnic groups all have their specific 
waqf to fund religious, educational, and welfare institutions, buildings, and activities 
for their communities (Brown, 2013; Brown, 2014; Prapertchob, 1991). Aside from 
traditional charity forms centred in mosques and Islamic boarding schools and few 
foundations started by wealthy Muslims, in the last two decades professional Islamic 
philanthropic organizations have emerged, which are specifically devoted to the man-
agement of financial resources for socio-economic purposes. They have revitalized 
investments of cash waqf and introduced more efficient collection systems for zakat 
and sadaqah. The most progressive among them have adopted development-ori-
ented theological interpretations of zakat enabling wider funding of non-religious 
causes and the financing and implementation of a variety of development and relief 
programs. An illustration of the recognition of the relevance of Islamic philanthro-
py regionally is the awarding of the Ramon Magsaysay Award – viewed as the Asian 
equivalent of the Nobel Price – to the first and largest professional Islamic philan-
thropic organization in Indonesia, Dompet Dhuafa (DD), in 2016 for its contribution 
to addressing social problems since its establishment in 1993 (see Fauzia as well as 
Latief, this issue).
The substantial resources of this wide range of faith-based charitable and phil-
anthropic organizations typically do not come from institutional grants. Unlike 
in the U.S., in Southeast Asia family and corporate foundations, even when moti-
vated by religious convictions, do not prioritize funding to religious causes. 
Among the exceptions are the Buddharaksa Foundation of the Chearavanont fam-
ily and the related DT Group in Thailand, which has an explicit focus on religion 
and funds Buddhist schools, monasteries, and nunneries (Thai Giving, 2017), and 
the Nanang Felicidad T. Sy Foundation, related to the SM Group, which is directed 
at endorsing Catholicism. Generally, however, religious institutions are critically 
dependent on cash and in-kind donations from individuals and families, and only 
secondarily count on income-generating assets and, increasingly, payments from 
social services. To give some indications of the sums involved: The approximately 
40,000 temples in Thailand receive about USD 2.83 billion annually in individual 
donations (see Phaholyothin, this issue). In Indonesia, DD is considered the largest 
philanthropic organization nationally in terms of donations, having collected in 2015 
a total of voluntary contributions and zakat taxes equivalent to about USD 23 million 
(Dana zakat dominasi, 2017). In the same year, the overall total of zakat collection 
by entitled semi-public and private institutions reached almost USD 3 billion and 
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the annual potential amount is estimated to be hundreds of times higher (General 
Directorate of Taxation, 2016). 
This reflects people’s inclination to give to religious institutions, when they 
donate to organizations rather than to individuals in their community as is com-
monly the case. In the Philippines of the 86% of households that donated to organiza-
tions in the period 1999-2000, 73% gave to churches and 29% to social services, with a 
minimal percentage going to, in decreasing order, culture and recreation groups; edu-
cation and research; local neighbourhood groups; health groups; and development 
and housing. Most of the recipients focused on the surrounding communities, while 
less than 10% of households gave to advocacy and NGOs with broader mandates. 
As the study concludes, people prefer to give to those that address local concerns, 
while “organizations that go beyond the purely local and towards more abstract and 
policy type issues tend to attract less individual giving” (Fernan, 2002, p.2). Likewise, 
in Indonesia, a 2006 study of Islamic philanthropy by the Syarif Hidayatullah State 
Islamic University found that while 94% of the Muslim population gave to religious 
institutions, only 11% donated to environmental groups, 11% to women’s organization, 
and 3% to human rights organizations (see Fauzia, this issue). A 2012 survey of giving in 
five provinces across Thailand7 found that temples are the most frequent beneficiaries 
of giving to organizations (93%), followed by educational institutions (83%), hospitals 
and health organizations (74%), community organizations (65%) and royal-affiliated 
projects (49%). The same survey also found that temples are perceived as the most 
trustworthy and effective charitable organizations, followed by royal-affiliated pro-
jects (Assumption University in Chhina., Petersik, Loh, & Evans, 2014, p. 92).
Even if widely trusted by the public, religious organizations do not always have 
transparent financial and management systems, and there have been highly pub-
licized occurrences of corruption and mismanagement such as the mega-church 
scandal in Singapore, or the USD 20 million temple embezzlement case in Thailand 
(Farley, 2017; Lesley, 2015). Like corporate and family foundations, religious organiza-
tions tend to provide only scant information to the public on the funds involved and 
even less on their use and impacts. There are worries, also at the government level, 
that accumulated resources are not always promptly disbursed and assets remain 
unproductive. 
Concerns have also been raised on the sectarian inclination of religious institu-
tions. While many do work for the broader society, there is a tendency to employ 
resources to advance the congregation’s well-being, or to proselytize. Christian groups 
have a long tradition of promoting their faith through educational and health activ-
ities (Goh, 2005). In Thailand, temple assistance mainly concerns the Buddhist com-
munity, and mosques’ resources focus on Muslim communities (Prapertchob, 1991). 
For Malaysia, Cogswell (2002) notes that despite legal requirements and official state-
ments that stress inclusive philanthropy, most charity and philanthropic institutions, 
and especially religious ones, are organized according to the ethnic and religious 
lines of Buddhist-Chinese, Muslim-Malays and Hindu-Indians with giving mostly 
directed to “the religious or cultural preservation of the ethnic group of the donor” 
(Cogswell, 2002, p. 107). 
7 The survey locations were Greater Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Chonburi, and Songkla.
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In recent times, fears have also surfaced about the rise of fundamentalism in the 
region and the financial support channelled by international (as well as national) 
faith-based donors. After 9/11, the focus has mainly been on Islamic humanitar-
ian organizations and on trying to differentiate those that may use aid to finance 
Islamist groups from those that seek to alleviate suffering and foster economic devel-
opment (Ibrahim, 2014). Some attention is also given to trans-border connections 
among extremist Buddhist movements and foundations in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and 
Thailand (Arora, 2014). In Singapore and the Philippines, links of conservative local 
Christian groups with those in the US and the external funding of mega churches 
and evangelization efforts have been questioned. Donations also flow the other way 
around; for instance, in Indonesia there are often fund-raising campaigns for human-
itarian issues that have been politicized by radical groups such as the persecution of 
the Rohingya community in Myanmar and the Palestine cause. 
A more general point of debate concerning religious organizations in Southeast 
Asia as in other parts of the worlds is whether they engage in charity or philanthropy. 
Indeed, much of their work is ad hoc and focused mainly on religious activities and 
otherwise on alleviating the suffering of the poor, orphans, disabled people, and other 
vulnerable groups. Although many also contribute to more sustainable community 
development, including education, health, and welfare, it can be generalized that for 
religious communities, like their corporate counterparts, structural change is rarely 
part of their agenda. 
CONCLUSION
In a region undergoing rapid and unequal economic growth, accumulated wealth is 
increasingly being used to ameliorate the underprivileged conditions of those lagging 
behind. In spite of the uncertain fiscal and legal environment, home-grown philan-
thropy is flourishing compounded by cultural traditions, religious aspirations, and 
corporate interests. Institutionalized giving is predominantly organized in family and 
corporate initiatives, semi-autonomous foundations funded by government sources, 
and faith-based institutions. An assessment of the extent of their overall contribution 
to Southeast Asia’s development is challenged by the lack of detailed information on 
the available financial resources and how they are used. There is sufficient evidence, 
however, to conclude that their contribution is valuable in enhancing the welfare of 
individuals and families through the provision of social services and education and 
for the relief of immediate suffering. 
Other sectors receive less attention; in particular, philanthropic and charitable 
funding shows scant appreciation for the importance of the arts and humanities and 
the ‘soft’ sides of development for society. With the enthusiastic adoption of venture 
philanthropy in Southeast Asia and further blurring of philanthropy and business, 
this lack can be expected to remain if not expand in the years to come. Given the 
authoritarian trend in the region, home-grown philanthropy also seems to deny a 
place to human rights advocacy and the pursuit of structural change. Religious giving 
caught in between charity and philanthropy is generally not geared towards trans-
formative processes and often does not propose an inclusive approach. Sectarian 
and extremist trends in all faith denominations deserve further research to better 
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understand their implications. Albeit for different reasons, the currently validated 
models of CSR, social entrepreneurship, and social impact investment, by their very 
nature, do not appear promising for a social justice agenda.
In the past, international foundations provided support to more critical causes, 
but with a decline in foreign aid and a paradigm shift toward a more technocratic 
and business approach to philanthropy, the level of funding from such sources 
has dropped and can be expected to decline further. As I argue in another paper 
(Sciortino, 2016), this does not imply that humanistic and social justice approaches 
are no longer relevant. On the contrary, with the acceleration of regional economic 
integration and the strengthening of fundamentalist and nationalist discourses, ques-
tions of equitable and inclusive development are more pressing than ever. This article 
thus leaves unresolved how efforts to address these questions can be resourced and 
how can concerned civil society groups find alternative sources of funding to remain 
vibrant. Experiments are underway to broaden the donor base with crowd-funding 
and electronic platforms, but it is too early to judge their value for advocacy and 
human rights NGOs. 
This article also brings us to reflect on whether giving that focuses on profit and 
corporate branding – without aiming at bringing about structural change – should 
be seen as just another form of doing possibly more accountable business, rather 
than philanthrophy. This all suggests that moving past the rhetoric on partnership in 
attaining sustainable development goals will require a more emancipatory brand of 
Southeast Asian philanthropy. At the moment, however, that looks more like wishful 
thinking.

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During the second half of the 20th century the Ford Foundation – at the time the world’s 
largest private philanthropy – made a significant commitment to issues of cultural herit-
age as part of its international work in Asia. Across countries in South and Southeast Asia, 
in particular, foundation grants were made to governments, private institutions, and in-
dividuals engaged in a wide range of fields in the arts, humanities, and applied sciences 
such as archaeology. The Foundation’s culture programs embraced tangible heritage as 
well as a range of living traditions and cultural expression. Such rubrics served as important 
labels locating culture within the broad portfolio of the Foundation’s grant-making, as 
well as touchstones employed to justify philanthropy’s attention to culture in contrast to 
the dominant emphasis of international aid on economic development and moderniza-
tion. This paper will look at how one of the world’s most important international philan-
thropies built a rationale for activism in cultural fields in Asia, how a decentralized format 
for local decision-making enabled sustained support for building capacity and knowledge 
in the arts and humanities, and, ultimately, how the ‘culture lens’ has gradually been dis-
placed – or perhaps redefined – in the Foundation’s current international work. 
Keywords: Art; Asia; Culture; Ford Foundation; Philanthropy

INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that American philanthropy, including activities in 
developing countries, is experiencing fundamental shifts. Philanthropy – often 
understood as using private wealth for public good – has been practiced in the 
United States for more than a century within a particular framework shaped by 
American laws, which made it possible for philanthropists to minimize their tax 
burden by giving away wealth for what are defined as ‘charitable purposes’.
Primarily as a result of new technologies created by large and successful 
corporations, there is now a group of tremendously wealthy entrepreneurs and 
investors seeking to redefine the purposes and methods of philanthropic prac-
tice. Often called “philanthrocapitalists” (Edwards, 2008; Wilby, 2010), these 
entrepreneurs assert that being successful in business gives them the know-how 
to solve large-scale problems of poverty and deprivation. Their philanthropic 
organizations promote “business-like ways of working, business-like efficiency, 
and market-driven solutions to social problems” (Feinstein, 2011, p. 88). Instead 
of the ‘bottom line’ of corporate profit, they promise a ‘bottom line’ of social 
impact. Along with bottom-line thinking comes an emphasis on measuring 
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outcomes and tangible results. The language of metrics, benchmarks, risk-reward 
ratios, and scaling up now pervades the discourse of new philanthropies, making staff 
and their boards even more eager to see results quickly. 
In his new book David Callahan scrutinizes major living donors, who he argues 
are forming a “heterogeneous new power elite” (Callahan, 2017, p. 8). He describes 
activist mega donors who want to be celebrated for carrying out their philanthropic 
mission and who maintain close personal control over their foundations, noting how 
in many cases donors are determined to give away all their wealth for specific pur-
poses during their lifetimes, rather than leaving behind foundations that could evolve 
and chart new directions in perpetuity. The proponents of what is nowadays termed 
“venture philanthropy” (Frumkin, 2003) do appear more activist than earlier genera-
tions of foundation executives. Venture philanthropists craft social media messages 
to explain their goals, and have created a celebrity culture of giving away wealth. 
Like the rock star Bono, they want to personalize their giving, and to be seen among 
African villagers or Indian slum dwellers directly carrying out their philanthropic 
mission. The people changing philanthropy paradigms today using vast personal 
wealth come from all political backgrounds, including progressives such as George 
Soros and the ultra-conservative Koch brothers. When the founder of Facebook, 
Mark Zuckerberg, and his wife, Priscilla Chan, recently announced the creation of 
a limited liability company for “advancing human potential and promoting equal-
ity” and pledged to give away 99% of their Facebook shares, public reaction to the 
Chan Zuckerberg Initiative was mixed (Soskis, 2015). Would this be a breathtaking 
example of private largess addressing major world problems, or another instance of 
a mega-philanthropy promising to cure social ills while promoting its own business 
brand? 
Undoubtedly, philanthropy has grown, both in total assets and numbers of private 
foundations. According to the Foundation Center’s database, in 2014 the United 
States had more than 86,700 grant making foundations, with total assets of over 
USD 865 billion. Some 30,000 new private foundations were created since 2000. U.S. 
Foundations made more than USD 60 billion in grants in 2014, both within the U.S. 
and abroad (Foundation Center, 2017). Increased public attention is drawn to new 
philanthropists pledging to ‘change the world’. The tech entrepreneurs shaping new 
philanthropy “believe their charitable giving is bolder, bigger and more data-driven 
than anywhere else” (Stanley, 2015). Yet as some critics have argued, we need to 
challenge venture philanthropy’s assumption that business logic is the same as the 
logic underlying complex social processes.1 We might ask whether an emphasis on 
short-term results is leaving out more open-ended kinds of grant making that train 
community organizers, build institutions, or take risks through new kinds of social 
change experiments. We could consider whether an overarching concern with the 
bottom line and metrics “can drive grant making out of types of work whose results 
can be difficult to gauge, such as leadership development, work on race relations, 
[and] human rights education” (Berresford, 1999). In addition, we need to examine 
the notion that the most important philanthropy resonates with the urgency of 
today’s media headlines. 
1 See Edwards (2008) on the limits of philanthrocapitalism’s promise to produce far-reaching change.
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Outside the United States, the manner in which concentrated wealth is employed 
in top-down ways in development projects – often determining local non-profit 
agendas and skewing public policy priorities – needs to be more carefully analyzed 
(Massing, 2016). It is not that concern for persistent poverty or disease in the world is 
misplaced. The problem is that promoting solutions that are designed in foundation 
headquarters to be implemented in distant communities, or that are expressed in 
terms of precise technical inputs to be measured, removes the need to “consider the 
cultural, humanistic, and political sides of the equation” (Anft, 2015).
This paper considers whether culture itself is important, especially in non-Western 
contexts, as the ‘new philanthropy’ paradigm becomes dominant. At first glance, the 
prospects do not look promising. The philanthrocapitalist’s emphasis on technical 
solutions and measurable results is not especially compatible with intangible subjects 
like the vitality of oral traditions, or for example the ways an ethnographic museum 
can build appreciation for a society’s ethnic diversity. A tech entrepreneur may look 
at a multitude of world languages to be learned and taught and imagine inventing a 
universal translation tool, instead of less cutting edge approaches – such as endowing 
under-funded language departments of public universities. And in a world rife with 
injustice and inequalities, private philanthropy and governments alike tend to see 
cultural pursuits – including disciplines in the arts and humanities – as secondary 
priorities, if they count at all.
My aim here is to reflect on the record and the motivations of a leading global 
private foundation that for decades was active in cultural philanthropy across 
Asia. I will review the overall trajectory of the Ford Foundation’s culture-focused 
philanthropy in its offices in South and Southeast Asia from the late 1970s into the 
21st century. Tracing the various rationales underlying cultural grants leads us to a 
more complete view of the paradigms of engagement Ford employed in ‘develop-
ing’ countries. It also reveals clear distinctions between field office grants and Ford’s 
domestic arts agenda, as well as intersections between cultural programs and other 
Foundation priorities. Given both notable changes in the field of philanthropy in 
recent years, as well as changes in Ford’s emphases and ways of working, it is impor-
tant to ask whether arts and culture are still relevant to its priorities, and what turns 
cultural grant making in Asia has taken.
EARLY SUPPORT FOR ARTS AND CULTURE
First, we must evoke the background of an institution that for many years was the 
world’s wealthiest foundation, once described as “a large body of money completely 
surrounded by people who want some” (Macdonald, 1989, p. 3). Today, when the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation looms over the philanthropic landscape with assets 
of more than USD 60 billion, one forgets a time when it was Ford that regularly made 
major headlines in American discussions of private foundations. This prominence 
began in around 1950, when the Foundation was endowed with 90% of the stock 
of the Ford Motor Company.2 By 1960 it had a corpus of over USD 3 billion, along 
2 Eventually the Foundation divested from its Ford Motor Co. holdings, and the Ford family disassoci-
ated itself from the expanded global foundation.
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with an annual budget much larger than that of the United Nations and its special-
ized agencies combined.3 Within the legal environment for American philanthropy, 
it is important to note that during this period the more valuable the Ford Motor 
Company became, the more the Foundation’s dividends increased, making it neces-
sary to increase its grant making in order to preserve its tax-exempt status.4
Yet it was not the sheer scale of its resources that commanded attention when, 
in 1949, the Foundation announced its intention to address issues of global impor-
tance such as peace, democracy, and human welfare – it was the startling breadth and 
loftiness of its vision. From its beginnings in the 1930s as a small local family founda-
tion that had supported the communities of auto factory workers around Dearborn, 
Michigan, Ford set out to become a major presence on the national and international 
stage. The founding text for its expanded mandate was a weighty document called the 
Gaither Report, which came out of a process involving multiple task forces and more 
than 1000 people charged to consider “the ways in which the Ford Foundation can 
most effectively and intelligently put its resources to work for human welfare” (Gaither, 
1950, p. 13). The Gaither Report provided the conceptual scaffolding for the interna-
tional edifice Ford would build through its network of overseas field offices, a key part 
of its expansive mission to solve the world’s problems. And this brings us to New Delhi, 
Yangon (Rangoon), and Jakarta, where the first field offices in Asia were launched.
Let us imagine a scene in Burma in 1953, not long after the Ford Foundation 
opened a field office in Rangoon as part of an expanding presence in Asia. Departing 
from its pattern of funding projects in public administration and agriculture, the 
Foundation decided to support a request from the Burmese Government for the 
creation of an International Institute of Advanced Buddhist Studies, which would 
foster activities in Pāli scholarship and organize the Sixth Great Buddhist Council. 
The Council was to convene for two years between the full moons of May 1954 and 
1956, gathering 15,000 Buddhist monks and scholars from all over Asia. According 
to its proponents, the Institute was “expected to become the spiritual center of 
Southeast Asia, radiating … irresistible and overpowering rays of Wisdom, Truth, and 
Righteousness” (Macdonald, 1989, pp. 66-69).5
This intriguing gesture to Burma’s heritage was just the first in a record of grants 
supporting cultural heritage in numerous Asian countries for more than 50 years. 
Cultural interests first emerged for Ford in a systematic way in India, where its first 
overseas office had opened in New Delhi in 1952. In 1955, for example, the Foundation 
established the Southern Languages Book Trust to publish great works of literature 
and philosophy in the four major languages of South India. The following year, the 
Foundation purchased from the Museum of Modern Art in New York a thousand copies 
3 At the end of 2014, the Foundation had USD 14.4 billion in assets; it gave away some USD 518 million 
during that year.
4 The United States Congress established rules for foundations, including the requirement to use a 
certain percentage of their assets annually for what are defined as ‘charitable activities’.
5  See Macdonald (1989, pp. 66-69) for more details on Foundation grant 05400155. Its budget of that 
time of USD 327,000 would be the equivalent of USD 2.9 million in 2015 – an extraordinary amount for an 
initial commitment even today, and evidence of the Foundation’s relative wealth. At this early point, Ford’s 
annual grant budget was about four times as large as that of second biggest U.S. foundation (Rockefeller 
Foundation).
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of books and multiple film prints, products of an exhibition MOMA had organized on 
Indian handloom textiles and crafts (Gandhi, 2002, p. 4). While the ostensible aim of 
this grant was to reintroduce ‘principles of good design’ to Indian cottage industry, it 
also clearly acknowledged the immense creative wealth of India’s artisan communities.
I cite these examples of early cultural grants to note how the Ford Foundation’s 
stance within the post-colonial Asian dynamic of continuity and change includ-
ed an inclination toward the arts and humanities. The Gaither Report lauded the 
importance of scientific investigation and “professional experts generating objective 
knowledge” (Francis X. Sutton, in Macdonald, 1989, p. xv)6 and for some years the 
Foundation was guided by this ‘heady prospectus’ in setting its priorities. Arts and 
culture were not among those priorities initially, but thinking changed and with its 
resources growing rapidly – thus making it a necessity to disperse many more dollars 
each year – in 1957 the Foundation looked seriously at the needs of American creative 
artists and the potential for providing support to projects of ‘national significance’. 
The Arts and Culture program launched in the United States in 1962 aimed to raise 
the arts to new levels of achievement and fiscal stability through long-term support 
to a group of promising institutions. The enormous impact of the USD 400 million 
spent in the 1980s can still be seen in the worlds of dance, regional theater, sympho-
ny orchestras, and arts management throughout the United States. Ford’s support 
for the arts both stimulated U.S. private and corporate gifts to arts institutions and 
influenced the creation of the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities. 
The creative force behind this landmark initiative was W. McNeil Lowry, who saw 
the arts and humanities as an important counterbalance to the Foundation’s focus on 
social sciences and research.
Cultural programming emerged very differently in the Asian settings where 
Ford worked. Field offices produced culture grants in a decentralized way, depend-
ing on local contexts, inclinations of Foundation staff, and direct encouragement 
from country directors, called Representatives. The 1950s and 60s were years when 
issues of nation-building and economic development dominated international rela-
tions and Western states were fixed on the ideological competition with Soviet and 
Chinese communist spheres.7 In India, with its flagship field office, Ford worked with 
the government to find ways to improve rural life. In response to the invitation of 
Prime Minister Nehru, the Foundation supported modernization and reorganization 
of village industries, which led to increased attention to traditional handloom and 
handicraft producers, thus raising the possibility of culture as a focus for develop-
ment efforts. The Foundation helped start the National Institute of Design in 1961, 
urging “the cooperation of ethnologists, art historians, and village teachers with a 
feeling for the true cultural past” (Gandhi, 2002, p. 5).
6 Macdonald (1989) labels the Gaither Report’s language “foundationese”, as in the following: “The prob-
lems of mankind must be solved, if they are to be solved at all, by a combined use of all those types of 
knowledge by which human affairs may be influenced” (p. 139).
7 The Foundation’s initial cultural efforts were focused mainly in Europe, reflecting the conviction that 
exchange of ideas and cultural achievements could help promote peace in the wake of World War II’s “dev-
astating effect on the European intellectual community … American observers feared that Marxism and 
Communism would exert a growing appeal among these disaffected intellectuals…” (McCarthy, 1987, p. 
94). The Foundation’s first President, Paul Hoffman, had served as administrator of the Marshall Program 
in Europe, and firmly believed in nongovernmental cultural diplomacy.
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At the same time, efforts in language development and publishing such as the 
Southern Languages Book Trust, along with bilingual education and English 
language training, reflected the importance of India’s multilingual and multicul-
tural environment. The Trust also reflected the geopolitics of the Cold War,8 as the 
Soviet Union was supporting a steady stream of cheap books in Indian vernaculars 
at the time. In newly independent Burma, competing East/West ideologies, along 
with the need to unite an ethnically diverse people, were clear factors in the creation 
of the International Institute for Advanced Buddhist Studies mentioned above. The 
suggestion that Ford Foundation might support the Institute – which was called the 
Pāli Project – was made in writing by a U.S. aid mission official, who cited Premier 
U Nu’s opinion that “the popular belief that Americans work solely for the benefit 
of themselves or others is one of the strongest weapons in the hands of Communist 
propagandists in Southeast Asia” (Macdonald, 1989, p. 67).
The rationale that intergroup unity and democratic values would greatly assist 
the nation-building process became linked to concern for culture, as reflected in Ford 
Foundation program guidelines for the 1960s:
The successful development of new nations includes, and in part depends on, cultural 
and intellectual factors. New nations seek to ‘discover’ their own cultures, and to 
achieve greater clarity concerning their national purposes…it is proposed that 
Overseas Development support carefully selected projects designed to further these 
less tangible but important purposes of developing nations. (Ford Foundation, 1960s)
An equally significant justification for Foundation involvement with India’s culture 
was articulated in the mid-1960s by a Ford consultant, Arthur Isenberg, who argued 
that India’s classical past and its ‘folk culture’ were threatened by urbanization and 
rapid change. By this time the Rangoon field office had closed, as the Foundation was 
ordered to leave Burma after the military takeover of 1962. In 1969 a small grant for 
heritage preservation created an opening for new programming; this was reinforced 
by positive signals from the Foundation’s Trustees.9 A contraction in Foundation assets 
through the 1970s (due to a broad U.S. economic downturn) meant “the Foundation’s 
enthusiastic conversion to the idea of conserving India’s cultural past had to be curbed” 
(Gandhi, 2002, p. 10). By 1978, however, the Foundation approved a comprehensive 
program centered on preservation for India. This program would grow and evolve, 
sparking grants in India and other Asia offices for more than two decades.
8 Much has been made of the degree to which Ford and other private foundations were linked to the Cold 
War policies of the U.S. government, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, through entities such as 
the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The debate over these activities is peripheral to this essay, but relevant 
discussion can be found in Saunders (2000), Epstein (1967), McCarthy (1987), and a variety of other sources. 
Coming from another direction, the Foundation was also targeted as “leftist” in the press for its work on 
civil liberties and racial discrimination, which led to a series of congressional investigations in the 1950s and 
1960s (Macdonald, 1989, pp. 27-35; Rosenfield, 2015, pp. 7, 23). And when Henry Ford II resigned from the 
Board of Trustees in 1976, severing the last Ford family ties with the Foundation, he criticized the organiza-
tion “for attacking the capitalist economic system that had created it” (Rosenfield, 2015, p. 24).
9 Chairman of the board Alexander Heard wrote in 1970 that “to interpret and make visible the cultural 
heritage of many a developing nation ought to contribute to a sense of national pride and to the much 
discussed sense of identity that everyone seems to want these days” (Zurbuchen, 1994, p.15).
ASEAS 10(2) | 171
Mary S. Zurbuchen
Key Programming Themes
The geography and modality of the Foundation’s support for arts and humani-
ties in Asia looks different from one vantage point to another. At various times 
the Foundation made grants in the arts and humanities in Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Burma, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. The history of this support is highly variable, 
with no fixed template determining which kinds of grants should be approved. 
There were scant policy guidelines for officers interested in working on cultural 
topics, and no specific annual budget allocation for such grants. On occasion, grants 
were conceived opportunistically without a longer-term strategic framework. 
Some culture programs were sparsely staffed, with field offices often relying on 
part-timers or consultants for this work. Officers whose actual assignments were 
in other fields such as education, social sciences, or human rights might have man-
aged culture grants. Those staff members frequently responded in a more or less 
ad hoc way to opportunities to support cultural activities within the constraints 
of time and budgets imposed by their primary program responsibilities. In the 
following discussion, I will focus on the larger, sustained programs in arts and 
culture in countries where officers were assigned to develop clearly articulated 
visions. Those offices are New Delhi (which made grants in India, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka) and Indonesia (which also managed activities in Thailand, the Philippines, 
and Vietnam, at different periods).
It is vexingly hard to be precise in tracking how much the Foundation spent on 
culture outside of the United States, because the structure of Ford’s program division 
and its accounting codes changed over the years. For the most part, culture pro-
grams in Asia fell under larger categories such as Education, Media, Arts and Culture, 
and received small slices of annual field office budgets. Between 1984 and 1994, for 
example, the largest expenditures in all overseas offices went to grants under the 
categories of Rural Poverty and Resources, International Affairs, and Education. 
During this same period, Cultural Preservation and Interpretation accounted for 
about 13% of all grant dollars in India, and 18% in Indonesia (Zurbuchen, 1994, 
appendix tables 2 and 4). These amounts were probably the highest among all over-
seas offices, since culture grants tended to be fewer in Ford’s Latin America and 
Africa offices. Budgets for culture never approached the scale of arts expenditures 
in the U.S. program. In the 1984-1994 period, culture-related grants in Asia totaled 
roughly USD 21.5 million dollars, a mere 8% of total Asia grant expenditures. In 
general, it seems that field office representatives could feel confident in recom-
mending annual culture program budgets as long as these remained subsidiaries to 
their major ‘developing country’ agenda. Addressing poverty, illness, and injustice 
would claim the major portion of field office resources even as robust cultural pro-
grams grew. 
Taking a closer look at how country programs responded to opportunities to 
engage with culture, we turn to sites receiving the largest commitment to the arts 
and humanities in Asia: India, Indonesia and (on a smaller scale) Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam. While the specifics of each field office’s grants differed 
widely, several key themes stand out across the region and over nearly thirty years. 
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Heritage Conservation
The Foundation initially addressed cultural issues as a matter of material heritage 
– the cultural property that manifests history and identity in tangible form. National 
governments were often open to outside technical assistance for preservation of mon-
uments, archaeological sites, and movable property such as ethnographic collections 
or hand-written documents. Thus, the India office worked with institutions such as 
the Archaeological Survey of India, Deccan College in Pune, the New Delhi School of 
Architecture, the cities of Jaipur and Ahmedabad, and public and private manuscript 
collections to support training, research, and improved technologies in the fields of 
archaeology, urban conservation planning, and manuscript documentation. Similar 
grants for archaeological training and research were made in Sri Lanka, and Bhutan’s 
National Museum received assistance in managing national art and manuscript collec-
tions. In Indonesia, conservation of monuments, advanced training for archaeologists 
and museologists, and manuscript preservation for endangered collections in the palaces 
of Central Java and the National Library were all supported. In Thailand, Foundation 
funds helped launch an important program to conserve the wealth of mural paintings 
in Buddhist temples, in partnership with the government’s Fine Arts Department.
All this heritage work opened up deeper challenges and questions about the 
validity of culture grant making. Identifying heritage conservation as a goal is hardly 
helpful, one Foundation staffer observed, in deciding what to preserve. Material 
remains of the past can be appropriated by power centers to legitimize dominant 
ideologies, as when India’s Babri Masjid was claimed as a Hindu site, or when archae-
ological evidence of ancient Tamil settlement in Sri Lanka conflicted with the politics 
of national history. The conservation of the past might sharpen conflicts when, say, 
excavation activity threatens local settlement or livelihoods. Involvement of a for-
eign institution with cultural property can aggravate local or nationalistic sensitivi-
ties. And even when a project is successful – such as the microfilm documentation of 
thousands of pages of frail manuscripts – there remain questions of public or schol-
arly interest, interpretation, and survival of that written heritage in its new format.
Still, the record of Ford’s cultural grants produced many compelling arguments for 
attention to material heritage. Learning from history and appreciating links with the 
past tend to be viewed as significant in most societies – a reality that needs recognition 
in wealthier countries where the existence of archives, libraries, museums, and other 
cultural resources is often taken for granted. On the local level, culture grants drew 
attention and appreciation from government and private institutions. By means of its 
sustained culture program the Foundation earned credibility among governments, 
artists, and scholars for supporting activities other major donors would not consider. 
On the international level, Ford’s attention to cultural heritage reinforced the major 
investments it was making in the 1960s and 1970s to build international and area 
studies in U.S. universities. As Benedict Anderson notes, post-WW II U.S. government 
agencies put priority on expanding much-needed international scholarship, “but very 
large private institutions, especially the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, also played 
an important role, partly offsetting the ‘policy’ focus of the state. Senior officials in 
these foundations … were more liberal in their outlook than state functionaries, and 
somewhat less obsessed with combating ‘world communism’” (Anderson, 2016, p. 34). 
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In some measure, then, the Foundation’s contributions to capacity-building in archae-
ology, museology, and conservation sciences resulted in benefits for Asian institutions 
and communities who would, it was argued by foundation officers, be better able to 
interpret and utilize the past for the common good. 
Cultural Transmission
It is not very far from conservation of tangible heritage, of course, to the intangible 
dimensions of culture. Core issues here involve change and vitality of cultural forms 
over time, and processes through which meaning is conveyed to audiences and 
across generations within the larger social, environmental, and religious settings 
of particular groups. The passing of skills and practice from older to younger, the 
dissemination of art forms to new audiences, and the formation of new relations 
between patrons, practitioners, and consumers are all part of the ‘transmission’ idea. 
Living traditions are always in a state of change; tradition is neither fixed nor 
static. As the Foundation saw it by the 1980s, many arts genres in Asia faced qualita-
tive changes of such magnitude that their survival was threatened.10 Minority groups 
under the hegemony of strong national centers and with new languages and educa-
tional systems to master found their inherited arts ignored, undervalued or otherwise 
marginalized. Changes in how an art form is transmitted, for instance from oral to 
written media, or in relations between artists and traditional sources of patronage, 
disrupt continuity. Formal education, the politics of language, and modern media all 
have profound effects on cultural transmission.
The Foundation put considerable effort into assisting arts practitioners to sustain 
and convey older forms of expression. In India, funds helped classical musicians and 
dance masters document their traditions and adapt older systems of pedagogy to new 
social and economic conditions. Folk culture studies became a major program for 
the New Delhi office, with goals of strengthening field research as well as the role of 
expressive arts in social development and communications. In Indonesia, meanwhile, 
cultural transmission required paying attention to ethnic diversity, oral traditions 
and performance genres across a large archipelago where heavy-handed bureau-
cracies were seeking to ‘guide’ and ‘improve’ local religious and cultural expression. 
Indonesian arts were also being disrupted by adaptation to modern education, as 
masters of performance traditions were increasingly expected to become creden-
tialed instructors in the government’s conservatories and arts academies. 
While in India folk culture studies provided a strong interdisciplinary focus for 
traditional arts, in Indonesia the field of world music or ethnomusicology became 
a key organizing principle, embracing both arts of the traditional aristocracy as 
well as diverse village-based performance genres. Foundation staff worked with 
arts academies and field researchers as they developed new humanities curricula 
and practitioner networks. Independent national organizations such as the Society 
for Indonesian Performing Arts and the Oral Traditions Association took shape. In 
the Philippines, Ford supported ethnomusicology in the academy and archiving of 
10 One document attributed the threats to a “rush toward economic growth and social modernization” 
and “changes in public values”, suggesting “the task, then, is to help national elites be more comfortable 
with their own pasts” (Ford Foundation, 1978, p. 20).
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field recording collections developed by José Maceda of the Philippines, whose pio-
neering research illustrated commonalities among performance genres throughout 
Southeast Asia.
One conceptual challenge in arts grant making involves finding a balance between 
scholarly and activist approaches. It was important to move beyond the academ-
ic atmosphere of arts institutes to direct engagement with living traditions in the 
communities that keep them vital. Thus, in Thailand a unique oral history project 
gathered stories of life and culture from displaced Khmer refugees in camps along the 
border. In Indonesia in the 1990s, Ford sponsored a major recording project involving 
the Smithsonian Institution and the Society for Indonesian Performing Arts, which 
over ten years documented musical styles in 23 provinces, resulting in a landmark 
20-CD series with the Folkways Records label.11 In Vietnam, support went for a com-
petition providing small grants to community-based arts groups to record, document 
or research their own arts, generating materials on ritual, crafts, performing arts, and 
languages among 30 ethnic minority communities across 39 provinces.12 
Foundation culture programs also tried to take account of interlinked processes 
of economic and social change, and of the impact of contemporary media and com-
munications revolutions. Issues of cultural transmission involve not only changes in 
the arts but also the survival of entire ways of life. As struggles over control of forest 
land intensified across Southeast Asia, community resource use patterns, material 
culture, and local identities all became threatened by larger political and economic 
forces. Culture programs thus intersected with the Foundation’s concerns to reduce 
poverty and address issues to do with rights and governance.
Creative Expression
Over time, the emphasis of Ford’s culture grants in Asia shifted from ‘cultural pres-
ervation and interpretation’– one of the frequent categories found in the documents 
– to include concerns for vitality and diversity. Program officers were interested 
in encouraging innovative, experimental, critical work in a variety of media. They 
felt an emphasis on creative expression would help incorporate the experiences of 
underrepresented groups into national life; support the emergence of new idioms 
in traditional arts; develop stronger capacities, new audiences, and channels for cul-
tural expression; and, clarify the links between contemporary expression and its con-
text, including traditional forms. What are the multiple stances toward modernity 
and tradition that artists attempt? What is the role of the artist in a post-traditional, 
heavily state-controlled environment? Would improving the infrastructure for arts 
organizations result in better conditions for creative work?
Field offices supported creativity in varied ways. In India, a theater laboratory 
project supported contemporary theater directors in experimental work drawing 
on local and folk genres, and also helped promising theater groups to develop new 
methodologies and share innovations. Indonesian arts and literary groups organized 
11 The Music of Indonesia project is described in detail in Ford Foundation (2003, p. 194).
12 The Folk Arts and Culture Fund — administered by the Center for Educational Exchange with 
Vietnam — has supported some 170 local projects to date (Nguyen Thi Thanh Binh, personal communica-
tion, 09 March 2016).
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national celebrations of local arts, oral tradition, and regional languages. The Hanoi 
office provided training abroad for young Vietnamese filmmakers and helped them 
showcase their productions, while a new supporting organization was created in 
Indonesia to help arts organizations in management, strategic planning, and funding 
strategies. Both offices in India and Indonesia provided resources for exploring the 
outreach and public service potential of broadcast media, including community radio 
and the expanding television spectrum. The explosive growth of digital media and 
the Internet in the first years of the 21st century prompted grants for studying new 
media access, analysis of emerging creative and copyright issues and innovations in 
documentary film.
Again, principles of selection were an issue. The Foundation did not stipulate 
global policies to help in the choice of which artistic or expressive field to encourage. 
Program staff needed to consult widely to understand the conditions that support, 
limit, and channel creativity within a particular field. They looked to expression 
of local needs, selecting points of entry through cooperation with consultants and 
expert committees, and through stimulation of dialogues among key actors in a 
particular field.
Culture and Identities
In the 1950s and 60s, important changes were taking hold in post-colonial Asian 
states, and the consolidation of national identities was a ubiquitous project. The ‘unity 
in diversity’ motto was heard in calls for integration and assimilation, both politi-
cal and cultural. National unity was inscribed on material heritage, too, as historic 
sites and artifacts were seen as defining a people’s shared identity. If that identity was 
strong, it was argued, people could be resilient in the face of the manifold pressures of 
modernization. Even in Thailand, which had escaped direct European colonization, 
destabilization brought by conflicts in Indochina meant that “Thai cultural identity 
was … subject to severe pressures of an accelerated westernization and moderniza-
tion process” (Klausner, 1991). A surge of thefts of valuable images from Buddhist 
temples, and the embarrassing disappearance of hundreds of objects from the collec-
tion of the National Museum, prompted leaders of cultural institutions to look for 
ways of “inculcating in the Thai public a sense of pride in their rich cultural heritage” 
(W. Klausner, personal communication, 24 February 2016). The Foundation’s sup-
port for research and training in both archaeology and mural painting conservation 
emerged in part from such locally-expressed concerns, which included anxiety over 
the impact of a large American military presence on Thailand’s social norms.
Of course, even when nation-building ideologies were dominant, and as Cold 
War-related conflicts led to Vietnam’s American War and the Indonesian annexa-
tion of East Timor, counter-narratives to the national unity theme have been reg-
ularly voiced. In the last years of the twentieth century most areas of Ford’s work, 
including governance, livelihoods, and human rights, became linked in one way or 
another to the acceptance and expression of distinct identities within the nation-
al fabric. Working with the cultural sector in Vietnam, for example, a portfolio of 
grants expanded effective arts management, to “create space for artists to reflect on 
issues of identity in the context of rapid socio-economic change” (Stern, 2003, p. 42). 
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Emphasizing diversity13 through cultural grants both underscored and contribut-
ed to each of the other program themes in field office settings. There is resonance 
between India’s folk culture institutions and advocates working for rights of the dalit 
and tribal groups of the country. Local artists recording oral epics in uplands Vietnam 
raise the profile of minority ethnic communities whose access to forest land is being 
undermined by national policy. A research project on traditional arts and the Islamic 
heritage of Java can address a growing rhetoric of discrimination and exclusion that 
would seek to suppress the performing arts on grounds of religious orthodoxy.
SHAPING A COMMITMENT
There were, of course, other actors in the culture field in Asia during the years I am 
discussing here. Most of these were bilateral or multilateral agencies representing 
a government, as with Germany’s Goethe Institute, or groups of governments, like 
UNESCO, which has long promoted heritage sites of global importance and whose 
Intangible Cultural Heritage program was defined in its 2003 convention. Embassies 
– including those of former colonizers – benefit from the ‘soft diplomacy’ of sponsor-
ing a museum exhibition or donating to a restoration project. Nonetheless, among 
U.S. private charitable groups it is rare for foundations to take more than sporadic 
interest in international cultural matters.14 For most of its history, for example, the 
Rockefeller Foundation focused on medicine and agriculture in its developing coun-
try philanthropy.15 Organizations that focus on tangible heritage include the J. Paul 
Getty Trust, which is most active in Europe and the Mediterranean. However, Getty 
is an operating foundation, meaning that it implements its own projects, in contrast 
to a grant making foundation like Ford, which funds independent groups. Japanese 
foundations have been active in sponsoring cultural projects in Southeast Asian 
countries, but this interest has been relatively recent and primarily involves academic 
research and collaborations (the Japan and Nippon Foundations are good examples), 
or restoration of particular historic sites or shrines (as some East Asian trusts have 
done in Hoi An, the historic trade port of central Vietnam). The Aga Khan Trust 
for Culture, based in Geneva, works across the Muslim world (including Malaysia, 
Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) on conservation of historic cities, musical heritage, 
and architecture and urban design.
Still, it is clear that Ford’s role in support of a wide range of cultural activities was 
for decades unique among donors working in Asia. By the late 1990s, professional 
staff with assignments in what was by then called Education, Media, Arts and Culture 
(EMAC) were located in Jakarta, Hanoi, New Delhi, and Beijing; together with new 
13 It is notable that the Foundation took diversity seriously both internally and in grant making. Through 
the 1980s and 1990s, both Presidents Franklin Thomas and Susan Berresford stressed that racial and gen-
der representation were important for the composition of the Board of Trustees as well as in staffing.
14  Important exceptions here are the Henry R. Luce Foundation and a Rockefeller offshoot, the Asian 
Cultural Council; both are based in New York and are much smaller philanthropies than Ford. While ACC 
has had small offices in East Asia, its grants primarily support individual artists from the U.S. or Asia. The 
Luce Foundation’s emphasis is to strengthen knowledge of Asia among Americans and it has no field of-
fices.
15 From 2001-2007, Rockefeller’s innovative program in the Greater Mekong Subregion recognized 
transnational cultural dynamics and included grants in arts and humanities; see Sciortino (2016).
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EMAC appointments in Cairo, Lagos, Nairobi, and Moscow, Ford’s global ‘footprint’ 
in culture reached a high point. A number of prominent initiatives in Asia from the 
early 1990s reflected this broadening commitment. Ford provided significant support 
for the Festival of Indonesia in 1990-91, an 18-month series of museum exhibitions, 
performances, film showings, conferences, folklife celebrations, and other events that 
provided many Americans with their first glimpse of Indonesia’s rich cultural herit-
age. At about the same time, Ford made an endowment grant to establish the India 
Foundation for the Arts, now one of India’s leading independent foundations, with 
programs encouraging new forms of creativity and arts education across the country.
What factors have been critical to the longevity and sustained focus of Ford’s 
programs? Doubtless Ford’s commitment to having offices in the countries where it 
works was an essential condition enabling culture grant making. Philanthropy based 
in field offices made it possible for the Foundation to develop long-term relationships 
with local individuals and institutions; to work more closely with grantees on devel-
opment and implementation of projects; and, to generate ground-level experience 
and insights important for senior management and the Foundation as a whole. Even 
though Asian field offices have opened and closed at different moments in line with 
emerging opportunities or internal policy, most of Ford’s culture grants were made 
within field offices with a well-established local presence such as in Bangkok, New 
Delhi, Jakarta or Dhaka.
The Foundation’s overseas offices have generally not functioned as branches of 
headquarters, but have typically stressed local context and settings in shaping grant 
programs. Ford’s Representatives in Asia tended to enjoy a high level of autonomy in 
exploring and setting local office grant making priorities, working within the broad 
guidelines set every few years by the Foundation’s Trustees and the biennial grant 
budgets allocated by New York. Grant approvals up to a certain level are delegated to 
local Representatives,16 who also play a key role in selecting field office professional 
staff. The Foundation looks for program officers with local experience and relevant 
language and intercultural skills to serve terms of roughly three to six years; often, 
staff have often been recruited from university faculty, research institutes or interna-
tional non-profit groups. 
In building a program of grants under a theme such as “cultural preservation, 
vitality and interpretation”, the Foundation looked for people with humanities 
backgrounds who could articulate a vision linking one set of grants to others in the 
portfolio. Deep local knowledge and professional experience were critical to work-
ing with potential grantees in responsive, creative, and flexible ways. In turn, strate-
gic thinking implied longer-term commitment to working with a group of grantee 
organizations, avoiding a random succession of unrelated grants. At the same time, 
staff were expected to look for special opportunities or new openings to work with 
talented people, young organizations, or to build new constituencies to address per-
sistent issues.
This emphasis on long-term commitment, along with local autonomy and flexi-
bility in identifying grantees, meant that Foundation staff could build relationships 
16 As of 2000, for example, any field office grant with a budget up to USD 100,000 was approved by the 
Representative. This kind of delegated authority is not typical of most international philanthropy.
178 | ASEAS 10(2)
Legacies of Cultural Philanthropy in Asia
over time through travel to different regions of a country, through broad consulta-
tions, and through bringing together different skill sets or points of view in addressing 
important issues. For example, when the Bangkok office decided to help the Thai 
government with its mural painting conservation program, companion grants were 
made to the International Centre for the Study of Preservation and Restoration 
of Cultural Property in Rome (ICCROM), which provided important technical 
assistance.17 When the Jakarta office developed a program aimed at promoting appre-
ciation of cultural diversity through private radio and television outlets, broadcasters 
and programmers from all over Indonesia were brought together to share ideas (Ford 
Foundation, 2003, p. 219). This kind of ‘convening power’ often led to important and 
unexpected connections in grant making, and is the kind of role Ford could play by 
virtue of local offices open to different kinds of people, institutions, and ideas. 
Employing staff responsible for cultural grant making, the Foundation built its 
own capacity for awareness of local priorities, values, and issues beyond the main-
stream technocratic focus on development followed by major donors. Within the 
field office, staff assigned to different programs often worked as a team, consulting 
each other and sometimes jointly developing grants. One grant in Indonesia fund-
ed environmental conservation and oral traditions research in the Kayan Mentarang 
tropical rainforest reserve in Kalimantan, and involved program officers working on 
both community resource management and cultural vitality who shared goals of 
strengthening the ability of forest-dwelling peoples to preserve their ways of life. The 
culture program officer thus served as an example of the kind of ‘engaged expertise’ 
that views heritage as something represented by whole communities and environ-
ments (Salemink, 2016). At the same time, Ford was cautious about claiming credit 
for the results of particular projects; its philosophy tended to carefully distinguish 
the Foundation’s profile as the grantor – sharing ideas and providing funds – from the 
grantee’s role in carrying out projects.
A HERITAGE WORTH SUSTAINING
Having worked as a Foundation officer during more than two decades in Asian settings, 
I have wondered what place cultural interests have in American philanthropy. Is there 
a 21st century relevance in the Ford Foundation’s perspectives on creativity, transmis-
sion, and identities discussed above? The emergence of ‘new philanthropy’, with its 
emphasis on business-like practice and measurable outcomes, has not been accom-
panied by a new wave of grant making in cultural fields. One reason arts and culture 
may be less compelling for philanthropy today is that studying foreign countries has 
suffered significant retrenchment in America’s academic realms. Over the past two 
decades, the multidisciplinary area studies model for learning about the world, prom-
inent since World War II, has been discounted as orientalist and Eurocentric (Gibson-
Graham, 2004). While alternative models – subaltern studies, post-modernism and 
cultural studies – have emerged, much social science research has turned to the study 
of large data sets and away from close study of cultural context. In the United States, 
17 Not incidentally, through its work with Thai conservators ICCROM developed new techniques for 
restoration of mural painting in tropical conditions – expertise that could be used in other places and 
contribute to building global knowledge.
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basic government funding for area and international studies has been drastically re-
duced. The Ford Foundation’s domestic program in area studies was cut back in the 
1980s, thus undermining the salience once fostered between domestic programs – 
promoting knowledge of the world among Americans – and international cultural 
grant making. 
The technology revolution itself may well have helped to dim the allure of inter-
national studies. With the Internet at our fingertips and social media linking anyone 
anywhere, much of the world now appears accessible and ‘knowable’ through web 
surfing and cyberworld networking. Further, we have seen widespread erosion of 
support for the humanities in U.S. schools and universities, supplanted by a belief 
that only the STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering, math) can produce 
market-ready citizens with skills for the 21st century workplace.18 Arguments that 
“humanities enhance our culture” or transmit “the best that has been thought and 
said” are no longer effective, says critic Stanley Fish, arguing that university adminis-
trators have shirked their duty to aggressively defend the humanities as an essential 
part of what a university should be doing (Fish, 2010).
In this environment, it might well seem counter-intuitive or retrograde to pro-
mote the arts and culture as important for philanthropy. Yet the new president of 
the Ford Foundation seems to be keeping the arts within view, at least for domestic 
grant making purposes. After taking the helm in 2013, Darren Walker announced in 
2015 that all Foundation grant making would be organized and streamlined around 
the concept of inequality. One of the seven thematic areas now featured on Ford’s 
website is Creativity and Free Expression, which “play a central role in weaving the 
fabric of a just society – a society in which exclusion and inequality can never stand 
unchallenged” (Ford Foundation, 2017). As the Foundation invests in organizations 
“that are pivotal in fighting inequality and making meaningful progress in creativ-
ity and free expression”, it will further focus grant making under two sub-themes: 
“Social justice storytelling” and “21st century arts infrastructure” (Ford Foundation, 
2017). Walker has spoken eloquently on how the arts “create economies of empathy” 
in building social movements. If there is crisis in the arts world, it is in part because 
“we have raised market-oriented thinking above all other kinds and categories of 
human understanding” (Walker, 2015). He argues that the United States’ greatness is 
revealed through its arts, and that America currently suffers from a poverty “of heart 
and mind, of spirit and soul, of civic imagination” which can be addressed through 
sustained funding for the arts (Walker, 2017). 
Some of the Foundation’s recent domestic grants reflect this orientation. For 
example, a grant of USD 10 million to United States Artists will build an endow-
ment for that group to continue providing grants to individual artists in a range of 
fields and genres. The ‘storytelling strategy’ in the U.S. embraces Ford’s JustFilms 
documentary initiative, and arts infrastructure builds on what Ford has already been 
doing in the U.S. for some years under the rubric of supporting diverse arts spaces. In 
2015, the Foundation made a total of 141 grants totaling USD 44.5 million under the 
Freedom of Expression theme (now superseded); over half of this support went for arts 
18 While there is no space here for detailed discussion, it seems clear that a decline in public support for 
tertiary education, and the fact that humanities subjects do not bring major research dollars to universi-
ties, has contributed to shifting priorities. 
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spaces, while most of the rest of the grants supported media access and the JustFilms 
initiative. There were also grants to a number of mainstream New York cultural insti-
tutions (Metropolitan Opera Association, New York Shakespeare Festival, New York 
Public Library, Vivian Beaumont Theater, etc.), suggesting that Ford intends to main-
tain a place among the city’s prominent arts patrons. 
This all sounds reassuring for culture in the United States, but the picture does not 
appear as bright when we look at the Foundation’s overseas activities. In Ford’s field 
offices, in fact, culture programs were curtailed under Walker’s predecessor.19 While 
Walker himself served as Vice President for Education, Media, Arts and Culture, at 
the same time, a focus on public service media and Internet access was enlarged. 
Program officers assigned to work on cultural vitality and interpretation disappeared 
around 2007, and today it is not clear whether any field office staff have specific roles 
under Creativity and Free Expression.20 The 2015 grants database includes a handful of 
grants under Diverse Arts Spaces from the Cairo and Mexico City field offices; there 
are none from Asia offices. In 2016 some 171 grants related to Creativity and Free 
Expression were made worldwide for a total of USD 69.3 million; in Asia, there were 
only seven grants (two in China and five in Indonesia). While it may still be too early 
to fully define new directions in cultural programming, the relative absence of cul-
ture among current Asia field office priorities is not encouraging. 
There are other reasons to wonder how Ford will treat cultural issues and prob-
lems in future, and whether new philanthropy perspectives and models have perhaps 
taken root more deeply during its program realignment. For example, the Foundation 
for many years used a succinct media tag for acknowledgment on television and 
radio: “Ford Foundation: A resource for innovative people and institutions world-
wide”. Today, however, the Foundation sees itself as “Working with visionaries on 
the frontlines of social change worldwide, to address inequality in all its forms”. The 
new tag posits an activist stance, putting the donor right alongside, if not leading, 
grantees in the social justice struggle. One wonders whether those who might hesi-
tate to claim the status of visionaries can still get a hearing from the Foundation, and 
whether support for individual artists and scholars has been eclipsed by a focus on 
institution-building.
The way Ford now describes Creativity and Free Expression stresses utility and 
purpose: art as instrument for something else. The arts do not exist in and of them-
selves; they “address inequality” and “contribute to a fairer and more just society” 
(Ford Foundation, 2017). There is no doubt that storytelling exists in a myriad of con-
texts around the world, responding to varied social, educational or communitarian 
needs. However, for the Foundation it necessarily “addresses issues of justice” and 
“fuels change” (Ford Foundation, 2017). There is more than a hint of agenda-setting 
here; how will this lexicon be translated, literally and figuratively, outside the United 
States? Who decides which projects will “transform attitudes that perpetuate injus-
tice” (Supporting the most innovative, 2016)21 and how will results in terms of 
19 Luis Ubiñas was Ford’s President from 2007-2013.
20 Staffing and assignments are still shifting in the wake of President Walker’s realignment around in-
equality. My comments reflect current information available at www.fordfoundation.org, as well as discus-
sions with several field office observers. 
21 From a description on Ford’s website of a recent Foundation grant in partnership with the Skoll and 
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attitudes and more justice be assessed? A recent profile of Darren Walker in The New 
Yorker described ongoing debates about the implications of addressing inequality: 
“Ford believed in supporting art as a means of disrupting dominant narrative”, notes 
the author, “but art didn’t always do what you wanted it to” (MacFarquhar, 2016).
Because the Foundation has long played a leading role in drawing attention to 
issues of cultural vitality and interpretation in Asia, eliminating cultural programs is 
certain to have an impact on the larger field. There is data suggesting that Ford’s turn 
away from culture in its international work is already having an effect. According to 
the Foundation Center,22 in 2002 Ford provided by far the largest share of grants for 
Arts and Culture to recipients outside the United States, making 138 grants (39% of 
the number of grants made in this category) with a total value of USD 20.1 million 
(equal to 42% of the amount of resources all US foundations provided for Arts and 
Culture outside the United States). As of 2012, Ford still made the largest number of 
Arts and Culture grants (61, or 21% of the total), but provided only USD 12.2 million 
in overseas grants (just 20% of the total grant amounts). Further, while in 2002 there 
were eleven Asian grantee organizations on the Foundation Center’s list of the top 
50 recipients of Arts and Culture grants outside the US, by 2012 there were only two 
Asian grantees on that list.
Global philanthropy has been transformed by many factors, not least among them 
the electronic information revolution that enables instantaneous contact between 
staff in field offices and headquarters. This means that ways of working have changed, 
and so have the interactions among staff in field offices and headquarters. Whereas 
field office communications with New York once took place primarily through weekly 
airmail pouches, today it is not uncommon for Foundation staff in Asia to stay up late 
at night for regular teleconferences. Grants processing, meeting agendas, budgeting 
and accounting, personnel, and other operations are increasingly uniform, digitized 
and centralized in the hands of managers based at headquarters. 
Ford’s global structure entails reaching the right balance between operational 
efficiency and field office creativity and autonomy. Running field offices with inter-
national staff is an expensive business that demands attention to maintaining an 
institutional profile in local contexts, to nurturing extensive networks, and to making 
sure that New York staff includes people who understand the complexity and nuance 
of overseas work. Some experienced hands have wondered if Ford’s ‘back-office’ func-
tions could more easily be centralized entirely in New York, which would mean even 
smaller staff levels overseas. Indeed, few philanthropies these days see utility in keep-
ing in-country staff on the ground, preferring an approach that flies out teams of 
consultants and evaluators instead. This may be effective for donors who design pro-
grams at a distance and then ‘contract out’ to appropriate governments or non-prof-
its for implementation. However, it might not be as productive an approach for Ford’s 
traditionally more engaged philanthropy. 
In a recent speech accepting an award from the Studio Museum in Harlem in New 
York City, President Walker noted that the arts are a powerful tool for challenging 
BRITDOC Foundations that will provide second-stage funding for joint projects by social entrepreneurs 
and filmmakers
22 See www.data.foundationcenter.org for relevant lists and tables.
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“persistent stereotypes and cultural narratives that undermine fairness, tolerance 
and inclusion”. Such narratives persist outside the boundaries of the United States, 
and are troubling in the Asian settings of Ford’s field offices. In India, for instance, 
exclusionary social structures persist alongside a rampant, growing religious nation-
alism that is leading to oppression of minority communities and growing censorship 
in the arts, literature, and the teaching of history. Many ethnic minority peoples of 
China, especially in the Tibetan and Uighur regions, face relentless pressure on their 
languages, religions, and lifeways. In Indonesia, religious intolerance is expanding 
into both cultural and political spheres in alarming ways. The Foundation has accu-
mulated significant experience in these countries with local activists who promote 
historical interpretation, appreciation of ethnic diversity, creative expression, and 
the vitality of living traditions – experience that could be translated into changing 
contexts to address current challenges.
In the end, what matters for Ford’s international philanthropy is not only how 
aspirational it might be in promoting disruption of the drivers of inequality. What 
will also matter is whether it uses the unique leverage of its offices around the world 
to sustain grant making that is informed by local insight, in the hands of creative and 
engaged staff who can implement its realigned mandate in grounded, relevant ways. 
I have suggested that a focus on culture and humanities embeds credibility, empathy, 
and deeper awareness within the Foundation. Such focus has made the Foundation 
an exceptional donor during the rich history of its grant making in Asia. As an organ-
ization that tries to place people’s real-world experience, dreams, identities, and 
vulnerabilities foremost, the Ford Foundation has from the beginning of its work in 
Asia seen a role for attention to cultural vitality and creative interpretation of human 
experience. That is a unique and immeasurable part of Ford’s own heritage – and one 
that its leaders should be proud to sustain.

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This paper outlines the characteristics of the philanthropic sector in Thailand today. It first 
describes the local concept of giving, which is intricately linked to Theravada Buddhism. 
Then, the paper provides examples of traditional forms of philanthropic institutions 
that are more closely associated with charity than philanthropy, followed by examples of 
innovative forms of philanthropic efforts. Given the trajectory of economic development 
in Thailand, opportunities to engage broader public interest in philanthropy exist and in 
order to do so, there is need for the sector in general to build stronger evidence of how 
public giving is translated into social impact. The main challenge to the Thai philan-
thropic sector is the limited attention to accountability and transparency, as philanthrop-
ic entities generally have not developed robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks 
that target outcomes. This can be turned into an opportunity to address the general lack 
of focus on strategy development, weak monitoring systems, and a limited reporting of 
outcomes.
Keywords: Charity; Giving; Philanthropic Organizations; Thai Philanthropy; Thailand

INTRODUCTION
Not much has been written about the evolution of charitable giving in Thailand 
from traditional practices related to religious giving to corporate and social giving 
today. There are very few scholarly works that have studied philanthropic activi-
ties in Thailand (Wattanasiritham, 2007). Two underlying reasons may be behind 
the sparse literature on the philanthropic sector in Thailand: 1) The understand-
ing of philanthropy as a sector or a professional area of expertise is at a nascent 
stage, and 2) there are few examples of local organizations operating in a manner 
that qualifies as philanthropy as practiced in North America and Western Europe.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a general overview of the context 
of charitable giving in Thailand, and to analyze the current landscape of char-
itable giving with examples of emerging forms of socially conscious entities 
working towards the betterment of Thai society.1 I will argue that practices of 
the current philanthropic sector in Thailand are generally closer to charity than 
1 This paper was written based on a series of grants funded by the Rockefeller Foundation in 2014 and 
2015 towards strengthening the philanthropic sector in Thailand. Several of the sources used in this paper 
are drawn from grantee reports that were supported by the Foundation.
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philanthropy. In the following, I will first describe traditional forms of giving in 
Thailand to establish the context of charity in Thailand, which is driven by deep 
religious beliefs in Theravada Buddhism where traditional forms of giving still 
permeate most socially-driven programs in Thailand. Then, I will present emerging 
local institutions which distinguish themselves by various characteristics that may 
qualify them as emergent forms of philanthropic entities. These examples demon-
strate the diversity of Thailand’s charitable sector today, ranging from large Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) programs to small foundations set up by 'high net-worth 
individuals'2 to an informal network of like-minded professionals who coalesce 
through Facebook. In the last section, I will describe the challenges that lie ahead for 
Thailand’s emerging philanthropic sector such as the need to strengthen accounta-
bility and transparency through stronger monitoring frameworks, and to build a col-
laborative culture across actors to leverage the impact of programs targeting similar 
social outcomes. The transition from a model of traditional charity to philanthropy 
is still in the making and the Thai case might demonstrate a home-grown repertoire 
of socially conscious forms of giving, or a local model of philanthropy that extends 
beyond financial support.
THE CONCEPT OF GIVING IN THAILAND
According to the Charities Aid Foundation’s (CAF) (2015) World Giving Index 2015, 
Myanmar ranks as the world’s most charitable country. The United States and New 
Zealand came in second and third place, respectively. Thailand was among the top 
20, ranking number 19 globally. This is not a new record for Thailand, as the country 
has been among CAF’s top twenty during previous years as well. Looking over the 
previous five years, the CAF World Ranking Index places Thailand at number 16. The 
CAF calculates its World Ranking based on three components of giving: 1) helping 
a stranger, 2) donating money, and 3) volunteering time, with the assumption that 
giving and helping others are natural human instincts.
The CAF report attributes Myanmar’s high giving index to the deep belief in 
Theravada Buddhism that translates into the practice of donating to temples, as well 
as volunteering time towards their upkeep and maintenance. Myanmar and Thailand 
rank number one and two respectively in terms of percentage of people and num-
ber of people who donate money to charitable causes. The CAF World Giving Index 
2015 reports that, “both Myanmar and Thailand have a high proportion of Theravada 
Buddhists practicing Sangha Dana which drives this high donation rate” (p. 19). Sangha 
dana refers to the practice of charitable giving to the community of ordained monks. 
While Theravada Buddhism encourages the practice of donation to religious causes, 
it may not be the only driving force that contributes to the high levels of donations. 
Charitable giving in Thailand is influenced by the Buddhist principles of karma3, as 
well as socio-cultural norms based on a political system rooted in kinship, family affil-
iation, regional ties, and networks that shape local attitudes on giving (Ockey, 1994). 
2 In the investment sector, private banking, and philanthropic institutions, ‘high-net worth’ is used to 
designate persons who hold a big amount of assets for investment.
3 Karma is derived from Sanskrit karman (action, effect, fate). I will use the Sanskrit spelling of the word 
in this paper.
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Understanding charitable giving in Thailand must take into account the local 
belief system that is heavily influenced by Theravada Buddhism, which constitutes 
the socio-cultural dimensions of giving (Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, 2001; 
Keyes, 1971). One cannot look at giving in isolation, but in relation to the driv-
ers of charitable actions. The principle of reincarnation is a fundamental belief in 
Theravada Buddhism. All life forms are reincarnated in a cycle of birth, life, and death 
without an end unless one reaches nirvana, or enlightenment. Tham bun, or making 
merit, is a means to accumulate good deeds (Fuengfusakul, 1993). The role that karma 
plays in determining reincarnation is key to understanding why people give to chari-
table causes. Karma, as defined in Theravada Buddhism, is action that is driven by an 
intention. Good karma is action that is driven by good intentions and making merit 
or meritorious deeds will contribute to accumulating good karma. One’s accumulat-
ed karma will determine the kind of rebirth or reincarnation of future lives. This core 
belief is a fundamental principle that drives charitable giving in Thailand (Asia Pacific 
Philanthropy Consortium, 2001, p. 2 ; Nye, 2008). The common belief in the karmic 
cycle based on one’s accumulated good deeds incentivizes people to donate towards 
religious causes. Ordinary Thais make merit through various forms of giving. The 
most popular and traditional form of giving is to temples in the form of monetary 
contributions. Giving alms to monks in the early morning is also widely practiced. 
The practice of soliciting money from friends, family members, and colleagues for a 
merit-making trip to a temple is wide spread. Another practice that reinforces one’s 
“karmic savings” is the practice of donations for oneself or loved ones who are alive, 
or also deceased (Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, 2001, p. 2).
Breakdown of Social Giving in Thailand: 
Most frequent beneficiaries of giving:
Temples or religious institutions  93.3%
Educational institutions   83.4%
Hospitals and health organizations  74.7%
Community organizations   65.2%
Royal-affiliated projects   49.6%
Most trusted charitable organizations:
Temples or religious institutions  47.9%
Royal-affiliated projects   23.3%
Educational institutions   15.8%
Hospitals and health organizations  5.6%
Community organizations   4.3%
Most effective charitable organizations:
Temples or religious institutions  31.6%
Royal-affiliated projects   20.4%
Educational institutions   20.4%
Hospitals and health organizations  14.2%
Community organizations   8.5%
Table 1: Breakdown of Social Giving in Thailand (Chhina, Petersik, Loh, & Evans, 2014, p. 92)
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Also common in Thailand is to make contributions for the costs of funerals. It is 
customary that friends and co-workers make monetary contributions to the family 
of the deceased. Each contribution is made voluntarily and the amount is entirely 
based on the donor’s social status and ability to pay. Weddings also draw in mon-
etary contributions. Such widespread social practices reflect social expectations in 
which giving serves as social glue in networks and communities. In rural areas, giving 
towards social events such as funerals, weddings, and the ordination of monks and 
novices constitutes a normal part of engaging in community life. Charitable giving 
as a social practice is meant to solidify the sense of belonging, the community, or the 
family. Local attitudes toward giving are influenced by the idea that if one is to give, 
then one should not expect anything in return. This notion may owe its origins to the 
Buddhist ideal of selflessness as a virtuous mindset that has a positive karmic value. 
Later sections of this paper will establish the link between this belief and challenges 
in transitioning from charity to philanthropy in Thailand.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CHARITABLE GIVING
Thailand is heralded as an economic success story. It earned the classification as a 
‘high middle income’ country in 2011 according to the World Bank’s ranking. Except 
for the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Thai economy has grown steadily in the 
past three decades at an annual average rate of 7.5% per year from 1986 to 1996, and 
at a slower rate of 5% from 1999 to 2005. As a consequence, the poverty rate fell from 
67% in 1989 to only 11% in 2014 (Pasul & Baker, 1998; World Bank, 2016). As the coun-
try continues to advance economically and thus building a larger middle class, it is 
hypothesized that donations towards charitable causes would increase. Calculations 
done by the Thailand Development and Research Institute (TDRI) based on household 
surveys seem to support this assumption. In 2014, donations from Thai households 
towards charitable causes amounted to THB 75 million, or around 0.6% of Thailand’s 
GDP of that year (Sumano, 2016). 
Despite Thailand’s impressive economic achievements, growing inequalities, 
especially those along the urban-rural dimension, pose a major challenge for the 
country to escape the ‘middle income trap’. This is understood as an economic devel-
opment ceiling which a country is unable to surpass without undergoing major 
structural changes that require moving from labor- and capital-intensive industries 
towards an innovations-driven economy. Given the 2008 financial crisis that has 
affected the world economy, Thailand has seen sluggish economic growth with an 
average annual growth rate of 3.5%. The rural areas, where the majority of the popu-
lation resides, still face serious disparities relative to their urban counterparts, such as 
access to quality education and healthcare. With new challenges to the Thai econo-
my these gaps risk becoming wider. According to the World Bank, in 2013 80% of the 
country’s 7.3 million poor were living in rural areas (World Bank, 2016). Recognizing 
that gains from participation in the global economy are not distributed equitably to 
address urban-rural inequalities, there is an emerging awareness among NGOs, the 
development and research community, and concerned public officials in Thailand 
that the country needs to break out of the middle income trap. This might require 
innovations to promote specific reforms such as in the education sector. In this spirit, 
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a handful of local organizations and some private sector champions of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) are thinking of innovative ways to run their charitable 
organizations and turn charity – that is defined as giving without any expectation 
in return – into philanthropy, understood as investing from private sources for the 
public interest towards the goal of sustained impact.
Based on data from the CAF report, Thailand has ranked consistently high in 
terms of monetary donations. 78% of Thais reported having made monetary con-
tributions while only 15% of those surveyed responded that they had volunteered 
towards a charitable cause (Charities Aid Foundation, 2015, p. 12). If time dedicated 
or volunteered to a charitable cause is used as the indicator, Thailand ranks 98 out of 
a total of 145 countries. This suggests that time is the rarer commodity in the lives of 
Thais today, and monetary contributions are the preferred means of charitable giving 
since it is easy to do ‘with no strings attached’. With the disparities growing between 
rural and urban areas, this pattern of giving indicates that charitable financial contri-
butions would need to address problems that result from the rural-urban gap.
In a study on social investment in selected ASEAN countries, three main charac-
teristics of charitable giving were identified in Thailand (Chhina et al., 2014, p. 91):
1. Giving is very much part of Thai culture and linked to religious beliefs in mak-
ing merit or tham bun;
2. Charitable giving is done in an ad-hoc manner dominated by individual giving 
which is motivated largely through personal connections or affiliations;
3. A large part of charitable giving goes to religious causes, organizations, or pro-
jects under royal patronage, and well-known charities or foundations. 
These findings, along with my argumentation here, suggest that traditional giving 
in Thailand is more akin to charity than to philanthropy. The first and third findings 
underline the assumption that giving in Thailand is largely driven by religious beliefs 
and is mostly done through traditional forms of charity represented by temples, 
established foundations, and charities. The second finding corroborates the notion 
that charitable giving is motivated by social cohesion and belonging to a group, as 
well as by the wish to enhance one’s social status or connections. 
THE LANDSCAPE OF PHILANTHROPY IN THAILAND
In Thailand, royal charities and projects under royal patronage occupy a significant 
proportion of charitable giving and have contributed to improving the livelihoods of 
many of their beneficiaries, especially in remote and rural areas. The three principal 
royal charities are the Sai-Jai Thai Foundation, which began in 1976, the Chaipattana 
Foundation, and the Mae Fah Luang Foundation, both established in 1988. Numerous 
royal projects funded by these three royal foundations form the basis of Thailand’s 
charitable sector. Royal charities are the product of King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s 
(Rama IX; 1946-2016) vision to assist his people and improve their well-being 
through sustainable agriculture, conservation of the ecosystem, and maintaining 
a well-balanced and self-sufficient livelihood. These projects aim to foster solidar-
ity among all Thais, wherein “Thais should help and support other Thais” (Sai-Jai 
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Thai Foundation, n.d.). King Bhumibol started these foundations at the time when 
Thailand was still a low income country, surrounded by political instability and war in 
neighboring countries. The rural Thai population was desperately poor and had lim-
ited economic opportunities to make a better living. Hence, bridging the inequality 
gap lies at the heart of the mission of these royal projects.
The royal projects under the above mentioned royal foundations are distinct 
from the rest of the philanthropic and charitable sector in Thailand because they 
are managed systematically, are highly organized, and have been in existence over 
a relatively long period of time compared to CSR programs or activities of local 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They belong in a category beyond the 
diverse and fragmented charitable sector because they have reached the scale and 
sustainability in which impact to segments of society has been palpable. In addition, 
royal projects are systematically organized and managed by professionals who are 
hired for various tasks. The Doi Tung project, for example, is highly sustainable as 
it operates as a social enterprise linking local producers and small farmers to urban 
consumers in Bangkok and secondary cities. The Chaipattana Foundation funds pro-
jects not only in Thailand, but also in neighboring countries and in locations outside 
the ASEAN region. Hence, royal charities will not be part of my discussion. 
The Thai philanthropic sector is composed of an amalgam of diverse types 
of organizations, ranging from NGOs, corporate giving programs, public funds, 
hospitals, and faith-based organizations, to well-established foundations and social 
enterprises (Wattanasiritham, 2007). To the public at large, all these organizations 
work in a sector generally known as the 'charitable sector' where there is little under-
standing between what distinguishes charity from CSR or from philanthropy. For 
example, in Thai there is no direct translation of the term ‘philanthropy’. A broad 
translation of ‘charitable activities’ or ‘socially driven activities’ are used to signify the 
English term. Still today, the deeply engrained notion of making merit is intertwined 
with charity, as in the expression tham bun tham than, (literally ‘make merit, make a 
donation’). Thus, projects funded under various ‘philanthropic’ causes, more often 
than not, do not invest in building sustained impact for the beneficiaries, but rather, 
contribute towards immediate or short-term results. Giving in itself is a charitable 
act, and thus, the engagement of the giver ends once the giving is done.
A typical annual activity that is considered as 'philanthropic' in Thailand con-
sists of the campaign run by a corporate or private entity to collect donations for 
the purchase of blankets for poor families in remote areas of Northern Thailand 
(ThaiBev, 2016). The assumption of the program is that poor rural families in the 
north lack blankets and so face hardship and health vulnerabilities during the win-
ter months. The underlying assumption is that providing blankets will contribute 
to improving their well-being. There have been very few attempts to assess system-
atically whether such an endeavor creates the results that are expected, or wheth-
er there are alternate methods to improve the living conditions for disadvantaged 
villagers during the cold winter months. The understanding of the objectives of 
strategic investment to obtain a sustained outcome and impact is absent from such 
programs. Other philanthropic activities, supported by the private sector, consist of 
providing scholarships to disadvantaged children. Yet, there is little follow up on the 
educational achievements of the students, the assumption being that just providing 
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financial support is sufficient to improve the education of the recipient. Most schol-
arship programs fail to comprehend that a robust education is more than attending 
classroom lectures, but includes supportive structures such as counselling, working 
closely with the students’ families, and consistent follow-up that is made together 
with the school and the students, as well as connecting the students with appropriate 
career prospects. Similar to initiatives that provide blankets to poor villagers, these 
scholarship programs do not focus on sustained and strategic investments to have 
a positive impact on the students. Investing resources towards building enhanced 
capacity for teachers and more productive teaching methods might yield greater 
educational benefits for the pupils. Nevertheless, the most popular charitable cause 
remains scholarships to poor and disadvantaged school children (Sumano, 2016).
EXAMPLES OF TRADITIONAL PHILANTHROPIC ORGANIZATIONS
There are a few examples of well-established charitable organizations that bridge the 
traditional notion of 'charity' and that of 'philanthropy'. More recently, new forms 
of philanthropic efforts by new groups of local actors have emerged as a response to 
the changing social and political content. The following examples are by no means 
exhaustive, but attempt to demonstrate some key characteristics of traditional phil-
anthropic organizations that have achieved a certain level of impact and scale.
The Thailand Development and Research Institute (TDRI) undertook research 
on religious giving and found approximately 40,000 temples throughout the country 
with an average annual income from donations of THB 3.4 million, or USD 96,200, 
and associated annual expenditures of THB 2.8 million, or USD 79,200. Each year, 
the average total amount of money that goes to temples nation-wide is estimated at 
THB 100 billion or USD 2.8 billion (TDRI, 2017). This remarkable figure seems to 
support the CAF study and attests to the deep spirit of giving among Buddhist Thais. 
The problem is that giving is not accompanied by an equally robust accountability 
system. In the same TDRI study it was discovered that the majority of temples do 
not possess a systematic process of accounting, and accounting books do not meet 
general standards. In recent years, numerous scandals involving inappropriate uses 
of donation money by temples in Thailand have prompted the public to demand for 
greater accountability and transparency. 
According to a recent study, from a sample of 39,513 households, 93% partici-
pate in giving towards religious activities (Kanchanachitra, 2014). The study defines 
this category of giving as 'merit-making', thus purely for religious reasons linked to 
Buddhist beliefs in accumulating good karma through making merit. The study also 
looks at giving as making donations for non-religious reasons, such as to established 
charities, foundations, and organizations. From the same survey, the percentage of 
Thai households that made donations to non-religious causes was estimated at 18%, 
considerably lower than for religious giving. The study also reveals that households 
that donate to charitable organizations for non-religious causes tend to have relative-
ly higher household incomes and have a higher proportion of heads of households 
with a university degree. Based on these findings, it seems that there is much space 
for the development of the philanthropic sector in Thailand. As Thai households 
are becoming more urban and have a smaller family size, these households will have 
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fewer dependents and thus more disposable income. Thus there is the potential to 
broaden philanthropic engagement and to make giving more systematic and strategic 
by tapping into these educated and urban households.
Unfortunately, the study does not delve further into analyzing which categories 
of charities or foundations benefit the most from non-religious donations. Based on 
my field observations and discussions with professionals working in the non-profit 
sector, another category which receives significant contributions from the Thai pub-
lic is foundations that serve the three main hospitals and medical schools in Bangkok: 
the Siriraj Foundation, the Ramathibodhi Foundation, and the Thai Red Cross Society 
which manages Chulalongkorn Hospital. For middle- to high-income households, 
donating to these large hospitals is compelling for several reasons. The first is that the 
institutions have well-organized structures to manage donations, and second that 
they have a clear mission easily understood by the public, which is to deliver quality 
healthcare and to reduce the pain and suffering from illness and disease. Third, these 
hospitals are recognized centers of excellence with a long history of public service 
to the people. The Thai Red Cross Society Board is chaired by Princess Sirindhorn. 
Royal patronage of hospital foundations provides a basis of trust among the public 
that their donations will be put to best use. Each hospital operates various trust funds 
and donors can specify that their contributions go towards a given cause. For wealthy 
individuals, giving to such hospitals or an affiliated trust fund is a common way to 
contribute to charity and to society in general, and one that also brings recognition 
to the individual and their family. Sizeable donations that for example support the 
construction of a new wing, or a new building at a hospital usually mean a visible 
outcome as well as broad recognition of the donation. It is common that a commem-
orative tablet, inscribed with names of generous donors, is placed at the entry of a 
ward or in the lobby of the donated building, or in a location visible to visitors. This 
type of giving by a select group of wealthy individuals instills a sense of longevity and 
permanence to the act of generosity, as infrastructure stands the test of time.
One of the best-known foundations is the Poh Teck Tung Foundation, which began 
in 1910 (Poh Teck Tung Foundation, 2010). Its activities were funded by a wealthy 
first generation of Sino-Thai merchants who settled in Siam4 or by the second gener-
ation who descended from migrants from China. The founders were inspired by the 
legend of a Buddhist monk who dedicated his life to serving poor and sick people to 
relieve them of pain and suffering. In 1937, the Poh Teck Tung Foundation was reg-
istered officially as the Huakiew Poh Teck Siang Tung Foundation. It had a revolving 
fund of THB 2,000, with a board of directors composed of 16 members. According to 
their website, the Poh Teck Tung Foundation is one of the biggest charitable organi-
zations in the country. Its mission consists of offering relief during disasters, provid-
ing education and healthcare and supporting culture and arts. Among its best-known 
activities is their role of retrieving corpses from accidents and catastrophes and taking 
charge of them, including cremation if no family or relatives can be identified. One of 
their contributions was the construction of the Huachiew Hospital, a large hospital 
in Bangkok that provides a comprehensive list of services. As a well-established and 
highly organized organization, the Poh Teck Tung Foundation delivers visible and 
4 Thailand was formerly known as Siam. The name was changed in 1949.
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quantifiable results. With the visibility of its charitable activities and a history inter-
woven with the development of Bangkok’s Chinatown, the foundation garners trust 
from the local community and the Thai-Chinese public, which in turn perpetuates 
the virtuous cycle of giving from individuals and businesses. 
The philanthropic organizations cited in the examples above do not make their 
annual donation or programmatic activities easily accessible to the public. For exam-
ple, all three hospital foundations have websites that allow easy donations online, 
but do not present details of their charitable activities or on how donations have 
been spent. The absence of such information might be due to weak interest from the 
public to seek such information after a donation has been made, thus reflecting the 
belief that giving is not to expect anything in return, not even following up on how 
the donation was spent or the results of the contribution. Another plausible expla-
nation is that setting up monitoring and evaluation systems is relatively costly and 
requires specific skills and knowledge. The amount of effort and resources required 
for a monitoring and evaluation system may not be considered as a strategic use of 
funds if there is no real demand to use such data to improve performance or refine 
current programs for greater impact to society. Therein lie the limitations of most 
traditional philanthropic organizations in Thailand that impede their categorization 
as professionally-run ‘philanthropic organizations’.
NEW FORMS OF PHILANTHROPIC ENGAGEMENT
As Thailand has graduated into being an upper-middle income country, its 
socio-economic development has spawned innovative forms of philanthropic entities 
and charitable models of giving. These newer actors are as diverse as the more tradi-
tional ones. The entities I cover in this section represent some of the innovations and 
demonstrate the diversity of emergent philanthropic actors.
One of the largest grant-making entities is the Thai Health Promotion Foundation 
or Thai Health, founded in 2001 under the Health Promotion Foundation Act. Thai 
Health operates through a fund collected from a 2% ‘sin tax’ or excise tax on tobacco 
and alcohol, which amounts to approximately USD 120 million annually (Thai Health 
Promotion Foundation, n.d.). The foundation interprets ‘health promotion’ broadly 
through the lens of well-being, which encompasses four dimensions of health – phys-
ical, mental, spiritual, and social. The majority of Thai Health’s grantees are local 
NGOs, universities, and research institutions. With its large annual budget funding 
over 1,000 projects per year, Thai Health has been criticized for distorting the NGO 
sector by creating a monopoly on funding and influencing the priorities and pro-
grams of the civil society sector. With an annual endowment guaranteed by law from 
the Thai state, Thai Health is a key funding organization in the country.
Thai Health can be considered a new form of local philanthropy as its institutional 
structure best fits the characteristics of a typical foundation: 1) it has a secure endow-
ment source, through sin taxes; 2) it does not receive donations or money from the 
public or any other source; 3) it possesses a governance and staffing structure compara-
ble to other professionally-run foundations; and 4) it implements strategic programs. 
Thai Health is overseen by a board, managed by a CEO and run by staff recruited based 
on their qualifications. It has an independent evaluation board comprising of seven 
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members who are experts from areas in health promotion, evaluation, and finance. 
The function of the evaluation board is to execute overall performance evaluations of 
the organization, and according to state legislation, Thai Health is obliged to report 
annually to the cabinet as well as to both houses of the Thai parliament.
In Thailand, large foundations such as Thai Health are the exceptions rather than 
the norm. Philanthropic efforts of wealthy individuals are made primarily through the 
family corporation with some activities managed by a small family foundation. In the 
study undertaken by the Lien Centre for Social Innovation, families of high net-worth 
individuals in Thailand, as in other Asian countries, engage in charitable activities 
through two principal channels: a family foundation that often focuses on charitable 
purposes such as in the areas of youth, education, and poverty alleviation; and a cor-
porate program attached to the family business (Chhina et al., 2014, p. 93). The study 
concludes with the emerging trend in Thailand in which philanthropic activities are 
being pursued out of corporate entities rather than private foundations. Corporate 
Social Responsibility or CSR is a subject that is broadly understood by the general pub-
lic and the urban middle class and thus has attracted more interest than philanthropy 
(Chhina et al., 2014, p. 93). The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) even set up a CSR 
Institute in 2007 and the Asian Center for Corporate Social Responsibility (ACCSR) was 
created in 2009 based at the Asia Institute of Technology in Bangkok. While this may 
be a positive sign for CSR in Thailand, family foundations remain small in terms of 
size of endowment and staffing, with family members facing the challenge to dedicate 
sufficient time and effort in managing the foundation (“The Changing Face”, 2015).
Thai corporations, led by Siam Cement Group (SCG), Central Group, and Premier 
Group, are re-thinking how they engage in the betterment of Thailand by leap-
frogging traditional models of community engagement, volunteering, and ad hoc 
donations by setting up programs that empower local communities through activi-
ties that build their capacities and valorize local resources (Chhina et al., 2014). SCG 
is the kingdom’s oldest and most highly respected conglomerates, founded in 1913 by 
King Rama VI (1910-1925) to provide domestically produced cement and construction 
materials for the country’s infrastructure. SCG started the SCG Foundation which 
focuses on children, youth, and community support during disaster relief efforts, such 
as the Indian Ocean Tsumani in 2004 and the floods in 2011. For the year 2012, the 
SCG Foundation reported on its website that it disbursed THB 563 million towards 
community development, social infrastructure, and the environment (Chhina et al., 
2014). Given the size of its annual CSR disbursement, SCG is among the top corporate 
givers in Thailand (Onozawa, 2013). Chaovalit Ekabut, currently president of SCG, 
explains that “CSR is not an extra activity, it is our duty” (Chhina et al., 2014, p. 21). 
Central Group is the country’s largest retail conglomerate, which has expanded 
into real estate, commercial property development, hotels, and restaurants. Central 
Group began as a merchandise store located in Chinatown, founded in 1947 by 
Tiang Chirathivat, a Hainanese Chinese who immigrated to Thailand. In 1957, his 
son Samrit Chirathivat opened the first Central Department store. Like many Asian 
family-businesses, 'Central' – as it is commonly referred to – is now run by Tiang’s 
children and grandchildren. One active family member who oversees Central Group’s 
CSR program is Busaba Chirathivat whose strategy aims to link local communities 
to its supply chain, explicitly working with local government agencies through the 
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state-run OTOP program to source products and materials.5 Central brings its pur-
chasers and merchandising managers to train communities in developing products 
for their market. Participating communities which face cash flow problems receive 
accelerated payment for their goods. This program works in 25 provinces with 45 
communities across Thailand (Chhina et al., 2014, p. 95). Another feature of their CSR 
program is to work with persons with disabilities through the Mahathai Foundation – 
Thailand’s largest association for disabled persons, which helps identify appropriate 
candidates to work at Central Group’s repair and call centers for Central’s Power Buy, 
an electrical appliances retail chain. 
Many extremely wealthy individuals run CSR programs through their own cor-
porations, and thus, may not be drawn into creating their own private foundations, 
which are time consuming and intellectually demanding. According to an article on 
the website of Wealth-X, a business specializing in global wealth information, family 
foundations are gaining ground in Asia among the wealthy as a way to deliver charita-
ble activities, and yet, creating such foundations may prove to be easier than actually 
managing them: 
The Asian foundation industry is in its infancy compared to Europe and the US, 
although it is on the rise … There is no official estimate for Asia but it is likely to 
be less than 10,000, experts say. Many of these have fallen into inactivity as they 
don’t have a dedicated professional running them ... ‘Many family foundations 
in Asia were set up by the patriarch years ago and are now dormant, usually be-
cause the family has been too busy running the business’ Chow [a philanthropy 
consultant at law firm Withers Worldwide] said. (“The Changing Face”, 2015) 
An exception to this general trend is Premier Group’s chairman, Vichien 
Pongsathorn, who provides a cohesive strategy to the company’s CSR program. 
Premier Group is involved in a range of businesses ranging between consumer prod-
ucts, real estate and hotels, IT, transportation, environmental services, and what it 
calls “social sustainable development” (Premier, n.d.). Vichien believes that one of the 
missions of the Premier Group should be to mobilize greater participation from Thai 
society in resolving the country’s pressing problems (Chhina et al., 2014, p. 96). A key 
distinction in Premier’s corporate philanthropy is the recognition that partnerships 
and involvement of other stakeholders are critical for the creation of positive and 
lasting changes in Thai society (Premier, n.d.). Committed to philanthropic efforts, 
Premier Group garners 5% of its annual net profits towards its social sustainable 
development programs (Chhina et al., 2014, p. 96). This amount is unprecedented in 
Thailand as the corporate tax deduction is set at only 2% of net profits. 
The Premier Group has taken a different strategy than other corporations. It has 
created four foundations to fulfill its mission: the Yuvabadhana Foundation, the Enlive 
Foundation, the Khon Thai Foundation, and the Pan Kan Society. The Yuvabadhana 
Foundation that started over 20 years ago helps disadvantaged children throughout 
the country through educational scholarships, support programs, and mentoring. 
5 OTOP stands for “One Tambon One Product”, and is a program supported by the Thai government 
that aims to encourage each district or tambon to produce and sell a distinct local product made from local 
resources and by the local community.
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Three million children benefit from their programs (Yuvabadhana Foundation, n.d.). 
The Enlive Foundation focuses on building increased awareness of the importance of 
preserving the environment and aims at promoting sustainable eco-tourism in which 
natural resources are preserved. The foundation encourages the involvement of local 
government agencies, local communities, and associations in its projects (Enlive 
Foundation, 2016). Enlive Foundation’s annual reports are easily accessible from its 
website – a practice that is rare among Thai non-profit organizations. Founded in 
2011, the Khon Thai Foundation has an ambitious goal of “creating a better Thai 
society through the development of scalable and replicable collaborative platforms 
[that] enable active citizens from all sectors to work together for the greater good for 
society” (Khon Thai Foundation, n.d.). The fourth foundation – Pan Kan Society – is 
a social enterprise in which profits go towards the Yuvabadhana Foundation’s schol-
arships. ‘Pan Kan’ comes from the Thai term baeng pan meaning ‘to share with each 
other’. Pan Kan outlets collect donations of second hand clothing, books and house-
hold items which are in good condition, from the general public, and resells these 
items in Pan Kan shops at very low prices. It has faced a great increase in profits and is 
now undergoing expansion by also working with Mahathai Foundation to help that 
organization to set up their own versions of social enterprises (Chhina et al., 2014, p. 
96). In 2016, Vichien Pongsathorn was listed among Forbes Asia’s top philanthropists 
along with Harald Link of the B.Grimm Group (Koppisch, 2016).
The American business magazine Forbes has reported about noteworthy Asian 
philanthropists in its annual rankings, and in an article published in their print ver-
sion on September 2015, entitled “In Asia, 40 Heroes of Philanthropy Are Making 
Their Mark” (Koppisch, 2015). It selected people who give their own money rather 
than re-purposing a percentage of their company’s revenues towards charitable caus-
es because, according to their opinion, “donating shareholder funds isn’t exactly phi-
lanthropy” (Koppisch, 2016). Three philanthropists operating in Thailand made it 
on the list: Anchalika Kijkanakorn, Thanong Leeissaranukul, and a German national 
who runs philanthropic efforts in Thailand, Philipp Graf von Hardenberg. Anchalika 
Kijkanakorn is managing director of Akaryn Hospitality Management Services and 
created the Pure Blue Foundation in 2010 as a way to link her hotel business to environ-
mental conservation and community service. Thanong Leeissaranukul is President of 
Sittipol Group and spearheaded the Spare Human Parts campaign to change public 
opinion on organ donation. At Sittipol, 30% of the profits or approximately USD 3.3 
million are earmarked annually towards the Spare Human Parts campaign and for the 
assistance of the physically and mentally disabled and teachers in the armed conflict 
southern provinces of Thailand. In addition, the group’s 20,000 employees can apply 
to fund books, equipment, or other support for schools in their respective hometowns 
(Koppisch, 2016). After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Philipp Graf von Hardenberg 
established the Yaowawit School, which serves orphans, and the Children’s World 
Academy – a supporting foundation. The school continues to educate underprivileged 
children in Kapong, in Southern Thailand, and has raised donations of more than 
USD 5 million for the school. These philanthropists are neither household names 
nor well-known within the CSR or corporate philanthropy sector, but nevertheless 
demonstrate the emergence of a new breed of Thai philanthropists who have the 
desire and the drive to make a positive change with their wealth and privilege. 
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There are also recent models of local philanthropy-cum-social-enterprise cre-
ated by Thailand’s urban and techno–savvy millennials. One such attempt that is 
becoming increasingly sustainable as a social enterprise is the platform Social Giver, 
which operates as a social enterprise that connects businesses to consumers by allow-
ing businesses to sell excess capacity that otherwise would be unused, to consumers 
who can purchase services and goods at a bargain. For example, service providers 
such as restaurants or hotels can offer a discounted menu set for two or a hotel room 
on a certain date for a reduced price because there is no demand for those services 
on that particular date. This creates a win-win situation for all since the business 
operator can fill the excess capacity, the customer can purchase a service at a reduced 
price, and a clearly indicated charity receives a financial contribution from the sales 
of excess capacity. A significant percentage of Social Giver’s profits go towards sup-
porting development projects and charitable causes. The idea is that all businesses 
at one time or another face excess capacity that goes to waste, and this excess can 
be turned into a win-win model for business operators, consumers, and society as a 
whole. The transaction is conducted through Social Giver’s online website. 
Another similar effort is Tae Jai, which can be translated into English as “giving 
from the heart” and is an internet-based platform that connects individual donors 
to numerous development projects implemented by local NGOs, communities, and 
charities. It is supported and managed jointly by a network of non-profit organiza-
tions such as Change Fusion, the Khon Thai Foundation, Ashoka Thailand, the Thai 
Young Philanthropists Network (TYPN), Open Dreams, and Krung Thep Thurakit 
newspaper. According to its website, Tae Jai has raised close to THB 13 million from 
3,631 donors for 179 projects throughout Thailand. Donors can follow the progress 
of their chosen projects, and once a project is completed, it is reported on the Tae Jai 
website. Tae Jai’s innovation lies in connecting individual donors directly to devel-
opment projects by providing both transparency and accountability through their 
vetting system and online monitoring. 
The third example of innovative non-profit organizations is Teach for Thailand that 
addresses a pressing problem that most Thais are likely to identify with: inequitable 
access to quality education.6 Reforming the education sector is a critical pathway 
for Thailand to breach the middle income trap and propel itself in the ranks of an 
advanced economy. Teach for Thailand is a member of the global network, Teach for 
All, and aims to build young leaders through a model adapted to suit the context of 
Thailand’s education inequities. It aims to develop a new education model for low 
income school children who live in slum communities in Bangkok. The model of 
Teach for Thailand is to recruit professionals and university graduates to teach at 
schools in poor neighborhoods where the majority of students are underprivileged. 
Each teacher-volunteer works to inspire, mentor, and evoke positive change among 
the students. Each volunteer will teach for two years. The goal is for young Thai pro-
fessionals to become more engaged in teaching and giving back to society. Teach for 
Thailand recognizes that youth cannot fully develop into productive and socially 
engaged citizens without role models, mentors, and teachers who inspire them.
6 Teach for Thailand is a chapter of Teach for All. It is local in the sense that it has adapted a global model 
to suit the local context and to solve issues of inequity in Thailand’s education sector.
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Another new home-grown form of philanthropic engagement is the Thai Young 
Philanthropist Network (TYPN), which was established in 2008 as a network of young 
professionals and business leaders with a shared interest to foster positive change in 
Thailand (“The State of Philanthropy in Thailand”, 2016). The TYPN began during 
the period of political tensions in Thailand and mass protests in Bangkok. The found-
er, Ada Chirapaisarnkul, sensed that she and her peers in their twenties and thirties 
wanted to contribute to society and make their country a better place without joining 
any political faction. TYPN began to coalesce through Facebook, which at that time 
was still in its early days. According to Ada, users of Facebook in Thailand in 2008 
were mostly university students and urban middle class professionals, and as a result, 
TYPN now consists of well-educated professionals who are also well-connected to 
national and global networks (interview with Ada Chirapaisarnkul). Today, TYPN 
has grown into a network of 2,500 members, 1,200 of whom have engaged in past 
activities. Forty core members commit their own time and resources to run the 
projects. TYPN, unlike other philanthropic entities, is not institutionalized in the 
sense that it has no legal entity and no regular operating offices other than that of 
its founder. Activities and projects are sought online through live chats and offline 
at weekend gatherings of TYPN members interested in a particular activity. While 
TYPN operates based on the volunteering time invested in an activity, the founder 
believes that members have already built sufficient trust to begin creating a fund and 
raising money (Chhina et al., 2014, p. 99). TYPN has been very active in the creation 
of social enterprises, including Tae Jai mentioned above. It has also partnered with 
the Ministry of Education to set up a Youth Entrepreneurship Training Program.
Thailand’s new forms of socially conscious organizations are varied and range 
from public organizations like Thai Health that use innovative tax financing to fund 
philanthropic activities, to loose networks of like-minded professionals who inter-
act through social media platforms. In between, there are large Thai corporations 
that demonstrate commitment to social development by investing large portions of 
CSR budget to support capacity building initiatives of local communities and linking 
these communities to the supply chain, as well as working with disabled persons for 
a more inclusive business approach. Next to inspiring figures who serve as leadership 
examples, at a smaller scale, social enterprises like Social Giver are leveraging the 
connectivity of the internet to bring excess supply in the private sector to support 
local NGOs. All of these examples demonstrate the potential of the philanthropic 
sector in Thailand with programs that address specific social issues, target results, 
and social groups.
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TO TRANSFORM INTO A TRUE 
PHILANTHROPIC SECTOR
The conceptualization of philanthropy as practiced in North America and Western 
Europe, where there is an expectation that the philanthropic investment would have 
an impact, is still embryonic in Thailand and would require much coordinated ef-
fort to develop. Furthermore, as more traditional forms of socially-conscious giving 
are closer to charity, the sector has not made any adequate efforts to develop robust 
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monitoring systems for transparency and accountability. As long as having an impact 
is not considered an objective of local charities, these programs will not be designed 
to ensure that their activities translate into social change. This is a critical systemic 
problem of the sector as a whole and will have to be addressed if the ambitions of 
local charities are to have impact on the lives of the beneficiaries.
Despite these obstacles, there is much potential to expand the pool of charitable 
giving in Thailand and engage a broader segment of the growing middle class and 
local corporations. Yet, the main constraint that will have to be addressed and sys-
tematically resolved in order to create a platform and a nurturing environment to 
scale home-grown, innovative philanthropic efforts remains the low level of interest 
to measure results and track outcomes. If the aim of the entire sector altogether is to 
strengthen public engagement, Thailand’s charitable sector must focus on measuring 
its impact more systematically and with tools that address the public’s concern. One 
key point that triggers public anxiety is how donations are actually used by non-prof-
it organizations, especially the smaller or less known ones. This mistrust is a key 
obstacle to strengthening and expanding the non-profit sector, and improving the 
lack of trust is regarded as an urgent need, especially among NGOs whose ability to 
deliver results, transparency, and operational efficiency are still limited (Chhina et al., 
2014, p. 93). This point of action is particularly critical for capturing the potential of 
greater charitable giving by the growing middle class. Securing broader engagement 
from the public is not limited to the question of supply, where there must be a pool of 
compelling and attractive projects to fund. It is also a question of demand, in which 
non-profit organizations themselves must address the issue of building trust with the 
public to attain more funding for social causes. I surmise that weak accountability 
might be linked with the pervasive belief that charitable giving implies giving with-
out expectations for anything in return – not even inquiring about the actual results 
of the giving. The English language TDRI blog on charity presents this wide-spread 
attitude in the following:
These statistics suggest that most Thais are kind and generous when it comes 
to giving money to others. But have we wondered whether our donation money 
makes any impact? ... We have been taught since we were kids that we shall give 
without demanding anything in return. Moreover, giving money is so swift and 
easy, but tracking requires time, efforts, and often more money. So why bother? 
(Sumano, 2016)
Building a robust accountability framework requires effort and money, as pointed 
out in the TDRI blog post. While some organizations have put in the effort required 
towards that goal, others lag behind. Understanding the core advantages of having 
transparent, accessible, and strong financial systems and program metrics, especially 
in attracting future funding, is a key factor that might motivate non-profit organi-
zations to invest in such frameworks. Resource Alliance, a non-profit organization 
based in the United Kingdom, helps Thai non-governmental organizations to build 
greater accountability by encouraging them to compete in the annual Thai NGO 
Awards. Resource Alliance has incorporated the Thai NGO Awards into its regional 
Social Entrepreneur Awards in 2016, as there was weak demand from local non-profit 
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organizations.7 On the supply side, non-profits, private foundations, and CSR programs 
hold responsibility vis-á-vis their donors and also towards themselves as profession-
als, to build a robust and reliable framework for monitoring the results of their social 
investments if they are to create growth pathways and remain relevant in an ever more 
competitive field. In addition, on the demand side, it might be time for the charitable 
sector in Thailand, including the donors themselves, to change the broad perception 
of donations as money ‘to give away’ into money to be invested into social impacts. 
One has to demand a socially impactful return for that charitable investment. 
Moving from charity, as in giving money, food, or specific assistance to those in 
need, to philanthropy, which is the investment of private capital for the public good, 
remains an arduous task. One pathway to reaching this goal may be to transform the 
expectations around how charitable contributions to non-religious causes are used, 
tracked, and accounted for. Already, some of the larger CSR programs and innovative 
platforms mentioned in this paper are attempting to construct metrics to measure 
results. Working with well-respected organizations which have the technical exper-
tise in philanthropy and in the management of non-profit entities can be a way to 
develop stronger accountability frameworks and measurement tools. Thai Health is 
known to have supported capacity building through “social return on investment” 
(SROI) as a tool to measure social impact in Thailand. Thailand’s National Institute 
of Development Administration (NIDA) hosts the Center for Philanthropy and Civil 
Society which can compile best-practices for accountability and results tracking. Also 
present in Thailand is the CSR Asia Center at the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), 
which serves as a knowledge hub and research and training center for sustainabili-
ty practices. These institutions, acting as independent experts in technical areas of 
accountability, can be valuable partners in moving philanthropy forward and chang-
ing the mindset of donors as well as the public.
Corporate giving can play a role in instigating the professionalization of philan-
thropy in Thailand by modifying current practices. According to a grant report for the 
Rockefeller Foundation, challenges in current corporate giving practices relate to three 
main issues (School of Global Studies, 2017), the first being the lack of transparency in 
reporting. This problem is tied to the points mentioned above. Moreover, most com-
panies do not disclose data on social and environmental activities of their CSR pro-
grams. While the UN Global Compact provides guiding principles for the private sector, 
most Thai companies perceive this as a burden rather than a useful guide that will 
enable them to become responsible businesses (School of Global Studies, 2017). In Thai 
companies, CSR units normally reside within marketing or public relations depart-
ments. Generally, Thai companies consider CSR as a component of public relations 
and marketing, rather than a vehicle to affect social change. Third, the practice of CSR 
and other types of corporate giving are still limited to donations, and not surprisingly, 
98.5% of Thai CSR activities qualify as donations (School of Global Studies, 2017). 
On a practical level, the tax code can be revised to encourage philanthropy in 
Thailand. Like most countries, Thailand allows tax deductions for both individuals 
and corporations. For companies, the total tax-deductible amount is limited to 2% of 
7 In 2014, Resource Alliance received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to support the Thai NGO 
Awards. 
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net profits, while for individuals the deductible amount does not exceed 10% of net 
taxable income. According to tax lawyers and financial planners, these percentages 
are still relatively small, suggesting that they do not efficiently incentivize philan-
thropic giving (School of Global Studies, 2016, p.4). Furthermore, legal requirements 
render philanthropic giving beyond religious causes more cumbersome. For exam-
ple, according to a report compiled by the School of Global Studies at Thammasat 
University (2016, p. 4), claiming a tax deduction for an educational institution may not 
be as easy because the tax law specifically indicates which types of contributions are 
tax-deductible. Furthermore, what is tax-deductible may not correspond to the needs 
of the school. Giving towards religious causes, however, is relatively easy. Reforming 
fiscal regulations to be more supportive of charitable giving to non-religious causes 
could promote larger allocations of giving towards philanthropy.
CONCLUSION
As examples in this paper illustrate, various philanthropic efforts attempt to create 
innovative social development programs that have positive impacts on the lives of 
their target groups. Yet, a major challenge to realize such an impact is the lack of 
measuring tools and initiatives. A key concern that has to be addressed with this 
regard is the deeply rooted attitude of Thai society that charity is the act of giving 
without the need or concern for anything in return. This mindset is a cultural and 
religious construct, originating in Thai traditions, and translating into the practice 
of giving as an end in itself, without expecting anything in return. Transforming 
this deeply engrained mindset will require changes amongst all actors of the chari-
ty-philanthropy sector in Thailand. From the corporate world, this will imply think-
ing of CSR and corporate charities differently. CSR programs will have to be seen as 
contributions to address social issues that add value to society, rather than specific 
events with little sustained impact for the beneficiaries. Accompanying this change 
will necessitate systematic monitoring and evaluation frameworks that are utilized 
by the management. Such changes normally do not happen at mid-management 
level and thus, senior executives with the authority to implement the change will 
have to lead this transformation. How to incentivize the growing number of wealthy 
individuals to engage in philanthropy is a potentially interesting topic for Thai 
think-tanks, research institutes, and business schools to explore. Small charities and 
NGOs in Thailand will have to adapt in an ever-evolving funding ecosystem where 
competition is coming from new types of organizations such as social enterprises. 
Setting up concrete and measurable goals with accountability measures is a strate-
gic investment that builds trust with existing and potential funders. Think-tanks 
and the media can play a critical role as public watchdogs for greater accountability 
and transparency in the religious charitable sector, which will reinforce the need 
for accountability within the non-religious sector as well. Prawase Wasi is a senior 
statesman and well-respected public health leader deeply involved in mobilizing sup-
port from the public sector as well as from civil society to influence national social 
policies such as the campaign for a national Universal Health Coverage Scheme. In 
mobilizing support across sectors towards a national cause, Prawase uses the analogy 
of “the triangle that moves the mountain” (Wasi, 2000, p. 3). The mountain signifies 
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an unsurmountable problem and the triangle symbolizes the three forces necessary 
to solve that problem: knowledge and relevant research, social movement, and polit-
ical involvement (Wasi, 2000, p. 3). Applying Prawase’s metaphor to the philanthrop-
ic sector in Thailand, the mountain is a combination of the challenges of changing 
mindsets, bringing together fragmented actors from different sectors, and rectifying 
weak accountability and the lack of public trust. The triangle will have to consist 
of 1) applying relevant knowledge, tools, and targeted research to better understand 
the sector in Thailand; 2) mobilizing partnerships to share this knowledge and best 
practices, especially in setting up accountability among key actors, such as well-es-
tablished charities, large CSR programs, and new philanthropic agents; and finally, 
3) the enacting of better policy, such as fiscal reform to create a broader base for 
charitable giving from both individuals and corporations, in addition to other incen-
tives to encourage more giving to non-religious causes. Through a combination of 
simultaneous approaches, it may be possible to change the public’s understanding of 
philanthropy and what distinguishes it from charity.

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Myanmar, with a human development index ranking of 145 out of 188 countries (UNDP, 
2016), has been given the prestigious title as the number one giving nation in the world 
for three years running (2014-2016) by Charities Aid Foundation, challenging the notion 
that giving is tied to wealth. Explanations for why this is the case tend to focus on the 
religious practices of Theravada Buddhism and merit-making. This explanation is only 
part of the picture, however, and does not account for the similarly high rates of giving by 
other religious groups in Myanmar or for the failing of other Buddhist nations to equal 
Myanmar’s generosity. I will argue that the low levels of state investment in basic human 
welfare and the widespread deprivation in the country due to the long years of military 
rule, coupled with the lack of effective institutions to provide basic social welfare ser-
vices, are equally strong motivators for charity. At the same time, I will demonstrate that 
giving trends in Myanmar—even those motivated by compassion or religious duty—are 
a response to immediate needs that are unmet by government or institutional support. 
For the vast majority of people, reliance on your neighbor is the only available insurance. 
Such charitable giving rarely extends to philanthropic giving, which addresses systemic 
and root causes of poverty rather than targeting symptoms. I provide explanations for 
the high level of charitable giving in Myanmar, looking at everyday examples of giving in 
Myanmar from both individuals and local businesses and considering the humanitarian 
disaster of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 as a case example.
Keywords: Charity; Cyclone Nargis; Giving Trends; Merit-Making; Myanmar

INTRODUCTION
Myanmar has a reputation for generosity. According to the World Giving Index, 
Myanmar has topped the list as the number one giving country in the world for 
the past three years. Developed by Charities Aid Foundation, this index creates a 
picture of generosity by measuring people’s behavior in terms of charitable action, 
with a special focus on how frequently people help a stranger, donate money, and 
volunteer their time for charity. In addition to placing first for donating money 
to charity from 2014-2016, Myanmar placed first also for volunteering time and 
donating money in 2015, the first country to be placed at the top for two of the 
three ways of giving since 2010 (Charities Aid Foundation, 2015, p. 5). In the 2016 
report they increased their overall score as a result of an increase in both volun-
teering time and helping a stranger (Charities Aid Foundation, 2016, p. 21).
Myanmar’s achievement as the number one giving country in the world is all 
the more surprising in that Myanmar is one of Asia’s poorest countries. The fact 
Aktuelle Südostasienforschung  Current Research on Southeast Asia
w
w
w
.s
ea
s.
at
   
 d
oi
 1
0.
14
76
4/
10
.A
SE
A
S-
20
17
.2
-5
206 | ASEAS 10(2)
Giving Trends in Myanmar: More Than Merit Making
that Myanmar, while ranking as one of the least developed countries in the world, 
can demonstrate such strong generosity and is, in fact, the leader of the world giving 
index, confounds conventional wisdom that assumes that people practice generosity 
out of their abundance. According to data from the Charities Aid Foundation Giving 
Report 2016, 91% of the people in Myanmar donated money during the survey month, 
yet the Asian Development Bank research suggests that one quarter of the popula-
tion remains below the poverty line (UNDP, 2015). In other words, whether rich or 
poor, young or old, and across religious and ethnic lines, Myanmar people give money 
more regularly than anywhere else in the world. Similarly, Myanmar’s excellence in 
giving is not shared by other ASEAN or Buddhist countries. Apart from Indonesia, 
there is neither any other ASEAN nor Buddhist country on this list. Additionally, the 
gap between Myanmar and the closest competitors for the title of most generous 
nation is wide. Countries ranked from number two through to number ten are within 
nine points of each other, whereas Myanmar is 16 points ahead of the nearest com-
petitor, the Muslim nation of Indonesia. This data suggests that Myanmar generosity 
cannot be simply explained as an ‘Asian’ or ‘Buddhist’ practice. Ironically, only five of 
the G20 countries are in the top-ten list of countries in the 2016 World Giving Index 
(Charities Aid Foundation, 2016).
MOTIVATIONS FOR CHARITABLE GIVING
Brown & Wong (2009) provide a review of the economics literature and summarize 
two differing explanations for the motivations underlying charitable giving. The 
‘public goods’ model is exemplified by giving based on an anticipated private return 
to some form of public good, where everyone can benefit (Sugden, 1984; Warr, 1982). 
In contrast, the ‘private consumption’ model arises when donors derive utility from 
the act of giving, often because the public approves of such giving, which may benefit 
the donor (Arrow, 1972). For example, conspicuous donations or the “look at me” 
motivation (Dawson, 1988; Guy & Patton, 1989) may signal wealth, thereby enabling 
donors to interact with people in higher socioeconomic strata, as such networks are 
advantageous (Glazer & Konrad, 1996). However, Andreoni (1990) notes that donors 
may also receive a “warm glow” (p. 464) from making charitable contributions if the 
well-being of others enters their own utility functions, even when there are no social 
benefits (Andreoni, 2015; Makoto & Kotani, 2011) to donors, and when the benefi-
ciaries of charitable giving are not known to the donors. Research by Guy and Patton 
(1989) and Dawson (1988) found that individuals donate because of intrinsic reasons 
such as to enhance their self-esteem, to reap public gratification, and to gain satisfac-
tion and fulfilment through meetings one’s obligation to others. 
Rose-Ackerman (1982, 1996) proposes that people derive utility from charity only 
if they personally donate. Complementary research in this area suggests that the 
utility gains from donating depend critically on the behavior of others. For exam-
ple, Duncan (2004) argues that many individuals make charitable gifts only if their 
donations represent large proportions of the total received by a given charity, as a 
form of “heroism”. By contrast, Sugden (1984) suggests that individuals are averse to 
“freeriding” and hence donate if others in their peer group have also given, even if 
the amounts involved are very small. Brown and Minty (2008) reviewed giving in the 
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United States after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and concluded that 
most donors were motivated neither by conspicuous giving for social recognition 
nor by opportunities to partake in ‘impact philanthropy’. Instead, they argue people 
donated to relief efforts precisely because so many others were also giving to the 
relief efforts, so they wanted to join the group giving movement and not lose face 
alongside their peers. Brown and Wong (2009) examined the relationships between 
news coverage of a major natural disaster and charitable giving for disaster relief, and 
found a positive relationship (the media factor) between event-driven news stories 
and levels of giving. Finally, tax incentives for giving can also provide institutional 
support and convenience for charitable giving.
The limitations of the research summarized above are clear: It is primarily 
focused on North America and does not consider the specific religious, historical, 
and community context in Myanmar, where these theories of motivation are only 
partially relevant. We can expect that the ‘warm glow’ from meeting obligations to 
others is a universal motivation and relevant to Myanmar, along with the theory 
of “group think”, as giving is a unifying characteristic of people in Myanmar. But 
more research is needed to understand the interconnectedness between theories and 
giving behavior. Media theories and concepts of utility, networking, face saving, and 
tax avoidance are not sufficient to explain the vast majority of givers in Myanmar. 
The question remains as to why are Myanmar people such generous givers.
CHARITY VERSUS PHILANTHROPY
Wealth is not new. Neither is charity. But the idea of using private wealth ima-
ginatively, constructively, and systematically to attack the fundamental prob-
lems of mankind is new – John Gardner (Pistell, 2014)
Before we can answer the question about Myanmar’s generosity, we must first define 
the difference between charity and philanthropy. Those who practice philanthropy 
or charity often share the same motivation: a sense of compassion and a desire to use 
their resources to help others in need. Yet the method that philanthropic entities and 
charitable entities use to reach that outcome is different. Charity refers to the direct 
relief of suffering and social problems, while ‘philanthropy’ systematically seeks out 
root causes of these issues and endeavors to find a solution (Pistell, 2014). Charity 
is often the direct relief of immediate needs, such as food, shelter, and health care; 
demonstrates a compassionate response to dire circumstances; and tends to increase 
during natural disasters and emergency situations (Charities Aid Foundation, 2016). 
In contrast, philanthropy is private initiative for public good that focuses on the root 
cause of the suffering and seeks to find a solution that is not partisan, self-serving, 
or for private profit, although philanthropists may receive tax-deductible status for 
making donations. As John Rockefeller said, “the best philanthropy is constantly in 
search of the finalities – a search for a cause, an attempt to cure evils at their source” 
(Pistell, 2014). A useful analogy is to consider charity as providing someone a fish, 
while philanthropy teaches someone how to fish. However, charity and philanthropy 
should be considered as two sides to the same coin. One is not better than the other: 
it would be inhuman not to feed hungry children while working out a solution for 
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world hunger. Both charity and philanthropy are overlapping strategies that come 
from the same motivation and sense of compassion and that share the same goal. 
Philanthropy is not an excuse to avoid paying taxes or employing responsible busi-
ness practices, so that you can ‘win your way to heaven’. While this paper examines 
both charity and philanthropy in the Myanmar context, the primary expression of 
generosity in Myanmar is in the form of charity.
A BUDDHIST NATION AND IMPACT ON CHARITABLE GIVING
The essence of true charity is to give something without expecting anything 
in return for the gift. If a person expects some material benefit to arise from 
his gift, he is only performing an act of bartering and not charity . . . The act of 
true charity is wholesome, has no strings attached, and leaves both the giver 
and the recipient free (Venerable K. Sri. Dhammananda Maha Thera, KT Care 
Foundation)
Myanmar’s strong giving has often been associated with the importance of reli-
gion in the country. According to the 2014 census data, 87.9% of the population 
practice Theravada Buddhism, which drives high levels of giving through the prac-
tice of Sangha Dana or charity, with Christians making up 6.2%, Muslims 4.3%, 
animists 0.8%, and Hindus 0.5% (Ministry of Labor, Immigration and Population, 
2014). However, it would be relevant to note that while the 2014 Census was the 
first meaningful census in 30 years, the process managed to omit ethnicity statistics 
and large segments of people living in remote areas, and did not include the large 
Rohingya population (Callahan, 2017b). Charity is praised by the Buddha in many 
ways, and seen as “the stairway to celestial realm” (Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
n.d.). The daily practice of charitable deeds is part of the teachings of Buddhism, in 
which food, water, and flowers are offered at the monastery and to Buddhist images, 
and which includes material support, charity, and spiritual guidance to those in 
need. According to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, every pious Buddhist carries 
out the meritorious deeds of dispensing charity, observing morality, and practic-
ing mediation. The motivation for giving to others is as important as what is given. 
Many Buddhists in Myanmar believe that in doing good they will receive good luck 
or merit. Donating or committing good deeds on one’s day of birth, or on the day 
of the week that one was born, is considered auspicious. For example, the KT Care 
Foundation, which was established by the Kyaw Thaung family, who successfully run 
the largest grocery store chain in Myanmar, created a small grants program that pro-
vides donations ten times a month in honor of each family member on their respec-
tive birthdays (KT Care Foundation, n.d.). Depending on their means, Buddhists will 
also make other donations, such as inviting the monks to their home and offering 
food, training their young sons as novice monks, special giving on birthdays and 
anniversaries to monasteries or private interests such as children’s homes or animal 
shelters, and donating materials to the monastery. While the amounts given may 
be small, they still have significant religious meaning and many people give daily, 
regardless of income level. Monks also collect daily food-alms by going house to 
house each morning in procession. 
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Indeed, monks in Myanmar are interconnected with the plight of the poor, and 
fulfil an important societal role by providing education, food, shelter, medical services, 
and comfort to the people. For example, monastic schools have been in existence in 
Myanmar since the 11th century. Using the same curriculum as the government schools 
but operating under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, these schools fill a significant 
gap in the education system by providing basic education and religious activities for 
children from needy families and orphans. Many operate as boarding schools for chil-
dren from remote areas without access to schooling. The monastic schools are viable 
through heavy reliance on donations, community support, and a small amount of 
income generation and parental contributions. In the 2013-2014 academic year there 
were more than 1,400 monastic schools, providing primary and secondary education 
to more than 150,000 Myanmar children (Burnet Institute and Monastic Education 
Development Group, 2014, p. 12). By supporting the monasteries that provide educa-
tion to children, the community members are able to live by the important Buddhist 
notion of parahita, which involves giving for the benefit or welfare of others. 
In recent years, monks have also been more directly involved in political action. 
In a 2007 event widely publicized in the foreign media as the ‘Saffron Revolution’, 
thousands of monks took to the streets in non-violent resistance to protest the gov-
ernment’s draconian decision to remove fuel subsidies. The monks turned their 
alms bowls upside down and refused alms from Burmese military generals, thus 
symbolically refusing to give the Buddha’s blessings to them and making a strong 
political statement in a religiously devout nation. The military cracked down vio-
lently on the demonstrations, resulting in injuries and deaths as well as imprison-
ments and torture (Welford & Zieger, 2013). More recently, Buddhist nationalism and 
anti-Muslim hate speech have been promoted through radical monastic groups, with 
the Ma Ba Tha, who came to prominence in 2015 by rallying for laws that widely limit 
religious freedoms, such as requiring women to seek permission from township offi-
cials if they wish to change their religion. The leader of the group, Ashin Wirathu, has 
also incited violence against Muslims, and has a wide following among the majority 
Buddhist people. While these intolerant and violent views are at odds with the key 
tenants of Buddhism, the group enjoys widespread appeal in part because of their 
broader agenda to protect Buddhism against external threats and the propagation 
of Buddhist faith and institutions through organized religious and social activities in 
communities throughout Myanmar (Walton, 2017).
Clearly Buddhist religious practices are a contributing factor to Myanmar giving 
trends, but they still do not answer why Myanmar outscores neighboring Buddhist 
countries in such a dramatic fashion. 
FAITH AND GIVING: EVERYDAY EXAMPLES OF GIVING 
Between 2016 and 2017, I collected the following stories through first-hand interviews 
with 32 people living in Yangon, Shan State, Chin State, and Kayin State. Additional 
information was obtained from research reports, websites, and newspaper articles. 
These anecdotes, while not exhaustive, can provide insight into the motivation behind 
giving in Myanmar. The stories that follow give examples of how everyday people prac-
tice charity in daily life. In all cases, names have been changed to protect confidentiality.
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Ma Thida Tun is a 53-year-old woman from Mandalay who is married with two 
grown children. Both she and her husband trained as medical doctors but left medicine 
in the early 1990s to open a business. Money was tight, but her husband found success 
in the early 2000s and their economic situation improved over time. For this family, 
regardless of what they had, they practiced many acts of charity. These included giving 
alms to monks every day, donations to monastic schools, and celebrating significant 
events such as birthdays and other auspicious occasions by making donations. As the 
family has prospered, their giving has increased. They have built several new monas-
teries and supported the upkeep of other monastic buildings, as well as building pre-
schools, elder care facilities, and a hospice for people living with HIV/AIDS. Ma Thida 
Tun notes that while her husband’s family has always given alms to monasteries, it 
was her own mother’s example of giving to social causes outside the monastery, such 
as providing food and school supplies to children, which also inspired her to give. She 
notes that, even as a young university student, she would save money out of her meager 
resources to buy eggs for a local children’s home. Her reasons are intrinsic – to share 
her own resources and meet obligations to others (Ma Thida Tun, 20 October 2016).
Aye Myat Thanda is a 40-year-old woman who runs her own business in tourism 
in Yangon. Her father died when she was young, leaving her mother to provide for 
the family. Times were tough, but the changes in Myanmar and the growth of the 
tourism sector more recently have resulted in new opportunities for her. Every week, 
Ma Thanda gives money to monks on their alms collection. She also buys flowers to 
adorn her small Buddhist shrine in her apartment, and volunteers on Saturdays as 
an English teacher at a local monastic school. On auspicious occasions, she makes 
additional donations at monastic schools of both food and robes for the monks. The 
practice of giving is part of her daily life and culture. She speaks of her motivation to 
pay forward her opportunities, so others can also have a chance to make a better life 
for themselves (Aye Myat Thanda, 17 February 2017)
One cultural practice I recorded frequently was the tradition of celebrating birth-
days by providing a special gift for others. One ten-year-old child attending an inter-
national school in Yangon received an end of year award for ‘most charitable behavior’ 
for celebrating her birthday by providing a special meal to the children in a monastic 
school. Yet she was puzzled by the recognition, as she notes this is common practice 
among her Myanmar peers. Another young office worker took vacation leave on her 
birthday to bring animal supplies to a local animal shelter. Within the workplace, I 
have observed that on staff birthdays, the ‘birthday holder’ will often purchase special 
treats or lunch for the office. Such is the example of a tradition that includes young 
and old as well as rich and poor..
Care for orphans is another theme that emerged through everyday stories. One 
forty-year-old woman shared that while she was an only child, her parents took in 
seven other children who were orphans. As she was the eldest child, once her studies 
were finished, she supported the seven adopted siblings for their school and univer-
sity costs. Many of those interviewed had similar stories of taking care of children left 
orphaned by disease or disaster, either through directly adopting or through dona-
tions to monasteries for the care of children. In many of these cases, their response 
was inspired by compassion to respond to the needs of these children and to share 
resources.
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The Christian pop singer Daw Chit Thu Wai, who is also a doctor, volunteered to 
help people in need following Cyclone Nargis, although she would not provide the 
details of her activities. 
According to my Christian beliefs, it is said that ‘when you do a charitable deed, 
do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing.’ That’s why I will 
not tell anything about it because we are not used to bragging about what we 
do for charity (Sandy, 2011). 
Interviews in Kayin state with a group of Kayin Christians and with a Christian 
pastor from Chin State discussed their community practice of religious tithing on 
their income to the church, which then uses those funds for the social welfare needs 
of the people. Both spoke of providing financial and social support to the elderly, wid-
ows and orphans, and also supporting youth programs, as motivated by compassion 
but also in obedience to the teachings of the church.
Other religious minority groups in Myanmar, such as Muslims, also have a strong 
tradition of generosity known as zakat. This is a form of alms-giving taught as a reli-
gious obligation, and is at least 2.5% of income, with followers encouraged to give as 
they are able (see also Fauzia in this issue). As one of the five pillars of Islam, zakat is 
distinguished from charity in that it is taught as a religious obligation and not simply 
a voluntary gesture. While no data currently exists on zakat in Myanmar, it is under-
stood to be significant by local people. For example, the displaced Rohingya popula-
tion in Rakhine State has received food, shelter, water, and sanitation through zakat 
giving from local Muslims and private donors from the Middle East and Malaysia.1 
Interviews with four Muslim believers in Yangon shared stories of giving to the mosque 
and religious institutions. Islamic teaching includes almsgiving as a private obligation 
and seeking credit on earth would diminish from any credit obtained in heaven or in 
the next life. Asking for information on the effectiveness or impact of that gift then 
goes against the benevolence of the giver, as it is the individuals’ responsibility to 
give but ultimately Allah will determine the results. Based on research in Indonesia, 
Parvanova & Fauzia (2013) argues that Islamic giving will never be fully formalized or 
regulated, because of its origin in the “altruistic and reciprocal nature of people” and 
collective awareness and “concern for the welfare of others”, as expressed through 
the traditional practices of Muslims motivated mainly by their faith (Parvanova & 
Fauzia, 2013, p. 201). The practice of zakat contrasts with an institutional approach to 
philanthropy, in which large sums are given, a foundation is established, and a meth-
odology is established to determine whether funds are achieving the stated purpose. 
The true amount of zakat giving globally will likely never be tracked in such a public 
display, as it would amount to the giver receiving his/her just award on earth and not 
in heaven.
Individual acts of charity have also led to collective action. In Yangon, a volun-
teer group, Noble Heart, provides free ambulance services for those affected by road 
accidents in the city. In 2015, a group of villagers set up a volunteer patrol on part of 
1 There is evidence of giving to religious organizations to support the Rohingya, but no data is available 
on the amount that reaches them directly in Myanmar.
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what is known as the ‘death highway’, a stretch of highway from Yangon to Mandalay 
which saw more than 450 accidents in 2015, and has been the scene of more than 400 
deaths since 2013 (“Conquering the road safety challenge”, 2016). Funded by private 
donations and with no government support, the goal is to find medical help for these 
victims of accidents, and decrease the number of unnecessary deaths on Myanmar’s 
poorly maintained roads. Providing emergency ambulance services to prevent unnec-
essary death and injuries was described as the mission for this service.
The Free Funeral Service Society (FFSS) was set up in 2001, and has grown from a 
handful of volunteers to 17 hearses and 340 volunteers–including 40 doctors–as well 
as 50 paid employees. They have supported more than 100,000 funerals since their 
inception. The Thukha Clinic provides free medical care to about 500 patients a day 
with a staff consisting of 50 specialists who volunteer (Thein, 2011). Notably, in 2006 
the director of FFSS, the well-known actor U Kyaw Thu, was arrested for indirectly 
highlighting the problem of poverty in Burma by helping the poor to perform last 
rites and bury their dead (McDowell, 2009, p. 5). After this crackdown, however, the 
FFSS has flourished and has continued to expand their reach of services. The motiva-
tion is to give respect and dignity to the dead, and to ensure the giving of last rites as 
part of the person’s spiritual journey.
Similarly, in 1937 the Muslim Free Hospital was established in the colonial city of 
Rangoon as a small dispensary to care for the poor of Rangoon who had no other 
access to medical care, with the initial investment provided entirely by other Muslims. 
From the beginning, the hospital did not discriminate based on religion, ethnicity, 
or income, and today it is a 160-bed hospital, reaching 500 outpatients a day, and 
providing in-patient medical care, including surgery, psychiatric services, maternal 
services, and eye care (Thein, 2011). Muslims in Myanmar donate USD 400,000 a year 
to run the hospital, and patients pay what they can. If patients do not have money, 
they pay nothing. According to Tin Myo Win, a department head at the hospital who 
is himself Buddhist, the Muslim practice of zakat, or donating some of their income 
to charitable causes, is an important source of income for the hospital, along with 
paid-for treatments and international donations (MacNamara, 2013). Interestingly, 
this example demonstrates how donors can derive utility from the act of giving, as it 
is part of a good public strategy to demonstrate how the minority populations also 
bring benefits to the majority Buddhist population. Another Muslim businessman 
reported how he also attends and contributes to Buddhist ceremonies and commu-
nity events in his town, as it is good public relations to be seen as contributing to 
majority interests and also to have good relations with the leaders of the monastery, 
who have considerable social and political capital in his small town. 
In a small, remote village in north-western Shan State, a group of men have 
started a new ambulance service to transport sick patients to hospitals in well-
equipped centers, thus decreasing avoidable deaths in the community due to the 
lack of medical care. They pooled their resources to purchase a van and fuel, and set 
up a mobile number for community referrals. There is no medical staff connected 
with the service, but volunteer drivers take sick patients to hospital in rotation. 
When asked, the group advised that even hospitals call them directly for transpor-
tation on a regular basis, which the group provides for free. There is no thought 
that this type of service should be reimbursed or even provided by the hospitals or 
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through some type of government funding, yet the group argues that by providing 
this service free of charge, they are making merit. To accept money or to have a 
formal arrangement with the hospitals would detract from the service mentality of 
the group (Thorfinn, 2015).
These collective initiatives are a direct response from volunteers who make up 
for the deficiencies in social services, which are chronically underfunded by the gov-
ernment. This same response is true for citizens of many countries, yet the scale and 
extent of daily response to the needs of the poor in Myanmar is striking, as is a lack 
of expectation that government will assist. In contrast to other developed and devel-
oping nations, where emergency services are common and medical care is accessible 
and available, even to the poor, Myanmar citizens charitably fill in the gap left by the 
lack of basic government services. 
GIVING IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE EXAMPLE OF CYCLONE NARGIS
The inadequacy of government services became apparent to the world in 2008, when 
a cyclone hit Myanmar, leaving over 140,000 documented dead, two million home-
less, and significant human suffering. Cyclone Nargis was the worst natural disaster 
to hit Asia since 1991 (UNICEF, 2009). The ineffective government response has been 
well publicized and contrasted to the international tsunami of 2004, when govern-
ments and international aid agencies quickly responded. The autocratic government 
delayed the arrival of international emergency services and supplies for several weeks, 
resulting in unnecessary human suffering (Selth, 2008). Rescue workers reportedly 
faced harassment by government officials and some parts of the country remained 
accessible only by boat (Preston, 2008). In some cases, relief supplies were re-packaged 
bearing government labels, leaving charitable organizations to question whether they 
were helping to bolster support of the military junta (Brown & Minty, 2008, p. 6). The 
government treated aid as a tactic of the West in pursuit of its political agenda. These 
suspicions were amplified by efforts to use the humanitarian situation in Myanmar as 
part of the justification for UN Security Council action. 
However, the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (2008) notes that the gravity of the 
situation brought the best out of the Myanmar people, who shared their wealth and 
whatever little they possessed. Given the late arrival and limited reach of relief agen-
cies, local civil society organizations provided emergency support to cyclone victims. 
In the early weeks, aid that kept survivors alive was provided almost entirely by civil 
society organizations and private citizens, while local authorities often turned a blind 
eye to such unauthorized relief efforts. People gave generously, and Buddhist monks 
and other religious leaders made substantial contributions. The Burmese diaspora 
also gave generously. Many returned home to help in ways large and small. The 
recorded contributions reached USD 11.86 million, but since many donations were 
made anonymously and were not officially recorded, it is impossible to put a precise 
value on the amounts (Tripartite Core Group, 2008, p. 60).
The above example is consistent with the private consumption motivation for 
charitable giving suggested by Arrow (1972) and Steinberg (1987). We can infer that 
the average donation was relatively modest and that many members of the com-
munity gave, rather than just one or two large donors giving large amounts. Finally, 
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many donations were made without fanfare, suggesting that donors were moti-
vated more by the ‘warm glow” and perhaps the desire to do ‘the right thing’, rather 
than for socioeconomic recognition associated with publicly visible giving (Glazer & 
Konrad, 1996).
Ultimately the Burmese army (tatmadaw) also provided essential aid and services 
through the mobilization of servicemen for search and rescue operations, evacua-
tions, camp construction, road clearance, and distribution of relief assistance. The 
business community also contributed substantially in both cash and kind and pro-
vided assistance in their areas of competence, such as the building support offered 
by large construction and engineering firms. The total value of their inputs was USD 
68.13 million (Tripartite Core Group, 2008). Some companies received lucrative trade 
concessions from the junta in exchange for donations to the relief effort.
While the military government of that period regularly used overwhelming force 
to control the population, they were unable to exert complete control over the Nargis 
response, partly due to lack of ability or interest to perceived threat from particular 
segments of the population, and unenthusiastic compliance by the enforcers of reg-
ulations (McDowell, 2009). In fact, contributing to relieve the suffering of fellow citi-
zens could be considered an act of civil disobedience, and could also be perceived as a 
way of demonstrating that the military does not have complete control. Throughout 
this period, faith-based charitable organizations continued to operate and large 
numbers of community-based organizations (CBOs) sprang up to deal with less polit-
ical sectors, such as health and education. Well known political dissidents such as 
Ma Thida and Khin Zaw Win gave up involvement in explicitly political activities 
after Nargis to focus on humanitarian causes. The military government saw that local 
and international NGOs, as well as concerned citizens, could play a role in delivering 
services to a country chronically underserved by government; space was created for 
community organizations to spring to life and take action instead of waiting for gov-
ernment permission.
The Impact of the “Nargis Moment”
The impact of the Nargis moment was mixed. The five-year post-cyclone assessment 
by the World Bank (World Bank, 2014) studied how Cyclone Nargis, the subsequent 
aid efforts, and the evolving economic conditions affected social capital, the capacity 
for collective action, intra and inter-village relations, and relations between villagers 
and their leaders. Better-off families that sponsored religious activities before Nargis 
were no longer able to afford them, depriving villagers of an important venue through 
which to strengthen social cohesion between community members. Increased migra-
tion among villagers of working age and the need to work longer hours also left villag-
ers with less time to socialize with their neighbors. The report noted the remarkable 
social strength of Delta villages as they responded to the emergency by helping each 
other through sharing food, shelter, and labor, building homes, and contributing to 
rebuilding village infrastructure such as water ponds, roads, and bridges. Aid was crit-
ically important in the aftermath of the cyclone, both to save lives and to provide 
people with a sense that they did not have to face the enormous challenges of recov-
ering from the disaster alone. Much of the initial aid was local, civil society-driven, 
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and was highly beneficial to the affected villages. In about one-quarter of the villages, 
however, social relations were poor five years after Nargis due in part to the aid effort. 
In these villages, there was a noticeable lack of social cohesion. The participation of 
villagers in activities that had been traditionally communal, such as religious and vil-
lage development activities, including renovation of roads, monasteries, and ponds, 
declined. While these activities continued, they were undertaken by smaller groups 
rather than the community as a whole (World Bank, 2014, p. 30).
There are a number of reasons for the initial strength in social capital. First, devel-
opment resources from higher levels are scarce. This accentuates the importance of 
working together at the community level and of carefully prioritizing resources for 
public goods. Second, in the absence of a state or employer safety net, community 
members help each other in times of need, which was particularly evident in their 
response to Nargis. Traditions of reciprocity, evident across Myanmar and across 
the world, encourage people to help their community members. This distinction 
cuts across different ethnicities and religions, between genders, between the young 
and old, and between different income and livelihood type groups (Tripartite Core 
Group, 2008, p. 2)
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Trends in Government Revenue and Expenditures
The Myanmar government revenue collection provides inadequate resources for 
the public sector. The budget of Myanmar is financed by funds from four primary 
sources: taxation, revenues from natural gas, transfer of surpluses from State 
Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and other non-tax revenue (various government fees 
and charges). Myanmar tax revenue netted, until recently, 6-7% of GDP, compared 
to neighboring countries that collected a minimum 15% of GDP. Vietnam for exam-
ple had revenues consistently in excess of 25% of GDP (Myanmar Development 
Research Institute/Center for Economic and Social Development & Crawford 
School of Public Policy, 2015).
Public tax revenue could be higher if military sponsored corruption did not skim 
off potential tax revenue earned from the lucrative extractive industries. There is 
well-documented evidence of lost revenues from a resource curse. The estimated 
value of the jade business in 2014 was USD 31 billion, of which only one billion in 
revenue went through legal channels (Dapice, 2016). This figure is half of the entire 
country’s GDP, yet the local population sees little benefit (Global Witness, 2015). 
Myanmar, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela are all examples of countries that encounter 
additional difficulties in equitable development as a result of rich natural resources. 
Jones (2014) and Dapice (2016) explain from a political economy perspective that 
the elite who control the natural resources become rich with little additional effort, 
since companies can be hired to drill and export, creating extreme wealth for the elite 
but little positive impact for the local community. Those with access to this wealth 
can ignore the rest of the population, creating intense and violent competition for 
control of mineral revenues and, therefore, power and wealth. Poorly taxed resource 
extraction has led to significant gaps in government services. 
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Self-Reliance in the Absence of a Welfare System
What tax revenue did come in was poorly spent. Myanmar’s culture of self-reliance 
is a legacy of the military’s indifference to the basic social welfare needs of the 
population, further reinforced by the current state counsellor’s recent speeches that 
citizens should “muster courage and self-confidence” to take personal responsibility 
for their own and the nation’s solutions and not expect government solutions 
(Callahan, 2017a). While data obtained from the World Bank (2013) demonstrates 
that the government is increasing spending on social welfare, defense spending still 
dominates the national budget, both as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of 
total expenditure. According to World Bank figures, health spending rose from 0.2% 
to just over 1% of GDP from 2009 to 2013, with the increase largely targeting needed 
staff salary rather than improved services. In contrast, 4.3% of GDP went to the mil-
itary (ESCAP, 2012).
These findings demonstrate that people used their own resources to provide 
essential services to those in need. Chronic underfunding of healthcare, education, 
welfare, and social services have left many gaps that are filled by volunteers giving 
charitably to meet immediate needs. Government spending on the social sectors is 
strikingly low by international standards and the lowest in ASEAN. Philanthropic 
giving, to address the root causes of these issues, is not yet significant.
A GIVING CULTURE AMONG LOCAL BUSINESSES
Myanmar as an emerging market provides many new opportunities for businesses to 
enter and engage in markets, and in philanthropic endeavors, creating both new job 
opportunities and a middle class. Research conducted by Welford and Zieger (2013) 
highlights that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is mainly understood as a phil-
anthropic and fashionable concept, but there is little understanding of CSR in terms 
of strategic alignment. For example, the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), 
formed under the Myanmar Investment Law as a government-appointed body to 
approve foreign business investment in the country, places little emphasis on creat-
ing tax measures, disclosure and reporting requirements, the inclusion of social and 
environmental criteria, and public recognition incentives. This is despite the MIC 
stated objective to “deeply emphasize on social impact” for companies looking to 
invest in Myanmar. Widger (2015) identifies CSR in Myanmar as a strategy of ‘school-
books and spectacles’, with a focus on the immediacy of the gift but rarely on the 
causes of poverty. Companies give gifts of schoolbooks, meal to orphanages or homes 
for the elderly, and medical equipment or glasses for those who cannot afford them. 
By doing so, companies participate in the redistributive economy, where the spoils of 
corporate success are shared with those less fortunate. 
New domestic foundations have begun to proliferate in Myanmar. Several large 
Myanmar companies have established their own foundations within the company 
brand. The Kanbawza (KBZ) Group was established in 1994 and controls two airlines, 
the country’s largest private bank, and lucrative jade and gem mining concessions. 
In 2008, they created the KBZ Foundation which focuses on providing clean water, 
sanitation, education, and youth development. According to their website, the KBZ 
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Brighter Future Foundation has spent more than USD 105 million over the past twenty 
years on charitable giving, although critics note that this is a small amount compared 
to the vast amount of money KBZ has received through illicit trade in gems and jade. 
Charitable donations may be part of the new quest for legitimacy in Myanmar. Another 
large corporate, Capital Diamond Star Group, began work in the 1960s as a small 
trading outfit and now is an international company spanning multiple sectors with 
more than 7,000 staff. Nevcan Coban, Senior Manager, Group Strategy and Business 
Development, while presenting at the Asian Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility 
Conference, 2016, in Naypyidaw, stated that the company has the desire to “give back, 
with less emphasis on charity and the writing of cheques and more on shared value 
creation through active engagement in projects that benefit both local farmers and 
businesses”. Their community website lists examples, such as a high school built 
in Mandalay; health clinics and donated medicines; rural development supported 
through building roads and providing water wells; contributions to monasteries 
and the operation of several contract farming initiatives with local farmers (Capital 
Diamond Star Group, n.d.). They see business opportunities behind social problems, 
and see themselves using their business acumen and resources to innovate and find 
business solutions to poverty (Asian Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2016).
Serge Pun, chairman, SPA Group, Myanmar, and his brother, Martin Pun, Head 
of Corporate Social Responsibility, Yoma Strategic Holdings, are considered standard 
bearers of responsible business practices in Myanmar. They described their approach 
to philanthropy at the Asian Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2016, as “a 
rights-based approach, in which we create innovative programs, prototypes and 
can achieve scale, with a responsible business model that pays living wages, taxes 
and provides work with dignity.” They emphasize a ‘triple bottom line’ for business 
that includes impact on their people/staff, the environment, and profit. Their CSR 
programs respond to emergency response situations with relief supplies, champion 
inclusive approaches for working with clients who are HIV positive, and provide 
responsible business workshops and practical support. Mr. Serge Pun has hired 
185 Burmese repatriates in his business, who returned to Myanmar motivated by a 
desire to be part of the recent changes and to help the country advance. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that SPA’s experience is similar to others. Across all sectors, there 
are repatriates returning to work in Myanmar, often with a pay cut, bringing back 
with them education and work experience from abroad as well as cultural and lan-
guage knowledge (Asian Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2016). While 
there is a lack of research in this area, it would be interesting to track the giving habits 
of Burmese expatriates, including remittances to Myanmar and their giving habits in 
their host countries, in order to understand the factors that influence their generosity.
The KT Company was formed in 1950 and the family began the KT Care Foundation 
in 2008, in response to Cyclone Nargis. The Foundation began with handouts but has 
now moved from individual donations to supporting specific causes, such as health 
and education services, and emergency preparedness and relief services. They also run 
a grants program for community based organizations providing social services. Dr. 
Hannah Kyaw Thaung, who is the daughter of the founder of the KT Company, notes 
that the foundation is an expression of the family’s priority on education, and over 
time has shifted from solely looking at the benefits to the community to looking at 
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mutual benefits of doing business, such as job creation and economic growth. With 
local language and cultural knowledge, connections with local and international net-
works, and their understanding of best practices from around the world, the KT Care 
Foundation sees itself as an expression of their family values, with a long-term vision 
and increased credibility in the community through giving back. Their culture of giv-
ing permeates both business and personal relations, as they use their wealth to respond 
to the institutional failure in Myanmar. This type of family-led foundation approach 
comprises 21% of all philanthropic giving in Asia and is growing (Mahmood, 2013).
The practice of ‘crony capitalism’ has resulted in the wealth of the country being in 
the hands of fewer than twenty families, who became rich with help from the military 
dictatorship (Ford, Gillan, & Thein, 2016). These families are trying to rehabilitate 
their images, quietly bringing sons and daughters into the business and consolidating 
a second-generation elite, creating a ‘crony capitalism turned philanthropist’ situa-
tion. For example, Tay Za, considered one of the regime’s top cronies because of his 
favor with the military government, controls an empire spanning oil and gas, minerals, 
drugs, timber, and guns. Yet his son Pye Phyo Tayza claims that “everything is different 
for [Tay Za] now. He is doing a lot of foundation work, and more contributions for 
society. Less greed” (Szep, 2012). Such statements may represent a change in strategy 
in an attempt to whitewash ‘black’ money, rehabilitate his public image, and retain 
influence and legitimacy. One way of looking at these business examples is to con-
sider how much is motivated by the reasons discussed earlier, or whether it is driven 
by profit. More work needs to be done to compare the giving patterns of responsible 
businesses and crony businesses and the motivations for each type of giving.
Risks of Private Sector-led Philanthropy
While giving by the people is exemplary, the weak Myanmar state has not developed 
processes and accountability. As elsewhere, Myanmar must build trustworthy institu-
tions, good regulations, open and transparent organizations, and strong governance 
so that people can continue to give easily and with confidence that their donations 
are being used for the maximum benefit. It is this task – building strong state insti-
tutions and removing the drudgery of life – which is the challenge for government. 
Similarly, there is the possibility that those who give the most have the greatest influ-
ence and the ability to write public policy, as in corporate America. We must ask 
whether these individuals are most suited for this task, and whether they are moti-
vated by the cause or by other factors. There is a risk that private funders may deter-
mine the future of health care, education, and vocational skills training in Myanmar 
and become an agent of civic inequality, in which more voice is given to those with 
power (Callahan, 2014). With the increase in ‘high net-worth individuals’ in Asia (and 
Myanmar), when will a Bill Gates appear in Myanmar, and will he/she be concerned 
with political, business, or social interests? Philanthropy cannot be an excuse for tax 
evasion, or a rationale for not following responsible businesses practices that respect 
human dignity and basic rights. Likewise, the Burmese government is not used to 
working in partnership – it operates on the principle that people obey what it says. 
Old habits, including a military culture, are still ingrained in the new government, as 
the 2008 constitution guarantees 25% of all seats in parliament to the military. How 
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can the focus be on inclusive growth and making good choices that do not impinge 
on the rights of others? This cannot be accomplished through self-regulation. The 
state is the trustee of public good, and strong institutions for social good and inclu-
sive growth are needed. 
CONCLUSION
The ‘urge to give’ is a universal human trait and people in Myanmar, like their fellows 
across the globe, have multiple motivations to give. They are motivated by their reli-
gious convictions; the urge to give back to the community; to pay it forward in return 
for advantages that they have received, and simply from compassion to help those in 
need. In the absence of any government safety net, people in Myanmar rely on com-
munity connections and relationships to do their best for one another and respond 
to basic needs in difficult times, redistributing wealth. 
With such a weak tax base and major demands on limited resources, there is no 
doubt that Myanmar will continue to rely on volunteering, charitable giving, and 
increased philanthropic giving by individuals and businesses. As the economy devel-
ops and wealth increases, it will be interesting to see whether the strength of giving in 
Myanmar will remain consistent. As the state increases its revenues through taxation, 
and is expected to provide more basic services, will the current sense of responsibility 
and compassion be replaced by an expectation that government will take on more 
responsibility? Or will people give even more as their wealth and income increases? 
The state can support this social transformation through regulations that recognize 
traditional forms of giving and create an environment where charities can demon-
strate their effectiveness. 
Myanmar needs peace, development, and democracy, all at the same time. The 
compassion of the Myanmar people toward their own people is unparalleled and, 
as the most generous country in the world, more research is needed to understand 
the factors, both religious and otherwise, which contribute to their shared sense of 
humanity, in order not to simply do better and give more, but to change the roots of 
poverty and inequality in communities all across Myanmar – one gift at a time.

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Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia: Modernization, 
Islamization, and Social Justice
Amelia Fauzia
► Fauzia, A. (2017). Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia: Modernization, islamization, and social justice. 
Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 10(2), 223-236.
This article discusses the potentials and constraints of social justice philanthropy in 
Indonesia in the context of two trends – of growing Islamization and modernization. 
It employs interviews and recent observations together with survey data. Although the 
challenges facing social justice philanthropy remain immense, the pathways to develop-
ment have been created; pathways through which the gap that exists between faith-based 
philanthropy and its secular counterparts may become smaller. Looking at growing 
philanthropization in the last 15 years and the pre-existing popularity of the concept 
of social justice among the population, could social justice and developmentalism may 
become the future of Islamic philanthropy in the country? The author argues that mod-
ernization and Islamization encourage the practice of philanthropy, but that they do not 
necessarily contribute to the development of a philanthropy that focuses on social justice. 
The modernization of the philanthropy sector has shown scattered pictures of develop-
ment into a form of social justice philanthropy, which remains small but nevertheless 
encouraging.
Keywords: Development; Indonesia; Islamic Philanthropy; Islamization; Social Justice

INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the 21st century the situation in Indonesia showed a kind of fever 
of Islamic philanthropy, which added to the existing local and Western private 
foundations. After two decades, the growing enthusiasm toward Islamic philan-
thropy in the country is unlikely to fade in the near future. It is a development that 
rose steadily out of the economic crisis of 1997 that preceded the fall of the New 
Order and that was later supported by the movement for political reformation 
and democratization (Reformasi). Various Islamic philanthropy organizations 
were established in the course of this process. It obtained another endorsement 
from the Islamization movement, via laws and other forms of legislation. The 
enthusiasm was further encouraged by the general Islamization that has been 
taking place in the country (Ricklefs, 2008, 2012). It received an unintended and 
painful ‘blessing’ from a series of large-scale disasters, from the 2004 Aceh tsu-
nami through to earthquakes in 2007. And then finally, it earned high attention 
from the Indonesian government, although, whether this could be interpret-
ed as positive or negative remains an open question. The government has re-
cently been trying to embody zakat (almsgiving) into its development agenda, 
Aktuelle Südostasienforschung  Current Research on Southeast Asia
w
w
w
.s
ea
s.
at
   
 d
oi
 1
0.
14
76
4/
10
.A
SE
A
S-
20
17
.2
-6
224 | ASEAS 10(2)
Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia
something that the Suharto government had tried but failed since the end of 1960s 
in their efforts to incorporate Muslim charity with modernization and development. 
Additionally, Western private foundations and international development agencies 
have put in efforts to endorse and support the field. Since 2002, the Ford Foundation 
has supported the development of philanthropy with a social justice approach and 
purpose, for both secular and Islamic foundations and organizations.1 Since 2004, 
the Australian organization AusAID has entrusted the two largest Muslim organi-
zations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, with the tsunami disaster relief in 
Aceh. Later, these organizations strengthened their humanitarian and philanthropic 
divisions. In the last two years, international development agencies from the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) have tried to assist in encouraging the direction of the Islamic 
philanthropy sector into development, including recent schemes for poverty reduc-
tion and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Noor & Pickup, 2017; Pickup, 2017).
Muslim philanthropy to benefit the public good has attracted many sectors and 
actors, from Muslim organizations and the state, to corporations and development 
agencies, each according to their own purposes (Fauzia, 2013; Latief, 2010, 2014). 
The potential amount of zakat, sedekah (donation), waqf (endowment), and other 
charitable forms have been mentioned in many research papers, conferences and 
reports (Abubakar & Bamualim, 2006; Kurniawati, 2004). The National Development 
Planning Agency and the National Zakat Board (BAZNAS) calculated the recent annu-
al potential of zakat collection in Indonesia ranging from IDR 100 billion (USD 7.6 
million) to IDR 286 trillion (USD 22 billion) (The National Zakat Board Center of 
Strategic Studies, 2016; Firdaus, Beik, Irawan, & Juanda, 2012). These do not include 
non-zakat donations and waqf assets. However, the de facto zakat collection by reg-
istered organizations is small and accounts for IDR 3.7 trillion in 2015 (The National 
Zakat Board Center of Strategic Studies, 2016, p. 9).
The concept of social justice has always been of interest to Indonesian scholars, 
starting with Hamka’s Keadilan Sosial dalam Islam (Social Justice in Islam), published 
in 1966 and reprinted many times in almost every decade until recently in 2015. The 
concept was usually linked to the economy (Mubyarto, 1995) and to the movements 
of Islam (Madjid, 1987/2008), including to practices of Islamic philanthropy (Mas’udi, 
1993). Sayyid Qutb’s book, Al-‘adalah al-Ijtimaiyah fi al-Islam (Social Justice in Islam), 
first published in 1949 and later translated into Indonesian language, has been the 
strongest inspiration for Indonesian scholars and activists on the idea of social jus-
tice. Apart from scholarly and activist discourse, the concept of social justice is rooted 
in the popularity of the state ideology Pancasila, especially its last principle.2 Pancasila 
has been taught at schools and read out loud by students at their weekly school 
assemblies. In addition, it seems that experiences of injustices since the 19th century 
have encouraged the idea of social justice. 
1 The author was team leader of a research project on Philanthropy for Social Justice in Muslim Societies 
(including Indonesia), led by Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic University Jakarta from 2002 to 2004, funded by 
the Ford Foundation.
2 The five principles of Pancasila are: 1) the belief in one God, 2) a just and civilized humanity, 3) the 
unity of Indonesia, 4) democracy under the wise guidance of representative consultations, and 5) social 
justice for all the peoples of Indonesia. 
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Research on Islamic philanthropy for social justice by Syarif Hidayatullah State 
Islamic University conducted in 2003 (later referred to as the ‘2003 survey’) finds 
that philanthropy has been practiced in a traditional way, but has certain potential 
for a social justice approach and aim (Abubakar & Bamualim, 2006). Following 
this study, a conceptual study on social justice philanthropy supports its potential 
practice in Muslim societies (Hasan, 2007). A possible transformation of the charity 
approach to social justice has been discussed by Fernandez (2009) and by the author 
(Fauzia, 2010a, 2010b). Looking at growing philanthropization in the last 15 years and 
the pre-existing popularity of the concept of social justice among the population, 
social justice and development may become the future of Islamic philanthropy in 
the country. But is one decade-and-a-half sufficient to show a convincing picture of 
the growth of social justice philanthropy? And what may contribute to or hinder its 
development? This article discusses the potentials and constraints of social justice 
philanthropy in the context of those twin forces of growing Islamization and mod-
ernization in Indonesia, focusing on the dynamics in the period from 2000 to 2017. 
The article defines Islamic philanthropy organizations as nonprofit entities which 
aim to provide public good and assistance for poor communities, either through 
organizations or directly to individuals, and which are based on Islamic values or 
having Islamic aims. The analysis for this article deliberately excludes mass organiza-
tions, except for sections within the organizations that clearly do fundraising, char-
itable management, and the redistribution of assistance. Both Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah have smaller organizations, called LazisNU and LazisMU respective-
ly, that collect and redistribute zakat, and also organizations that work on relief assis-
tance. Furthermore, this article does not include waqf because they have a different 
character in terms of managing charitable resources, although theoretically waqf is 
regarded as having strong potential for social justice philanthropy.
In Indonesia, the practice of philanthropy has transformed over time and the 
term has different nuances. This article acknowledges the conceptual difference 
between charity and philanthropy. Whereas charity is understood as a service delivery 
for a short-term assistance, philanthropy is more of a long-term project that targets 
the root problems creating inequality and poverty (Casey, 2016). Since the difference 
between the terms is not seen clearly in practice in Indonesia, the term philanthropy 
is used here. Philanthropic organizations receive their main resources from donors 
(either from family donation, corporations, institutions, or individuals). They man-
age these resources and then (re)distribute them to beneficiaries, either directly or 
through other organizations.
This article uses observations of organizations as well as interviews.3 To account 
for the limitations of these observations, it refers to data from a 2003 survey on 
understanding, opinion, and practices of Islamic philanthropy at the national level 
(Abubakar & Bamualim, 2006). The author finds that the modernization of the phi-
lanthropy sector has shown scattered pictures of development into a form of social 
justice philanthropy, which remains small but nevertheless encouraging. The author 
argues that modernization and Islamization encourage the practice of philanthropy 
3 The author has been researching Islamic charitable organizations since 2002. Interviews used for 
this article have been conducted since January 2016 as part of a research project on Islamic philanthropy 
networks in Southeast Asia at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore (NUS). 
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but that they do not necessarily contribute to the development of a philanthropy 
that focuses on social justice. In discussing this, the article is divided into four main 
sections: 1) Islamization, modernization, and social justice in philanthropy, 2) mod-
ernization of the organization and programs, 3) examples of social justice practices, 
and 4) potentials and constraints of social justice philanthropy, and 5) some conclud-
ing remarks. 
ISLAMIZATION, MODERNIZATION, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN PHILANTHROPY
The history of philanthropy in the post-Reformasi period reveals a picture of modern-
ization and Islamization. Islamization can be found in the deepening use of Islamic 
sources, the involvement of a greater number of Islamic organizations, the efforts 
toward more revivalist or conservative interpretations of certain practices, and the 
efforts to implement of zakat as an individual tax obligation to the state. Islamization 
is “a process of deepening commitment to standards of normative Islamic belief, 
practice and religious identity. Those standards are subject to contestation among 
groups and individuals” (Ricklefs, 2012, p. 516). The influence of Islamization has 
also increased charitable activities within Salafi networks from the Middle East to 
Indonesia. However, those activities are not as large as it has been assumed, and 
are exceeded by donations from local Muslims (Jahroni, 2015). Modernization in the 
practice of philanthropy manifests itself in the use of modern forms of organization, 
modern technologies, and a modern model of ‘rational thinking’ in the collection, or-
ganization, and distribution of various forms of charitable giving. Both Islamization 
and modernization have become imbedded in the recent, growing development of 
Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia.
Among Islamic organizations, the term philanthropy was new and was intro-
duced through advocacy and the research program Philanthropy for Social Justice in 
2002. Acceptance of this term and concept was not easy as it was regarded as secular 
and Western. However, to date, the term has been widely used, including by Islamic 
newspapers (such as Republika) and by zakat organizations. The adjective ‘social’ 
when applied to justice endorses the acceptance of the term philanthropy. However, 
as this article later shows, the common understanding of the term among philan-
thropy organizations varies and there have been varied local adaptations.
The practice of social justice philanthropy developed in the US as a continuation 
of the move from charity to philanthropy, and the move toward effective giving that 
endorses social change through intervention in the root causes of social problems 
(Anheier & Leat, 2006; Hunsaker & Hanzi, 2003; Rabinowitz, 1990). The National 
Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP) defines social justice philanthropy as 
“the practice of making contributions to nonprofit organizations that work for struc-
tural change and increase the opportunity of those who are less well-off politically, 
economically and socially” (Hunsaker & Hanzi, 2003, p. 6). This article follows the 
NCRPs definition but adjusts it to Indonesian and Islamic contexts. Islamic philan-
thropy for social justice works in terms of long-term grantmaking, social change, and 
inclusive giving. The 2003 survey, led by the author, did not only endorse giving for 
structural change and increase the opportunity of the weak, minority, and discrimi-
nated groups among society, but also highlighted the impartiality of giving without 
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discrimination with regard to groups, gender, ethnicity, and religion. These values 
were taken from the progressive understanding of Islamic teachings. The growing 
trend of modernization and Islamization in the last two decades needs an assessment 
of how the seeds of social justice philanthropy grew and to which direction these 
trends in Islamization and modernization stir the practice of philanthropy.
MODERNIZATION OF ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS
Philanthropy organizations have modernized since Reformasi in three important 
ways: 1) legal reform, 2) reform in management, and 3) reform in programs. The ref-
ormation period endorsed a legal reform related to philanthropy with the issuance of 
the Zakat Management Law No 38 in 1999 – later amended with Law No 23 in 2011, 
the Foundation Law No 16 2001 (amended in 2004), and the Waqf Law No 41 in 2004. 
Muslim philanthropic organizations crystallized into three main types. First, zakat 
organizations, these are organizations that focus on the collection and distribution 
of zakat and that are supposed to register under the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
and the National Zakat Board (BAZNAS). There are state-based zakat foundations 
(like BAZNAS) and community-based zakat foundations (like Lembaga Amil Zakat or 
LAZ).4 These comply with the Zakat Law, even though they also manage non-zakat 
donations. Second, there are charitable and humanitarian organizations. These fo-
cus on the collection of non-zakat donations, they report to the Ministry of Social 
Welfare and are registered under the Foundation Law. The third type includes waqf 
foundations and bodies. They comply with the Waqf Law and they mainly manage 
waqf assets. These three types may also be legally registered as foundations or mass or-
ganizations, therefore complying with the Foundation Law or the Mass Organization 
Law. Additionally, there are zakat committees, or temporary committees working to 
collect zakat in mosques, Islamic schools, and neighborhood associations.5 The three 
types of organizations have been endorsed to become modern in nature through laws 
and other government regulations, with expectations that they could work in a more 
effective and accountable way – not necessarily aiming for social justice. The move 
has been relatively successful for the non-zakat and zakat organizations, which as a 
result have more potential for social justice philanthropy.
The second reform is on the level of management. The adoption of modern 
management leads Islamic philanthropy organizations to use banking systems, hire 
full-time professional staff, improve organizational capacities, implement transpar-
ency and accountability principles, and have fundraising divisions. There has been a 
positive environment to do financial audits and publish reports, to provide an equal 
access for men and women, to do public fundraising, and offer the best service and 
programs to obtain public trust. The organizations also adjust to modern manage-
ment by referring to contextual interpretation of Islamic teachings, for example, 
on the acceptance of banking systems that were previously regarded as unlawful 
4 The total number of BAZNAS – from national, provincial, to districts – is 549 (Decree Director General 
for Guidance of Islamic Community No 499/2016). The approximate number of community zakat organi-
zations – according to the General Secretary of Zakat Forum – is 231 (Amin Sudarsono, 28 August 2017). 
5 The zakat committees at mosques approximately equal the number of mosques in the country, namely 
731,095 (Langkah Strategis Meningkatkan Kualitas Masjid, 2017). 
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(haram) by some ulama (Islamic scholars) and organizations. The more modern the 
organization, the more it is open to women and to modern interpretations of Islamic 
teachings on philanthropy.
The third reform concerns programs. Most Islamic philanthropy organizations have 
expanded their activities into educational, health, disaster relief, economy, and socio-re-
ligious programs. Some leading organizations, such as Dompet Dhuafa, have created 
divisions for advocacy, provide grants for research and the publication of journals and 
books, and run research and training institutes on zakat management. Dompet Dhuafa 
also supports anti-corruption programs, advocacy for victims of evictions, and cam-
paigns for environmental conservation. Following problems related to migrant workers, 
Dompet Dhuafa established a Migrant Institute and a branch in Hong Kong to provide 
assistance for female migrant workers (Abilawa, 3 February 2016) (see also Latief, 2014; 
also see this issue). These programs lead to the enhancement of practices of social jus-
tice philanthropy. This programmatic reform has broken the strong tradition of zakat 
giving, which is usually only for purposes related to religion and restricted to Muslims. 
Modern philanthropy organizations provide important means for the gradual inclusion 
of social justice in philanthropy practices. Traditional charity may also have a social 
justice value, for example, giving without discrimination and giving to underprivileged 
groups. The non-organized character of traditional giving, however, tends to keep social 
justice values low so that it could not change into effective and strategic social change. 
While modernization, especially programmatic expansion, has developed well, Islamic 
philanthropy organizations still keep traditional charitable activities in their programs, 
such as giving food and money to orphans, providing food for fast-breaking during 
Ramadan, and providing cash for Islamic preachers. In this respect, how organizations 
define social justice differs from one to another, as can be seen below. 
EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE PHILANTHROPY
This section discusses examples of social justice philanthropy developed by Islamic 
philanthropy organizations and looks at the contexts from which these ideas and 
practices come. The first example discusses the establishment of non-zakat organiza-
tions, while the second and third show efforts for social justice philanthropy based on 
the Indonesia Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar and the World Zakat Forum.
Establishment of Non-Zakat Organizations
As mentioned previously, there are charitable and humanitarian organizations which 
do not focus on zakat. This type of organization has flexibility in dealing with fund-
raising and managing donations that follow general regulations and not strict Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh) on zakat. Such organizations offer greater potential for social jus-
tice philanthropy.
One example is the Yasmin Foundation which was founded by the intellectual 
Chaidar Bagir, an expert on Muslim philosophy and Sufism. Yasmin was an abbre-
viation for Yayasan Imdad Mustad’afin, focusing on empowering the poor. In 2016, 
it changed its brand name into Amal Khair Yasmin and became a Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) program of another of Bagir's institutions, namely Mizan 
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Publisher, which is known as a progressive Islamic publisher. Yasmin has a School 
Resource Centre, an Autis Therapy Centre, a health advocacy program, a second hand 
store, and many other activities. In early 2017, it advocated against hate speech and 
provided advice for polite communication, which seems to respond to social media 
hate speech against a Christian Chinese governor of Jakarta (Belajar Bicara Sopan 
Santun, 2017). For Yasmin, social justice means to give – not only to Muslims – and 
to appreciate minorities. 
Philanthropy organizations that are similar to Yasmin are few in number. They are 
mostly founded by progressive Muslim intellectuals. Another example is the Social 
Trust Fund (STF).6 Established in 2012, STF is founded and supported by academics 
of the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta. Learning from the Ford 
Foundation and philanthropy in other countries, STF’s advocates for ‘philanthropy 
for social justice and peace’ that promotes equality and diversity, but adapted to an 
Indonesian Muslim context (Philanthropy for Social Justice and Peace, 2013). It aims 
to provide opportunities for the less advantaged, regardless of their religious or ethnic 
background, in order that they can have better access to education and welfare. Its 
grants and activities include scholarships for schools in remote areas (in the ‘Outer 
Islands’) and peace scholarship grants for Muslim and Christian children in conflict 
zones (Social Trust Fund UIN JKT, 2014). It offers advocacy programs for empower-
ing civil society and the philanthropy movement, such as supporting judicial reviews 
of the Zakat Law. STF’s views reflect progressive Islam, as it has been influenced by 
Muslim scholars from Syarif Hidayatullah University. As seen from the above activ-
ities, STF advocates for giving without discrimination as well as for the support of 
minority groups, peace and religious harmony, and long-term development programs. 
Although having the same Islamic values, these two examples represent a different 
cultural tradition than zakat organizations. They follow a more humanistic form of 
Islam, which avoids ‘political Islam’. This position differs from many zakat organiza-
tions that approach their beneficiaries solely as Muslims and are therefore relatively 
close to political Islam and dakwah (Islamic propagation) movements. 
Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar
The Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar (AKIM –  Aliansi Kemanusiaan 
Indonesia untuk Myanmar) was created in response to the humanitarian crisis 
concerning ethnic Rohingyas in Rakhine State, Myanmar. The escalation of the 
conflict in October 2016 and in August/September 2017 resulted in more than 500,000 
Rohingyas fleeing as refugees to Bangladesh.7 Developed in early 2017 as a collabora-
tion of Islamic philanthropy organizations and supported by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the alliance has accepted the minister’s policy on ‘soft diplomacy’, which is based 
on mutual respect and does not interfere in another country’s domestic affairs (Tomy 
Hendrajati, 30 November 2016). AKIM’s approach is to “give to the people in need for 
6 The author is one of the founders of this organization.
7 The crisis arose from a complexity of ethno-religious conflict between Rohingya-Muslims and Rakhine-
Buddhists, and a conflict between the military junta and militant Islam, based on long-term discrimina-
tion and the negligence of the Myanmar government to recognize the Rohingya minority as citizens of 
Myanmar. 
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both societies, without any discrimination” – a policy that was endorsed by Minister 
Marsudi (22 January 2017) and articulated by a limited number of organizations. 
This ‘soft diplomacy’ succeeded in making this alliance the only organization 
welcome to carry out humanitarian aid in Rakhine State. In January 2017, AKIM 
inaugurated two schools (renovated by one member of the alliance) (Kemenlu, 2017), 
and delivered aid given by the government (ten container trucks of food packages and 
sarongs). The alliance plans to help both Muslim and Buddhist refugees in Rakhine 
State in four areas: education (such as through schools and libraries), health (through 
medical training), economy and livelihood, and relief for two years at the cost of more 
than USD 2 million. The long-term development and inclusive approach made by 
this alliance could be part of a social justice approach. 
AKIM is worth mentioning for two reasons: First, it could persuade a number 
of Islamic philanthropy organizations –  some from conservative backgrounds 
–  to bring assistance not only to Muslim-Rohingya’s but also to Rakhine-Buddhist 
refugees. In fact, some of the money contributed for this project is zakat money (see 
the next section on zakat to non-Muslims), which means that they accept a more 
progressive interpretation and an inclusive approach to distribute zakat money also 
to non-Muslim beneficiaries. Second, it marks an acceptance of a long-term devel-
opment program focusing on building peace rather than a short-term ‘hit and run’ 
approach that most organizations tend to engage in (see the low percentage of giving 
to long-term purposes in the next section). 
The alliance has survived in the face of high politicization, from provocations of 
fundraising without clear objectives by individuals and unregistered organizations, 
as well as against reactions of hatred (such as those from radical organizations of 
the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) who launched a war, declared as a jihad, against the 
Rakhine Buddhists) (Hodge & Rayda, 2017; Kami, 2017). Despite strong conservative 
and non-inclusive harassment, the alliance maintained its position. Between March 
and August 2017, its membership decreased from 14 to 11 organizations but increased 
to 25 organizations later in September. Today, there is increased public support for 
the alliance, including from the Zakat Forum.8 It remains premature to claim suc-
cess for this alliance as an example of an inclusive and social justice practice of phi-
lanthropy, as we need to wait for a few years to confirm this. However, the project 
displays an early effort in a social justice approach toward giving that commentators 
need to take into account. 
World Zakat Forum 
The World Zakat Forum (WZF) is a network that consists of organizations, indi-
vidual practitioners, and academics that together aim to enhance the practice of 
zakat worldwide. It was established in 2010, initiated by the Dompet Dhuafa and 
8 The 11 organizations that signed the commitment are Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre, 
Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana dan Perubahan Iklim – Nahdlatul Ulama, PKPU Human Initiative, 
Dompet Dhuafa, Rumah Zakat, Dompet Peduli Ummat – Daarut Tauhiid, LAZIS Wahdah, Laznas Lembaga 
Manajemen Infaq (LMI), Aksi Cepat Tanggap, Lazis Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia, and Social Trust 
Fund – UIN Jakarta. More new members include four from social and humanitarian organizations, and 
ten zakat organizations.
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supported by the National Zakat Board or BAZNAS (Purwakananta, 1 March 2017). 
The forum later received support from leading zakat organizations, including from 
organizations in Malaysia. It aims to be an institutional platform to support the fur-
ther movement of zakat for the welfare of the ummah and “the glorification of Islam” 
(World Zakat Forum, 2017). It has held regular meetings to promote and enhance col-
laboration in zakat for poverty reduction. Previous conferences and meetings aimed 
at the engagement of practitioners, individuals, and zakat organizations from many 
parts of the world, and tried to endorse progressive interpretations of zakat, which 
still remains a big challenge.
Between 14 and 16 March 2017, the WZF held its fourth general assembly confer-
ence in Jakarta entitled “Strengthening the Role of Zakat as a Global Instrument to 
Eradicate Poverty” (World Zakat Forum International Conference, 2017) which was 
attended by about 300 participants (mainly from the national board of zakat) and 
representatives from 19 countries. Its local host was the National Board of Zakat. 
It held a plenary session on zakat and SDGs, and it signed a cooperation agreement 
with the UNDP and the National Development Planning Agency on zakat for devel-
opment. Although the forum remains exclusive for Muslims and those who want to 
use zakat as a weapon against unbridled capitalism, liberalism, and for reinforcing 
solidarity among Muslim nations, its platform is quite open for collaboration with 
international development agencies, such as the UNDP. It somehow follows the 
schemes of international agencies in the question of how zakat could be used effec-
tively for development – specifically for poverty eradication – and fits with goals for 
sustainable development. The move toward zakat for development is made possible 
through the leadership of BAZNAS and Dompet Dhuafa. This move is in accordance 
with the value of social justice philanthropy. For zakat organizations, agreement on 
the tools of SDGs and the development agenda indicates a big leap that may advance 
the agenda of social justice. Although it is not clear how this forum could further 
endorse zakat organizations toward a social justice agenda, it shows a path toward 
the transformation of zakat for development aims. 
POTENTIALS AND CONSTRAINTS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE PHILANTHROPY
The examples above reveal the potential for the further development of philanthropy 
of social justice. This, to some extent, echoes several findings of the 2003 survey. 
First, looking at social capital and the principle of social justice, the survey finds that 
Muslims in Indonesia have the potential to develop social justice philanthropy. It finds 
that more than 65% of Muslim respondents agree on certain principles of social jus-
tice, such as the importance of obtaining and securing rights, income equality, wom-
en’s rights, minority rights, and freedom of expression (Abubakar & Bamualim, 2006). 
Almost all Muslim respondents agree on the need to support equality and to have 
freedom of expression. It is clear that Muslims are quite rational in responding to 
values of income justice, such as the agreement that income should be based on skill 
and talent, and that income equality may reduce or prevent social conflicts. The con-
cern of Muslims in this survey over women’s rights and the rights of minority groups 
are also moderately high, with over 70% expressing such concerns. However, these 
concerns and levels of support do not necessarily achieve congruence with the target 
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of giving. As mentioned in the previous section, a strong religious motivation and a 
traditional pattern and practice of giving have not brought the generosity of Muslims 
to match the purposes of long-term social justice.
Second, the tendency toward social justice can also be seen from the motives for 
giving. A total of 11% of respondents stated that they give for 1) discharging ‘the rights 
of the poor’, 2) reducing poverty, and 3) helping the government to increase commu-
nity wellbeing. These motives show evidence of concerns over other people’s rights 
and welfare, which is itself an indicator of the potential of social justice philanthropy.
Third, the target of giving to social justice purposes is low, even marginal. 
Muslims give their sedekah directly to recipient organizations, ranging from schools 
to Islamic associations and organizations working on human rights. However, while 
94% of Muslims donate to religious organizations, only 3% of them donate to human 
rights organizations, 11% donate to women’s organizations, and 11% to environmen-
tal organizations. Giving to organizations is determined by religious affiliation and 
neighborhood attachments. This shows the domination of a traditional pattern of 
giving. What is clear is that issues related to the empowerment of human rights, 
or to women and labor rights, do not attract much attention from Muslim donors. 
Advocacy activities are somehow too abstract, so they are not popular targets of giv-
ing among Muslim donors. In the same way, giving for ‘long-term purposes’, which 
has the character of social justice philanthropy, is also not popular. Indeed, persuad-
ing and fundraising for social justice projects is a challenging task.
The crucial question – fourth – is whether religion becomes a constraint for the 
development of social justice philanthropy. The 2003 survey shows that religion is 
an important cause for giving, and that Muslims who donate to religious causes also 
tend to donate to social causes. 
Analyzing the pattern of donors for neighborhood associations, I find that two 
thirds of the Muslims surveyed donate to both religious and secular causes, whilst 
only about one third donate solely to religious organizations (Fauzia, 2010b, p. 61). 
This finding shows a similar picture to that in the US, where religious people are 
most likely to give, and that the person gives not only for religious causes but also 
to secular causes (Wuthnow & Hodkinson, 1990). In the Indonesian context, data is 
similar to that of Mujani’s (2004) thesis, which finds that Muslims who participate 
in religious activities will also participate in secular and community activities. This 
implies that Muslims also donate to non-zakat and humanitarian organizations (such 
as discussed in the previous section) as well as to secular NGOs. For example, in the 
aftermath of the tsunami in Aceh, the SCTV (TV News) Foundation attracted a huge 
amount of donations for the victims of the tsunami (Kehati, 2005). 
As one important element of social justice is the principle of non-discrimination, 
a further question is whether Muslims agree with the notion of giving to others with-
out considering their religion. Survey results show that 77% of the respondents find 
no problem with this (Fauzia, 2010b, p. 61).
However, when the survey asked a more detailed question related to the possi-
bility of zakat money being given to non-Muslims, half of the Muslim respondents 
(51%) voiced their objections, while 45% of the respondents agreed that money could 
be given to non-Muslims, and 4% did not answer. Six percent of the respondents 
stated that they had already given zakat to non-Muslims (Abubakar & Bamualim, 
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2006, p. 186). A possible hindrance to non-discriminative giving is related to inter-
pretations of  zakat (almsgiving), which is generally regarded as being given strictly to 
Muslim beneficiaries, following conservative practices – although contextual and pro-
gressive interpretation, such as that by An-Naim & Halim (2006), has permitted zakat 
to be used for anyone who is in need. There are also many other forms of charitable 
donations that are not subject to such strict and detailed regulations such as sedekah. 
The 2003 survey  data confirm that non-zakat organizations have greater potential for 
social justice philanthropy. This hindrance caused by interpretation does not diminish 
or detract from the humanitarian values of Muslim donors. The survey found that 
73% of Muslim respondents shared a concern to improve their attitude toward minor-
ity groups. When they were asked the challenging question on their agreement as to 
whether or not to give to causes outside the traditional mainstream, their answers 
remained positive. 38% of Muslim respondents wanted to give to non-Muslims, 83% 
wanted to give to refugees, 56% agreed on the need to save sexual workers who were 
forced to work by giving them support, and 37% were even willing to give to victims 
of HIV/AIDS (Abubakar & Bamualim, 2006, p. 186). The willingness to give to and 
work on HIV-related projects was not typically supported, however, Nahdlatul Ulama 
and Muhammadiyah had proved it was possible. Both organizations collaborated with 
the Global Fund to fight HIV, TB, and Malaria (Rae, 2017), and this example, together 
with the survey findings and case studies discussed, build a picture of the potential 
for social justice philanthropy, especially in larger organizations. Many organizations 
remain very strict or too careful in their interpretation and tend to follow the main-
stream understanding, but a number of organizations have stepped up their work for 
the social justice practices of philanthropy. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
While a majority of Indonesian Muslims preserve a traditional way of giving, the in-
novation and reform pioneered by modern Islamic philanthropy organizations con-
tribute to the transformation of the sector. Recent developments in the practice of 
Islamic philanthropy discussed in this article have shown encouraging features from 
both recent case studies and the 2003 survey data. The contribution of moderni-
zation to legal reform, management, and to the program innovation of philanthro-
py organizations has increased the possibility of philanthropy for development and 
social justice, but remains very premature. Islamization encourages the practice of 
Islamic philanthropy, but it also impedes it due to the dominance of strict, traditional 
interpretations of jurisprudence (fiqh), and to the politicization of Islam.
The trend toward modernization has not necessarily led to thoughts that are 
inclusive. Both modernization and Islamization bring a notion of social justice phi-
lanthropy. Progressive thoughts may arise from any religious tradition and a social 
justice perspective does not necessarily imbed itself in either modernization or 
Islamization, but in the progressive thoughts inherent within the religion. This is 
similar to the argument that modern philanthropy is not necessarily socially just. 
Even though modern philanthropy has potential in the addressing of social justice, in 
reality some of these thoughts are only modern in terms of aspects of their outlook; 
their concern is far from addressing injustices.
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In Indonesia, traditional – and strict – religious behaviors have complicated mod-
ern program management, and have hindered long-term structural programs as 
organizations face difficulties in adapting fiqh regulations established in the eighth 
and ninth century cultures of the Middle East to the modern situation of Indonesia. 
However, efforts toward reinterpretation have been on the way, not only in Indonesia 
(Abidin, 2004), but also in international Islamic agencies (Shirazi, 2014). Practices of 
Islamic philanthropy with an inclusive approach, non-discrimination, and long-term 
structural programs have been seen here and there, including in the establishment 
and support given to non-zakat philanthropic organizations and forums/associations. 
The transformation toward social justice philanthropy has benefited from dialogs 
and exchanges between Islamic philanthropy organizations and secular ones, as well 
as with other faith-based organizations that are concerned with the agenda of social 
justice. Indeed, there are many charitable foundations, such as media-based, CSR, 
and family foundations that come from different spheres than zakat organizations 
but whose work is similar or complementary in intention and character. From the 
exchange initiated between 2002 and 2004, Islamic philanthropy organizations 
learned from the development of the philanthropy sector in Indonesia, Asia, and 
the US, and about various issues such as environment and advocacy. It is likely that 
this dialog contributed to the discreet acceptance of the term ‘philanthropy’. Zakat 
organizations continue to engage with secular NGOs and work on public policies, on 
anti-corruption, on consumer affairs, on the empowerment of women, and on issues 
of social justice. 
Overall, while not rapid, the continuance of the development toward social jus-
tice philanthropy has been clear. The account that asserts that religious charities 
have more interest in promoting their own confessions (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 
2014) may continue to be challenged step by step by a more vibrant, inclusive philan-
thropy. The future of social justice philanthropy remains possible but will depend on 
a stable political and economic situation, support from the state, and the existence 
of a strong civil society.
 
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► Latief, H. (2017). Addressing unfortunate wayfarer: Islamic philanthropy and Indonesian migrant work-
ers in Hong Kong. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 10 (2), 237-255. 
This article analyses how Islamic philanthropy is translated and reiterated in contemporary 
Indonesia and contextualized in the international arena. It examines the experience of an 
Islamic philanthropic organization, Dompet Dhuafa (DD), in defining and addressing types 
of zakat beneficiaries by, among other things, addressing unfortunate Indonesian migrant 
workers residing in Hong Kong. The effort of DD to expand the types of zakat recipients 
reflects a new development of Islamic philanthropy activism in Indonesia. There is a sub-
stantial change in how zakat is formulated and practiced among Indonesian Muslims in 
general, and in particular Indonesian migrant workers overseas. Islamic philanthropic or-
ganizations, such as DD, have functioned not only as intermediaries between benefactors in 
Indonesia and Indonesian migrant workers overseas but also as energizers to encourage the 
zakat practice among fortunate migrant workers to help their unfortunate fellows overseas.
Keywords: Dompet Dhuafa; Indonesia; Islamic Philanthropy; Migrant Workers; Relief

INTRODUCTION
Over decades, Indonesian Muslims have practiced zakat (almsgiving or mandatory 
giving). This involves paying 2.5% to 10% of their income, and channeling their 
sedekah or sadaqah (voluntary giving) to semi-permanent or ad hoc zakat collec-
tors established in the communities, who are referred to as ‘amil (from Arabic: the 
alms collector). The collected funds are mainly disbursed among deserving ben-
eficiaries in the neighborhood, such as the poor and the needy. Therefore, zakat 
and charity practices in Indonesia and many other countries are very local in char-
acter, taking place as a sort of community-based self-help or communal support 
(Ali & Hatta, 2014; Weiss, 2002). However, there has been a substantial change 
in zakat practice where a new form of Islamic philanthropic organizations arose 
in urban areas, emerging as well-organized organizations with regard to man-
agement, competencies, and institutional capacity (Alawiyah, 2010; Latief, 2010; 
Lessy, 2013) that can formulate and adopt new and ‘modern’ concepts of ‘devel-
opment’ by engaging not only a ‘service approach’ but also an entrepreneurial ap-
proach as well as innovation in finding solutions and measuring impact (Anheir 
& Leat, 2006, p. 90; Payton & Moody, 2008). Islamic philanthropic organizations 
in Indonesia have also formulated ideas and activities that align with the frame-
work of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and now 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Noor & Pickup, 2017).
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Hence, Muslim understanding of philanthropy in Indonesia has also changed over 
time as Islamic philanthropic organizations seek a new interpretation of who zakat 
beneficiaries are and why they deserve assistance from philanthropic organizations. 
It is unsurprising that Muslim philanthropic organizations in Indonesia have played 
pivotal roles not only in relieving the poor in neighborhoods, but also in operating 
humanitarian missions and relief projects in disaster-affected spots in Indonesia and 
overseas, notably where Muslims and Muslim countries are affected (Bush, 2015; 
Latief, 2013, 2016). Some Islamic philanthropic organizations also focus on commu-
nity-based economic empowerment, entrepreneurship, income-generating activities, 
and other types of development-oriented projects. This means that some portions of 
zakat and sadaqah funds collected by Islamic philanthropic organizations have been 
used to address not only the symptoms but also the roots of the problems, thus pro-
viding a long-term impact. 
The expansion of the scope of philanthropic practices in Indonesia indicate that 
there has been a process of professionalization and the increase of the organizational 
capacity of Islamic philanthropic organizations as a response to the government regu-
lation as well as a fulfillment of people’s demand for accountability. This suggests that 
Muslim philanthropic organizations have been underpinned and equipped with spe-
cialized human resources, state regulation, and various methods of financial resource 
mobilization. Beyond that, there has been an effort to reinterpret some Quranic 
concepts about the eight types of zakat beneficiaries, partly because challenges faced 
in recent times are more complicated than those in the past. The categories of those 
in need in today’s world have changed in line with the complexity of the root of pov-
erty. According to the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), 
the nature of poverty is multidimensional. It does not only relate to the fulfillment of 
basic needs such as food and housing, but also other needs such as sanitation, clean 
water, education, healthcare, and the opportunity to obtain proper jobs (OPHI, 2017).
According to the Qur’an (At-Taubah: 60), zakat fund should and can be disbursed to 
particular types of beneficiaries: the needy (fakir), the poor (miskin), the alms collector 
(amil), in the path of God (fi sabilillah), people burdened with debt (gharimum), way-
farer or traveler (ibn sabil), people in bondage or slavery (riqab), and those who have 
inclined toward Islam (muallaf). Muslim scholars hold different views as to whether 
zakat funds should be equally distributed to the eight types of beneficiaries or wheth-
er they should only be dispensed to certain categories found in the neighborhood, 
notably the poor and the needy. In practice, two types of zakat beneficiaries which are 
rarely included in Islamic philanthropic organizations are ‘the travelers’ and ‘people in 
bondage’. This is because there is lack of new interpretation among Muslim scholars 
(ulama) about the travelers and people in bondage in modern times, and, thus, zakat 
fund, for the most part, only addresses poverty problems in the communities. Ulama 
and zakat collectors have mainly paid attention to the poor and the needy visible in the 
neighborhood while the travelers and people in bondage are hardly found in daily life.1 
1 Some Muslim scholars have attempted to translate and interpret the meaning of ibn sabil and riqab in 
modern context. Literally, ibn sabil means the traveler or those who face shortage during their travel, and 
therefore deserve aid from zakat fund. Masdar Farid Mas’udi is one of the leading Muslim scholars in In-
donesia and active in the Nahdlatul Ulama who have attempted to provide new insight into the definition 
of these two types of zakat recipients.
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In Muslim literature, riqab is often associated with the slaves in early Islamic history, 
and now most of Muslim countries do not recognize the concept of slavery. 
This article addresses the role of Dompet Dhuafa in linking Indonesian bene-
factors and zakat recipients with migrant workers, as well in organizing and stim-
ulating philanthropy among migrant workers. This article is based on my broader 
research on Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia and particularly on my field research 
in Indonesia and Hong Kong in 2008 and 2010 where Dompet Dhuafa set up branch 
offices. In Hong Kong, I visited some shelters in Kowloon and Causeway Bay as well 
as met and interviewed people with different backgrounds, such as migrant workers, 
NGO activists, clerics, and staff of Islamic philanthropic organizations. This article 
argues that there has been a new interpretation of zakat categories introduced by 
philanthropic organizations. 
INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS 
For many years, Indonesia has been renowned for its supply of migrant workers over-
seas, notably to Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Emirates) as well as to 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia. Indonesia is one of the larg-
est suppliers of women migrant workers to Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong (Ananta, 
Kartowibowo, Wiyono, & Chotib, 1998; Constable, 2007; Hugo, 2002; Silvey, 2004). 
The migration of Indonesian domestic workers to Hong Kong began in the early 1990s 
(Rahman & Fee, 2009). Changing demographics, the Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990s, and the political-economic context prompted the Indonesian government to 
promote the export of female labor to Hong Kong and other economies in Asia and 
the Middle East (Constable, 2009). The Indonesian Statistic Bureau (BPS) and National 
Agency for the Protection and Placement of International Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) 
have reported that the number of migrant workers from Indonesia from 1996 until 
2014, both male and female, fluctuated but the number and population of Indonesian 
migrant in Hong Kong remain high (see Table 1). In 2001 and 2003, the Indonesian 
government strengthened the policy and implemented stricter requirement for 
Year Number of Migrant Workers Female (%) Male (%)
1996 517, 169 288,832 (66%) 228,337 (44%)
2000 435,222 297,273 (68%) 137,949 (32%)
2004 380,690 296,615 (78%) 84,075 (22%)
2007 696,746 543,859 (78%) 152,887 (22%)
2010 575,804 451,120 (78%) 124,684 (22%)
2011 586,802 376,686 (64%) 210,116 (36%)
2012 494,609 279,784 (57% ) 214,825 (43%)
2013 586,802 276,998 (54% ) 235,170 (46%)
2014 429,872 243,629 (57% ) 186,243 (43%)
(Sources: BNP2TKI & BPS, ILO; own compilation)
Table 1. Indonesian Migrant Workers in Hong Kong 1996–2014 
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migrant worker agencies, the number of migrant workers sent in 2004 decreased to 
compare with those who were sent from 2007 until 2014. 
Indonesian female migrant workers have surpassed the number of men since 
the mid-1980s (Hugo, 2002). Economic instability and limited access to jobs caused 
unemployed women in some regions of Indonesia in West Java, East Java, Nusa 
Tenggara Barat, Nusa Tenggara Timur, and others to seek jobs overseas. For particu-
lar groups of people with limited skills and low levels of education, working as maids 
or domestic helpers in foreign countries seems the ‘best’ and most ‘promising’ – but 
at the same time – uncertain option, which may risk their lives. As the acute pover-
ty-related problems cannot always be effectively resolved, either by the government 
or civil society organizations, women in rural areas are still interested in working 
abroad to secure a better life. 
There are three categories of migrant workers who have left Indonesia to seek 
employment abroad (Constable, 2007; Rahman & Fee, 2009). The first are highly-skilled 
workers whose considerable expertise is very rare and needed by large companies in 
developed countries. The second are semi-skilled workers whose practical skills are rath-
er common, and yet needed in both developed and developing countries, and who just 
require short-term training. The last are low-skilled workers who are mostly assigned 
to the informal or domestic sector (Constable, 2007; Jones, 2000; Loveband, 2007). 
Women migrant workers (Tenaga Kerja Wanita, or TKW) from Indonesia, who are 
also termed ‘domestic workers’ or ‘domestic helpers’, are predominately lower-skilled 
and lower-educated compared with those from other Asian countries, such as the 
Philippines and Thailand, because most Indonesian workers, based on a research 
survey conducted by IOM (2010, p. 75), have merely primary education (elementary 
schools and junior high schools) and only a few have college diplomas. Indonesian 
migrant workers who are mainly working as housemaids are paid less (Rahman, 2005, 
p. 90). Men who are willing to work abroad are mainly appointed as laborers in various 
kinds of ‘dirty, dangerous, and difficult jobs’ (3-D Jobs) in the industrial and construc-
tion sector, while women are mainly employed in the informal sector. Women migrant 
workers’ vulnerability lies mainly in the uncertainty of gaining adequate protection 
from the state, not only during recruitment by private agencies in Indonesia but also 
during their work overseas (ILO, 2015). It has often been reported in the mass media 
and in reports that some domestic workers from Indonesia working in such countries 
as Malaysia, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia have had horrifying experiences, often suffer-
ing sexual and physical abuse, and at the same time receiving no adequate protection 
from the Indonesian authorities (Rudnyckyj, 2004; Setyawati, 2013). 
In Hong Kong, domestic workers have a minimum wage stipulated in their contracts 
(Constable, 2009). However, Rahman and Fee (2009) found that the mean earning of 
Indonesian domestic workers in Hong Kong was HKD 3,333.82 per month suggest-
ing the presence of illegal wage underpayment. It can be summarized that Indonesian 
migrant domestic workers form “a marginalised group along the intersecting catego-
ries of gender, economic class and migrant status/citizenship” (Rother, 2017, p. 964).
The plight of domestic workers working as housemaids overseas continues 
(BNP2TKI, 2017). At the same time, human trafficking and the dispatch of women 
migrant labor to work as housemaids overseas have increasingly become the con-
cerns of NGOs (Marcoes, 2002; Silvey, 2004). Muslim philanthropic organizations 
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started formulating strategies on how to cope with problems faced by migrant work-
ers, among other strategies by expanding the scope of types of zakat beneficiaries 
(Latief, 2017). In recent times, the enrichment of Muslim discourse and praxis on 
Islamic philanthropy in general, and in particular categories of zakat beneficiaries, 
signifies vibrant engagement of Muslim philanthropic organizations in response 
to the hardship in the communities. More specifically, the poor prospects faced by 
Indonesian women migrant workers have stimulated Islamic associations to speak 
up for them and show their dissatisfaction towards insufficient government policies. 
For example, in 2000, the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) enacted Islamic legal 
opinions (fatwas), according to which the plight of Indonesian women workers over-
seas was considered ‘illicit’ (haram) and as something to be avoided by any individual 
or institution. This fatwa also insisted that the Ministry of Manpower should stop 
sending Indonesian women to work overseas, unless the government can ensure the 
safety of female migrants and protect their honor and dignity (see MUI’s Fatwa No. 
7/MUNAS VI/MUI/2000). Similar calls were made by some Islamic associations that 
urged the government to issue a regulation that could prevent female migrant work-
ers leaving, notably to Saudi Arabia.2
CONTEXTUALIZING MUSLIM PHILANTHROPY IN INDONESIA
I started conducting research on Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia more than 
ten years ago. I found that there were some Islamic organizations that specifically 
worked on poverty relief by providing direct aid, basic health care, scholarship, and 
income-generating projects for low-income families. These philanthropic organiza-
tions attempted to participate in increasing the equality in life of the community by 
utilizing fund collected from the communities. Unlike zakat agencies established in 
many mosques throughout Indonesia, this new form of Muslim philanthropic organ-
izations is more publicly visible. Muslim philanthropic organizations rent houses or 
stores in strategic areas where the middle-class families would see their offices and 
advertisement. Banners to attract Muslim middle-class to channel their zakat and 
sadaqah as well as to participate in various types of social entrepreneurship, including 
financing poverty alleviation projects, could be seen in many places, such as main 
roads, boulevards, crossroads, shopping malls, airports, and business centers (Meij, 
2009). Likewise, advertisements of Islamic philanthropic projects appeared on radio, 
billboard, television, and newspaper. This suggests that the nature of Islamic philan-
thropy has transformed from its modest form into a new pattern (Retsikas, 2014).3 
2 It should be noted that in 2000, MUI also enacted Fatwa No. 7/MUNAS VI/MUI/2000 that puts em-
phasis on the negative impact faced by female workers when they are sent for work overseas without 
being accompanied by muhram (somebody/relatives whom a woman is never allowed to marry because of 
their close blood relationship). The issuance of this fatwa was to protect women migrant workers overseas 
as well as to remind the government to provide best protection system. Some leaders of Women Mus-
lim organizations such as Siti Noorjannah Djohantini of Aisyiyah, Titin Suprihatin of Persatuan Islam Istri 
(Persistri), Valina Singka Subekti of Wanita Syarikat Islam raised similar voices, urging the government to 
halt the dispatch of women migrant workers overseas (Ruslan, 2010). 
3 In the past, zakat collectors or philanthropic organizations only operated during the Ramadan month 
and were run by small and ad hoc committees. Those organizations set up charity programs in the commu-
nities by distributing zakat and sadaqa fund without any vision to create development-oriented projects. 
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People working in philanthropic organizations, such as DD, Rumah Zakat (House of 
Zakat), and LAZISMU (Muhammadiyah Zakat Agency) are not only part-time workers 
but also fulltime workers. The directors and CEOs of philanthropic organizations 
wear coats and ties while their staff dress in stylish uniforms to indicate discipline 
and professionalism.
The educational background of the advocates (directors and managers) of Islamic 
philanthropic organizations varies. Some graduated from top universities in Indonesia 
holding a Bachelor or Master’s degree in medical sciences, economics, management, 
social sciences, or religious studies. They can communicate with directors and man-
agers from national and international companies and create strategic development 
projects proposed to donors from affluent families and upper Muslim middle-class. 
Therefore, Islamic philanthropic organizations in Indonesia that have emerged over 
the past 20 years are no longer the small community groups with weak management 
that they used to be. Instead, they appear in public as professional organizations 
that uphold principles of professionalism and promote modern corporate culture. 
The programs provided by Muslim philanthropic organizations are almost similar to 
those offered by other development and religiously-affiliated NGOs. These phenom-
ena can be seen in urban areas, especially in the major cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, 
and Surabaya.
Dompet Dhuafa (DD) is one of the largest Islamic philanthropic organizations 
that was established during the ‘New Order’ era. It was founded in 1993 by some 
Muslim journalists working in the Republika Daily News. DD started changing public 
perception of the nature of Islamic philanthropy or zakat collection in Indonesia. 
Zakat is promoted as a tool to strengthen the communities, alleviate poverty, and 
increase people’s quality of life. With other newly founded zakat collectors in the 
1990s, DD contextualized the meaning of zakat for the communities by operating 
projects in both urban and rural areas. Improving skills and knowledge of farmers 
in villages, sailors in coastal areas, and low-income urban families to run a micro 
business were among the popular projects organized by DD. Likewise, in the after-
math of the disaster in some regions of Indonesia, DD actively engaged by sending 
volunteers and aid for disaster victims while at the same time attracting donors to 
channel their money through DD (Alawiyah, 2010). Apart from DD, there were some 
other organizations with similar visions that also worked with and gained support 
from the communities, such as Rumah Zakat and Daarut Tauhid in Bandung, PKPU 
and LAZISMU in Jakarta, or Al-Falah Foundation and Rumah Yatim in Surabaya. In 
short, Muslim philanthropic organizations vibrantly developed in the main cities of 
Indonesia, especially in Java. 
Although similarities can be seen within Islamic philanthropic organizations in 
Indonesia in running charity programs, there are also particularities and differences 
in formulating the issues and addressing the problems. Some pay much attention 
to basic health services, while others are more interested in supporting education 
for low-income families. Some organizations work specifically on income-generating 
projects, while others dedicate their aid to dakwah activities. As mentioned previous-
ly, the uniqueness of DD became evident when it started operating its organization 
The zakat committees were usually dismissed soon after Idul Fitri or the end of Ramadan month.
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branches overseas, such as in Japan, Australia, Malaysia, and Hong Kong. Thus, DD 
was able to convince supporters in Indonesian communities abroad and started to 
run development programs in Indonesia and other countries where many Indonesian 
workers reside. 
 In 2004 DD established a branch office in Hong Kong, one of the largest and most 
cosmopolitan cities in Asia, and home to approximately 150,000 Indonesian migrant 
workers (Asian Migrant Centre, 2017). The DD branch office has cooperated with some 
Indonesian migrant associations.4 Various reasons, mainly humanitarian and religious 
ones, have been given by DD to explain its presence in a city such as Hong Kong. 
Humanitarian issues relate to the actual conditions and prospects of migrant workers 
who have been placed in inopportune and weak positions, especially in facing conflicts 
between themselves and their employers. A variety of problems have marked the lives 
of many female migrant workers, including sexual abuse and the inappropriate break-
ing of the terms of the contract by both employers or job providers.5 At the same time, 
the employees, predominantly women, are in a weak position due to their status as 
migrant workers or ‘foreigners’, regardless of their legal status as residents. The second 
set of reasons given by DD, pertaining to religion, is also instrumental in shaping the 
typical social activities carried out by DD in Hong Kong. Unlike Indonesian female 
migrant workers in Middle Eastern countries, who are close to ‘the cradle of Islam’, the 
migrant workers’ religious life in Hong Kong, as far as DD officials are concerned, has 
become the target of Christian missionary activities. This indicates that as an Islamic 
organization, DD attempted to assist Muslim migrant workers to prevent them 
from the influence of other religions. It is unsurprising that DD frequently organ-
ized Islamic study gathering (pengajian) for Muslim migrant workers. Apart from this, 
some Indonesian female migrant workers fall into the trap of becoming commercial 
sex workers in Hong Kong.6 The third factor is the political openness in Hong Kong, 
which makes it possible for the NGO sector to develop; unlike in other countries such 
as Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, two Muslim countries that are quite resistant to the 
NGO sector (Ford, 2006; Hugo, 1993). In fact, in these two Muslim countries, Saudi 
Arabia and Malaysia, the situation of Indonesian domestic workers appears to be con-
siderably worse than that in Hong Kong (Ford, 2006). Although migrant workers still 
experience violent abuse, termination of employment, problems with the employer, 
unpaid salary, and sexual harassment in Hong Kong, avenues to resolve the problem 
and regain the migrants’ rights through the courts are relatively open. 
There has been a lot of public concern over women’s poverty, trafficking, and the 
plight of migrant workers. Like other development NGOs, DD has extended its social 
4 It is worth emphasizing that the establishment of DD’s branches overseas was also stimulated by the fact 
that there have been many success stories of Indonesian migrants who can be regarded as prospective benefac-
tors of DD. So far, DD’s overseas branches have been set up in places such as Hong Kong, China, Japan, and 
Australia, and these countries are quite distinct from one another in terms of culture, politics, and economics. 
5 This information is based on my interview and discussion with some women migrant workers and 
NGO activists in Hong Kong in 2008 and 2010. The Migrant Care, an Indonesian NGO working on advo-
cacy for Indonesian migrants overseas, especially in evaluating and fostering government regulation has 
provided information on how Indonesian women migrants are vulnerable to any abuse and unfair policies 
(Ignacio & Mejia, 2008).
6 The experience of one ex-migrant worker in Hong Kong has been penned, published, and filmed in 
Indonesia (Susanti, 2007).
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programs to deal with poverty issues in general, and in particular women’s empow-
erment. In fact, DD as a growing Islamic philanthropic organization has so far oper-
ated both relief and development-oriented projects in the national and international 
arenas. For this Islamic charitable association, underprivileged female migrant work-
ers, especially those who are not paid appropriately or who experience abuse, can be 
regarded as one type of zakat beneficiary who needs assistance from Islamic organ-
izations. There are a variety of expressions in Indonesian that can be used to refer 
to female migrant workers. The most popular of which are Tenaga Kerja Indonesia 
(Indonesian Workers, TKI), Tenaga Kerja Wanita (Indonesian Women Workers, TKW), 
Buruh Migran Indonesia (Indonesian Migrant Labors, BMI), or even Pembantu Rumah 
Tangga (domestic servants, PRT). While these terms are perceived in Indonesian soci-
ety as referring to occupations that are of an ‘inferior status’, ‘less respectable’, and are 
even associated with a ‘subordinate’ occupation, DD has endeavored to employ the 
more neutral term perantau (migrant). 
Efforts to link ibn sabil (wayfarer, traveler) and riqab to perantau or migrant work-
ers by DD are appropriate, and we have not so far seen such an understanding for-
mulated by Muslim scholars at MUI, thus DD’s interpretation of zakat beneficiaries 
at that time was sensible and signifying a progressive understanding of zakat and its 
beneficiaries. DD has been able to respond to the current challenges and problems 
of transnational migration. If we take a closer look at fatwa (legal opinions) issued 
by religious authorities or Islamic organizations, such as MUI, Muhammadiyah, 
Nahdlatul Ulama, and Persatuan Islam in Indonesia, we may see that, for the most 
part, fatwa issued by those organizations relate to the issues of zakat collection, per-
centage of zakat, mechanism of zakat distribution, and wealth subjected to zakat in 
modern times. However, discussion and debates over the new meaning of zakat ben-
eficiaries are hard to find.
Muhammad Hasby Ash-Shiddieqy, a prominent Muslim scholar, and professor 
from Syariah Faculty, IAIN (the State Institute of Islamic Studies) Sunan Kalijaga 
who wrote extensive works on Islamic jurisprudence and history, including fiqh of 
zakat, explains that ibn sabil can be interpreted in various meanings. Ibn sabil can 
mean “those who are away from their hometown and cannot afford travel expenses 
and children abandoned by their parents” (Ash-Shiddieqy, 2009, p. 168). Meanwhile, 
according to Haji Malik Karim Amrullah, the first chairman of MUI, ibn sabil can 
mean “affluent families who are disconnected from their wealth and, thus, cannot 
afford their life or those who are expelled from a certain Muslim country due to polit-
ical turmoil and reside in another Muslim country” (Amrullah, 2015, p. 138; author's 
translation). Amrullah’s view shares a similarity with Masdar F. Masudi’s (2005) 
understanding which mentions that ibn sabil in modern times can be associated with 
homelessness, street children, and refugees.
Unlike Islamic scholars mentioned above, DD’s activists link the concept ibn sabil 
to the concept of perantau. The term perantau in the Indonesian context is a term 
mainly used by people from West Sumatra who migrated to other parts of Indonesia 
to run businesses, notably restaurants, and to build their careers. Despite its ‘neutral’ 
connotations, which avoids disgracing women migrant domestic workers, the term 
perantau in Islamic literature can also be translated into, and associated with, one of 
the zakat beneficiaries called ibn sabil (wayfarer, traveler). The concept of perantau, in 
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this respect, can mean those who are struggling to make a living overseas. It is also 
worth bearing in mind that, in practice, ibn sabil is an entity that is rarely included 
as a zakat beneficiary. The existence of the concept of ibn sabil and riqab are even 
commonly put aside in the whole discussion of du’afa or mustad’afun (those who are 
oppressed).7 Arifin Purwakananta, the program director of DD, for example, suggests 
that DD aims to act as a ‘small general consulate’ of Indonesia, an association that 
may support migrants by giving them both, social and legal assistance. He considers 
the disadvantaged migrants as representing mustad’afin (oppressed entities) that need 
not only short-term service, but more particularly, long-term political and legal aid 
(Arifin Purwakananta, 25 January 2009).
DOMPET DHUAFA AND ‘UNFORTUNATE’ MIGRANT WORKERS 
DD has created a variety of activities relevant to the migrants’ needs, ranging from 
providing shelters for homeless migrants who have been driven from their dwellings 
to facilitating the establishment of migrant associations and supporting their activi-
ties. To facilitate the establishment of shelters (to rent an apartment for unfortunate 
migrants) and support four existing shelters used by Indonesian migrant communi-
ties, DD receives funds from donors in Indonesia and Hong Kong. Migrant women, 
especially, are in need of support and assistance, not only from the government, who 
may provide a legal umbrella for the protection of migrants, but also from other par-
ties like NGOs, who may offer practical and psychological assistance. For example, 
there are some ‘shelters’ for Indonesian migrants in Hong Kong and Macao that have 
been managed by various Indonesian associations. ‘Shelter’ in this respect means an 
apartment rented out by NGOs or associations to temporarily accommodate migrant 
workers who are facing difficulties, such as losing their jobs, something that automat-
ically causes them to become ‘homeless’ during their stay in Hong Kong. Religious 
institutions, notably Muslim and Christian ones (i.e., Christian Action), are among the 
most active agencies assisting female migrant workers in Hong Kong. Some shelters, 
therefore, have been sponsored by Christian congregations, others by Islamic associ-
ations (Pdt. Johan Kusmanto, 8 June 2010). 
Migrants in Hong Kong who cannot find a new job within three weeks after being 
fired by their employers have to return to their home countries. It is in this critical 
period that they usually stay in a shelter while contacting different agencies to seek a 
new job. The shelter located in Kowloon, co-supported by the Hong Kong Coalition of 
Indonesian Migrant Workers Organizations (KOTKIHO) and DD, for example, accom-
modates about 20 domestic workers from Indonesia, whose ages range from 20 to 
30 years, with various problems, mainly contract termination by the employers. This 
shelter is, of course, far from sufficient to accommodate all these unfortunate domes-
tic workers. It is run by a lady who has been living in Hong Kong for more than 30 
7 The experience of zakat agencies suggests that there are a lot of people who label themselves as travel-
ers and who, having run out of supplies or money, seek assistance from agency offices. They usually ask for 
a certain amount of cash. Despite the willingness of zakat agencies that support these travelers, a tighter 
procedure has been applied by zakat agencies, as there have been many instances of ‘fake travelers’ abusing 
the trust of zakat agencies. So far, zakat agencies have made partnerships with transportation agencies, 
notably bus companies, and thus only provide a small amount of cash for travelers seeking funds. 
246 | ASEAS 10(2)
Addressing Unfortunate Wayfarer: Islamic Philanthropy and Indonesian Migrant Workers in Hong Kong
years. She came to Hong Kong as a domestic worker, and while there she became active 
in NGOs, such KOTKIHO and the Coalition for Migrants’ Rights (CMR). She has often 
acted as a ‘spokesperson’ in court, for the police, or even in public when Indonesian 
migrant workers have problems. Most of the workers staying in this shelter were look-
ing for new jobs, while others were waiting for the result of court processes. 
Another shelter is located in the Causeway Bay area. This shelter also functions as 
an office of DD, sponsoring various philanthropic and development-oriented activi-
ties for domestic workers. There were three DD staff working in this shelter, and dur-
ing the weekends, 20-30 women migrant volunteers helped DD to introduce zakat 
to migrants and distribute funds to those in need through some kinds of skill-de-
velopment program and providing assistance in Hong Kong. Often, some domestic 
workers visit this shelter, either to meet their friends or to become DD volunteers. In 
the month of Ramadan, shelters established or supported by DD and other Muslim 
associations become more active as religious gatherings are intensified during this 
period. On certain occasions, migrants, sponsored by zakat agencies like DD, even 
invite famous preachers from Indonesia, from whom Indonesian migrants may learn 
new insights on current issues involving Islam in Indonesia.8
DD in Hong Kong has several objectives. First of all, it attempts to help solving 
the problems faced by migrant workers. Although DD has targeted migrant women 
as their charitable beneficiaries, there is no active discourse on issues such as gen-
der equality and feminism within DD. Instead, DD mainly focuses on protecting and 
empowering women migrants who work as housemaids. Abdul Ghofur (5 June 2010), 
head of DD’s branch in Hong Kong explains: 
For the time being, we are dealing with the symptom or fateful result of the 
problem of poverty in our country (Indonesia). But in our recent programs we 
have started to address the ‘cause’ and the ‘symptom’; our mission is to create 
the agents of social change [among female migrant workers or female ex-mi-
grant workers] when they come back to their hometown.9 
Secondly, DD acts as an Islamic philanthropic institution that collects and distrib-
utes zakat and charity from and for migrant workers; and thirdly, it plays a role as a 
solidarity-creating and da’wah (mission) association that assists Muslim migrants who 
seek Islamic knowledge. As briefly discussed earlier, strengthening religious identity 
among female migrants is one of the main issues addressed by zakat agencies and 
Muslim community associations. Moreover, religious study groups have functioned 
not only as a way in which zakat agencies and Muslim community associations can 
8 It is very common for Indonesian communities abroad to invite preachers (ustadz) or Islamic scholars 
(‘ulama) during Ramadan month, either sponsored by an embassy of the Republic of Indonesia or Indo-
nesian community associations, to assist and give sermons for the whole month in mosques, dwellings 
belonging to Indonesians, and the office of the Indonesian embassy.
9 At the time I interviewed the director of DD in Hong Kong, there was a knock on the door. A young 
lady came to this office, crying while carrying a big piece of luggage containing her clothes and other kind 
of belongings. DD’s director approached her and asked about what was going on. She replied: “I’ve just 
been fired and my employer did not tell me why”. She then dropped her belongings in DD’s shelter and 
after taking a rest for a while, she went out to see an employment agency office in another region of Hong 
Kong that might find her a new family that might need her skills as a housekeeper. 
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set up religious patronage for migrants but also as a way in which migrant women 
can overcome their financial and social problems during their time working in Hong 
Kong. These study groups also aim to strengthen female migrants’ objective to work 
in Hong Kong, which is primarily to earn money to support left-behind families in 
Indonesia. Religious knowledge, therefore, becomes guidance for those workers to 
stick to authorized occupations and to avoid illicit and ‘dishonest’ jobs and to prepare 
for their futures after coming back to their hometowns in Indonesia. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that as part of da’wah, the intention of DD’s branch 
in Hong Kong is also to strengthen Muslim workers’ religious commitment to Islam. 
As minority people who live far from their hometowns, social cohesion and solidarity 
among migrant workers is relatively strong. Migrant workers try to forge solid rela-
tionships, as they want to share similar – both sweet and bitter – experiences. Hence, 
the establishment of Indonesian migrant associations inevitably takes place in many 
countries; Hong Kong is not an exception. In Hong Kong, there are many other 
Indonesian associations with various religious, social, and cultural backgrounds and 
they have made partnerships with DD branch office in organizing various activities 
such as public discussion, lectures, entrepreneurship training, seminars, workshop, 
etc. DD has functioned as both a zakat collector and provider. As a zakat collector, 
DD has organized giving practice among Indonesian migrants, whose donations are 
used for wide-ranging projects. Within one year, DD could collect approximately 
Figure 1. A leaflet created by Dompet Dhuafa to mobilise zakat funds from, and to organize 
social and religious activities among Muslim migrant workers in Hong Kong 
(source: author’s collection).
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HKD 150,000 to HKD 200,000 (USD 26,000) in donations from migrant workers 
themselves. DD branch office in Hong Kong has received subsidy from DD Office in 
Jakarta for its operational cost and program in Hong Kong.10
In the event of a crisis such as a natural disaster back home, Indonesian migrants 
overseas in Hong Kong, as in many other countries, usually assist by sending money 
through humanitarian NGOs. In that situation, DD could function an intermediary 
between migrants in Hong Kong and disaster victims in Indonesia. However, in a 
normal situation, the main objective of DD in Hong Kong is to collect funds from 
‘fortunate’ migrant workers, or what can be referred to as ‘migrant philanthropy’ to 
support unfortunate fellow migrants in Hong Kong. This objective is different from 
the establishment of DD’s branch offices in Australia and Japan, for example, which, 
in fact, is intended specifically to organize ‘diaspora philanthropy' (Anand,  2004; 
Brinkerhoff, 2013) to support social projects in Indonesia. This is because Indonesian 
workers in developed countries such as Australia can usually expect better social, 
economic and legal conditions and they can contribute to resolve problems faced by 
Indonesians back home (Arifin Purwakananta, 25 February 2009).
DD STRATEGIES: MUTUAL HELP, SOLIDARITY, AND RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS
Like other Islamic philanthropic associations in Indonesia, religious study groups 
seem to have become one appealing way to disseminate Islamic messages on the ne-
cessity of building solidarity and social cohesion among migrants, and in turn, these 
messages are gradually translated into more concrete actions. To run its branch of-
fice in Hong Kong, DD has appointed staff knowledgeable about Islam and acquaint-
ed with development-oriented projects. The staff recruited were trained on how to 
raise funds as well as how to create development and training projects for migrants. 
Building solidarity among migrants has become the priority of the DD program, un-
der which social and moral awareness among migrants are a necessity for helping 
each other evolve. Of course, DD is not the only Islamic association in Hong Kong. 
There are some long-established migrant associations whose concerns deal primarily 
with the welfare of Indonesian migrants. Therefore, the way in which DD engages in 
the public sphere of Indonesian communities’ workers in Hong Kong has been ex-
pressed through building partnerships with other Indonesian workers’ associations. 
This is partly because Indonesian migrants reside in various areas of Hong Kong, in-
cluding other cities, such as Macao, and partly because other associations are already 
more familiar with the work and typical problems faced by migrant workers.
Like other zakat agencies that keep a low profile and refrain from political crit-
icism, DD portrays itself as a religiously-motivated philanthropic association. To 
be able to engage in social and economic enterprises, DD has set up three main 
10 I have not found a comprehensive financial report from DD in Hong Kong. But according to DDs 
June 2014 report, the DD office in Hong Kong spends HKD 37, 800 (USD 4,800) for office operational 
cost per month while receiving a subsidy of HKD 27, 500 (USD 3,522) from Jakarta. For the whole ex-
penses (office and program) in May and June 2014, DD received HKD 118,859.30 (USD 15,224) and spent 
HKD 184,728.88 (USD 23,661). It should be noted that in the first years of its operation, almost 100 per-
cent of the money came from DD office in Jakarta, and then starting from 2006, DD operation in Hong 
Kong could be mainly financed locally and just received small portion of subsidies from Jakarta.
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programs in Hong Kong that relate mainly to life-skills training and development. 
The first program is ‘Self-Reliance for Migrants’ (Migran Usaha Mandiri), under which 
DD attempts to cultivate and fortify the entrepreneurship mentality of migrants 
who may return to their hometowns and start new lives as entrepreneurs. The sec-
ond is the ‘Migrant Institute’ that offers English and Mandarin courses, computer 
training, as well as sewing and cooking education. The third program is ‘Blessed 
House’ (Rumah Berkah), in which migrants may practice their knowledge and skills 
in cooking, sewing, and managing businesses. The migrants usually come to DD’s 
offices and shelters to participate in DD’s activities or attend a religious study group 
during a weekend or holyday, which is also known as a ‘Migrant Day’ (Hari Perantau).
To translate and implement DD’s vision of social entrepreneurship, DD and a 
long-established migrant association called Perantau Indonesia (PERI) have embarked 
on a joint venture by setting up an Indonesian restaurant that also functions as a 
‘social-entrepreneur laboratory’. This restaurant mainly targets the Hong Kong mid-
dle class and Indonesians. The aim of this project, besides promoting innovation 
in doing business and fulfilling the need of Indonesian migrants for halal foods, is 
to teach migrants how to run a business in an ‘Islamic way’, and more importantly 
to facilitate successful and economically established Indonesian migrants in Hong 
Kong who can express their ‘social piety’ by supporting and becoming involved in 
social entrepreneurship for empowering Indonesian women migrants who work 
as housemaids. Thus, it is worth bearing in mind that DD as a zakat agency has 
endeavored to bridge the gap, at least socially, between Indonesian migrants who 
have successfully run a good business in Hong Kong, and those women migrants 
who are in temporary work as housemaids in Hong Kong. No less important is the 
fact that connecting charitable works with entrepreneurship, as carried out by DD 
and Indonesian migrant associations, in part, represents their efforts to translate 
Figure 2. Migrant workers raise their voices and aspirations in a demonstration held in Hong 
Kong. (source: author’s collection)
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the notion of social enterprise into innovative action for social and economic devel-
opment. DD seems to realize that women migrants are temporary workers who, 
within a few years, in accordance with their contracts, will return to Indonesia. As 
the migrants will then start new lives, DD prefers giving the migrants assistance in 
preparing to face new environments and by providing them with various kinds of 
life-skills training. Some migrants who returned to Indonesia and in turn joined the 
DD project called Institut Kemandirian (Self-Governing Institute), a program that 
offers skill training, have been able to run a small business (Rustanti & Zuhri, 2016). 
Indeed, while this project is worthwhile, this does not mean that the project is sus-
tained and can reach the expected goals. Moreover, there are a wide-range of small 
or micro businesses run by ex-migrant workers in Indonesia, such as car rentals, 
travel agencies, a sewing factory, restaurants, local food production, etc.
MAKING PARTNERSHIPS WITH SOCIAL MOVEMENT NGOS
In the case of Hong Kong, Indonesian housemaids can raise their voices and protest 
against exploitation and mistreatment by employers, exploitative agencies, and weak 
Indonesian government policies, by setting up a migrant association (Blackburn, 2004, 
p. 191; Indarti, 2007). One of the Indonesian NGOs in Hong Kong that has come to 
the fore and plays a pivotal role in creating solidarity is the Indonesian Migrant Workers 
Union (IMWU), an advocacy NGO organized directly by Indonesian migrant workers 
in Hong Kong. Having cooperated with other national and international NGOs based 
in Hong Kong whose overarching concern relates to migrant workers and women’s 
empowerment, IMWU seems to have a different approach to overcoming migrant 
problems compared with Islamic philanthropic associations as for instance DD. This 
can be seen in the way in which the IMWU addresses the issues, makes its voice 
heard, and expresses its social and political concerns (Constable, 2009). To the IMWU, 
Indonesian workers abroad face many problems in the workplace due to many reasons. 
The main cause relates to the government’s inability to provide an adequate welfare 
system in the home country, stimulating disadvantaged groups in society to survive 
by working abroad. Their conditions have deteriorated with the weakness of regula-
tion in Indonesia, enabling unprofessional and irresponsible agencies to act illegally, 
and in turn, have caused female migrant workers overseas to suffer. In many cases, the 
activists of the IMWU also believe that the Indonesian government, including its rep-
resentation abroad (the Indonesian Embassy), seems reluctant to intervene on behalf of 
female Indonesian migrant workers when there are problems. 
All volunteers who work for IMWU do so part-time and are migrant activists. They 
can work for IMWU during weekends only, either on Saturdays or Sundays.11 Despite 
gaining support from others, this NGO empowers itself by revitalizing contributions 
from members. Every month, workers or helpers voluntarily contribute a certain 
amount of money to the organization. A pamphlet installed in front of the door of 
the IMWU Office to remind IMWU members, mentions: “A true workers’ union is a 
11 In Hong Kong, according to local regulations, domestic workers or helpers should have one day off 
per week, either Saturday or Sunday. It is very common for helpers from Indonesia to have gatherings in 
Victoria Park. Thousands of helpers come to the Victoria Park to find funds, to meet friends, to take Eng-
lish courses and computer training, and to attend religious gatherings.
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union funded by its members” (Serikat buruh sejati ialah serikat yang dibiayai oleh ang-
gotanya sendiri). Some other pamphlets and badges used by IMWU volunteers voiced 
their concerns in ways that are redolent of labor movement slogans around the world: 
“Reject outsourcing” and “Give us holidays and rest days”. In short, the IMWU, which 
was established in 1998, is actively part of the global labor and transnational women’s 
solidarity movement, whose concerns include the minimum wage, exploitation, labor 
rights, and the protection of female migrant workers from abuse (Sweider, 2006, p. 126).
The IMWU often engages with other labor unions such as KOTKIHO, the Asian 
Domestic Workers Union (ADWU), the Filipino Migrant Workers Union (FMWU) coa-
lition, and OXFAM, enabling the IMWU to enrich its insight and reinforce its views 
on resolving migrant workers’ problems. In building awareness among migrants 
to organize demonstrations, the IMWU has also engaged other Hong Kong-based 
advocacy NGOs and pro-democracy movement to echo their aspirations, addressed 
either to the labor department in Hong Kong, to the public and employers, or even 
to the Indonesian Embassy as a representative of the government of Indonesia. 
Active participation in the IMWU conference on labor affairs organized by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) in various countries indicates the commit-
ment of Indonesian migrant workers to fostering migrant workers’ rights. Although 
philanthropic organizations such as DD and other ‘movement NGOs’ such as IMWU 
have different concerns and types of activities, they can work together to sponsor 
migrant activities. DD can work with NGOs, such as IMWU as they share a similar 
concern about the protection of migrant workers. For example, DD together with 
other NGOs in Hong Kong assisted female migrant workers whose contracts were 
terminated and therefore needed lawyers to resolve their problems, and shelters 
for temporary housing. The intensified interaction between DD and other NGOs 
Figure 3. IMWU slogans promoting female migrants’ rights. (source: author’s collection)
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indicates that ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ NGOs have shared an interest in addressing the 
same issues, which is the protection of migrant workers. The phenomenon can also 
be seen in Indonesia, where DD and other Muslim philanthropic organizations have 
established a partnership for humanitarian missions in disaster-affected areas. 
Compared to Islamic associations, it appears that secular workers’ movements 
such as the IMWU are more progressive in building awareness of how to represent 
workers’ interests. These workers’ movement can voice aspirations and rights by 
engaging other workers’ movements in Hong Kong. Slogans used by the IMWU to 
carry their message to the authorities (both those in Hong Kong and the Indonesian 
government) are also stronger than those voiced by Islamic associations. While 
Islamic charitable associations and movement NGOs have their own way of overcom-
ing domestic workers’ problems, cooperation between charitable associations and 
‘movement NGOs’ has taken place, characterizing the dynamic relationships between 
these two types of associations. In the Ramadan month of 2011, Dompet Dhuafa, the 
IMWU, Liga Pekerja Migrant Indonesia (Indonesian Migrant Workers League), and 
others organized a seminar entitled: Dengan Semangat Ramadan Melawan Perbudakan 
Modern untuk Mewujudkan Perlindungan Sejati bagi BMI (With the Spirit of Ramadan 
[we] Fight Against Modern Slavery in Order to Provide a Comprehensive Protection 
for Indonesian Domestic Workers). 
CONCLUSION
This article argues that effort to contextualize zakat practices among Indonesian 
Muslims has become increasingly dynamic overseas, energized by the increasing social 
and economic problems of migrants abroad. The increase in number of the dispatch 
of Indonesian women to the domestic sector overseas has stimulated Islamic philan-
thropic organizations such as DD to reinterpret the basic concept of zakat beneficiaries. 
Innovation in interpreting the meaning of ibn sabil by DD activists indicates that the 
social concern of social activists in Indonesia in proposing new concepts of zakat bene-
ficiaries has surpassed religious authorities in the country. As a matter of fact, religious 
authorities, including MUI pays less attention to the current issues. DD has utilized 
the ‘language of religion’ as a discursive center in constructing notions of empower-
ing migrant workers. The use of religious language to address social issues and to en-
visage a better community is a common phenomenon within Islamic associations. By 
using religious symbols and narratives which cope with individual piety, community, 
and Islamic solidarity, as well as by providing healthcare, shelters, and education, DD 
believes that a better quality of life for the oppressed (mutad’afin), in this case female 
migrant workers, can be created, although with very limited results, and the aggrava-
tion of the social, cultural, and economic conditions of the oppressed can be prevented.
It should also be noted that as a philanthropic organization, DD has been able to 
establish partnerships with NGOs and groups of Indonesian people in Hong Kong in 
addressing various problems. It has functioned not only as a welfare provider and aid 
giver for those ‘unfortunate’ migrant workers but has also increased the participation 
of ‘fortunate’ migrant workers to aid social entrepreneurship and charity activities for 
migrant workers. DD’s sustainability in Hong Kong and migrant volunteers’ enthu-
siastic supports to DD activities indicate that the organization has gained reception 
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from Indonesian migrants overseas as indicated by vibrant engagement and active 
participation of migrant workers in DD activities in the shelter (office) as well as by 
the willingness of migrants to donate. The increase in funds collected by DD every 
year in Hong Kong, which in turn is dispensed to finance migrant activities, also sug-
gests that what is to be called ‘diaspora philanthropy’ among Indonesian migrant 
workers, works well. The increasing participation of migrant workers in Islamic 
philanthropy indicates that Islamization in many respects has taken place in Hong 
Kong and at the same time shows that many migrants benefited economically from 
their presence in Hong Kong. Solidarity in the form of sending money to their home 
country can be seen among migrants to supports social, religious, and educational 
activities in Indonesia. This means that reinterpretation of zakat has had a profound 
impact on the pattern of Islamic philanthropy, especially among migrant workers as 
they have participated in resolving problems in their home country.

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Analyzing International Migrant Responses to Crisis 
Situations in the Context of Floods in Thailand
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The 2011 floods in Thailand were one of the most devastating disasters in the history 
of the country and affected migrants in several regions. The purpose of this paper is to 
analyze migrant responses in crisis situations and to assess the impact of the 2011 floods 
on migrants from Myanmar, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The authors argue 
that such migrant groups have a weaker social, economic, and political position when 
compared with local (non-migrant) groups and are thus facing particular vulnerabilities 
in crisis situations. This paper is based on desk research and empirical data collection 
consisting of 55 semi-structured interviews.
Keywords: Crisis; Floods; Migrants; Thailand; Vulnerability

INTRODUCTION
The results presented in this paper derive from the larger European Union-funded 
project Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC): Supporting an Evidence-Based 
Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action which focuses mainly on post-
crisis issues, primarily on the situations after a specific crisis event, including both 
natural disasters and civil unrest (Hendow, Pailey, & Bravi, 2016). While the over-
all MICIC Thailand project analyzes the response to the crisis by different stake-
holders including government authorities, intergovernmental organizations, 
and civil society organizations (Bravi et al., 2017), this article predominantly 
discusses experiences of and responses by members of migrant communities in 
a flood crisis context. 
In 2011, Thailand suffered its worst flooding in more than a half century. The 
floods, which lasted from July 2011 to January 2012, affected more than six million 
hectares of land in 66 of the country’s 77 provinces and impacted more than 
13 million people (World Bank, 2012). The flooding was categorized as a level 4 
which is the highest level on the country’s disaster management scale. Several 
factors caused the flood situation in Thailand. These factors include the tropical 
storms coming late in the rainy season, poorly planned infrastructure, land fill-
ing for urban/commercial and industrial growth, degraded water canals in urban 
areas, and construction along river banks. At the time of the flood, approximate-
ly 3.5 million migrant workers were living in Thailand (Benfield, 2011) with the 
majority of them from Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR. According to the offi-
cial statistics reported by UNDP and the World Bank, as of September 2011, over 
Forschungswerkstatt  Research Workshop
w
w
w
.s
ea
s.
at
   
 d
oi
 1
0.
14
76
4/
10
.A
SE
A
S-
20
17
.2
-8
258 | ASEAS 10(2)
Analyzing International Migrant Responses to Crisis Situations in the Context of Floods in Thailand
870,000 migrants (excluding unregistered migrant workers) lived and worked in prov-
inces that were affected by the floods. However, despite the lack of statistical infor-
mation on the undocumented migrants, it was noted that up to around one million 
migrants (including both documented and undocumented) were working and living 
in the flooded areas as estimated by the Ministry of Labour (Koser, 2014). Migrant 
workers in Thailand are particularly vulnerable groups in crisis situations, primarily 
because of their political and socioeconomic status in Thailand (Bravi et al., 2017). 
A crisis can be defined as “a situation faced by an individual, group or organization 
which they are unable to cope with by the use of routine procedures and in which 
stress is created by sudden change” (Booth, 2015, p. 86). Against this background, 
this paper analyzes migrant responses in crisis situations and examines the impact 
of the 2011 floods in Thailand on migrants from Myanmar, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam.
THE MIGRATION CONTEXT
Thailand has experienced a transformative process of shifting from a rural-based 
to an urban-based society and to an export-oriented and labor intensive economy 
with higher incomes and wage levels than most neighboring countries. This has 
led to a growing demand for low-skilled labor, especially from Lao PDR, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005). In spite of this high demand for 
migrant labor, Thailand features restrictive employment regulations for low-skilled 
migrants (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). This lack of formal regulation created many 
informal migration channels and “subversive mobilities” (Cohen, Cohen, & Li, 2017) 
– often supported by brokers or smugglers – to bring unregistered migrants to the 
country. 
Over the past 25 years, major policy changes affecting the administration of migrant 
workers have taken place (Chamchan & Apipornchaisakul, 2016). Migration and reg-
istration policies shape the legal statuses of Thailand’s migrant population according 
to the following categories (Archanvanikul, 2014): 1) unregistered / registered migrant 
workers without work permits, 2) registered migrant workers with work permits, 
3) registered migrants who are approved by the Nationality Verification (NV) program, 
and 4) migrant workers who entered the country under the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU). The first two groups are considered to be irregular migrant 
workers (the first one because they do not have a work permit and the second group 
because of their incomplete National Verification), while the third group includes 
migrants regularly living in Thailand, but may comprise regular or irregular workers 
depending on whether their employment is authorized or not. The migrants included 
in the last group are considered to be regular migrant workers (Sasiwongsaroj, 2014). 
The criteria of the migrants’ status ranging from undocumented to the obtainment of 
a temporary work permit and the formal channels of NV or a MoU is important as it 
impacts the freedom of movement as well as the migrants’ general rights in Thailand. 
Undocumented migrants can be detained when crossing provincial or national bor-
ders if they are stopped by police or immigration officials and thus constitute the 
most vulnerable group.
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RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA SAMPLE
The MICIC project was conducted in collaboration between the Institute for 
Population and Social Research (IPSR), Mahidol University, and the International 
Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). IPSR acted as local research 
partner in Thailand and conducted the majority of the interviews. Semi-structured 
in-depth interview guidelines were developed covering interview themes such as 
socio-demographic background, migration experience, legal status, realization of 
and information about the floods, migrant responses, role of family and relatives 
left-behind, employer’s response, response and reactions of others within Thailand, 
unequal treatment, and future plans. The guidelines were translated into the na-
tive languages and the interviewers translated into respondents’ language where ap-
propriate during the interview. The fieldwork was carried out from March 27 until 
June 28, 2016 and took place in those provinces (Samut Sakhon, Pathum Thani, 
Nonthaburi, Nakhon Pathom, Ayutthaya) that were highly affected by the floods and 
that featured a high concentration of migrant populations from the four neighbor-
ing countries (Beesey, Limsakul, & McDougall, 2016). A total of 55 migrants from 
Myanmar (28 respondents), Lao PDR (6), Cambodia (11), and Vietnam (10) were inter-
viewed in-depth. About one quarter of respondents in this study hold only a passport 
or a national identification card but no work permit for Thailand. 
RESPONSES TO AND IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS
This section discusses how migrants perceived, experienced, and responded to the 
2011 crisis situation. Migrants’ responses can be divided – according to the time 
frame – into migrants’ responses before, during, and after the flood event. This paper, 
however, focuses on migrant responses during the flooding and presents selected 
findings in the following paragraphs. 
Deciding to Stay
The majority of the interviewed migrants stayed in Thailand throughout the crisis 
time. The reasons for not returning home during the flood are manifold and relate to 
the following factors: Moving across provinces was risky for undocumented migrants 
as they feared arrest; travelling home during the crisis was difficult due to the partial 
shutdown of roads in the flooded areas as well as the expensive nature of transporta-
tion, and the migrants interviewed reported that hardly any assistance for returning 
home was available or offered to them; migrants underestimated the severity of the 
flood and then it became too difficult to leave once the floods struck. Finally, fear of 
losing their jobs and sources of income also deterred migrants from leaving because 
they either had debt to pay or they did not want to return home; some stayed because 
they could earn extra money working during the floods. The size of migrants’ house-
holds in Thailand also played a role in their decision to return, as travelling was more 
complicated and costly: “I did not think about moving back to Myanmar. My family 
was here. Also, transportation is way too expensive for all of us” (Female migrant 
from Myanmar aged 34).
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Desk research, on the other hand, illustrates that several thousand migrants 
returned to their home countries because of the floods. According to migrant workers 
groups, thousands of migrants from Myanmar evacuated flooded industrial parks in 
the provinces of Ayutthaya, Nakhon Sawan, Nakhon Pathom, and Pathum Thani 
in the second half of 2011 (Undocumented workers exploited post-floods, 2011). In 
November 2011, aid workers estimated that about 600,000 migrant workers were 
stranded due to the floods (Koser, 2014). IOM reported that the flood crisis of 2011 
forced many migrant workers in Thailand to flee flood-affected areas and return to 
their respective countries of origin (Huguet & Chamratrithirong, 2011). 
Preparedness and Awareness
The risk perception of migrants before the flood is mainly related to information and 
awareness about the crisis. In terms of information and awareness about the 2011 
floods, migrants can roughly be divided into two groups. First, several interviewed 
migrants stated that they were surprised by the floods and only realized the severity 
when they had already happened. 
Actually, I had no idea. I went to work on that day and nobody informed me 
or warned me about the flood. Until I came back from work, the flood had 
already attacked the market. I was completely shocked (Female migrant from 
Cambodia aged 24).
The lack of information and preparedness pertained especially to migrants unable 
to read and speak Thai (exclusion due to language barriers) and to those who were 
not embedded in a Thai social environment (segregation by ethnicity or nationality 
and socioeconomic factors). Migrants without registration or work permits tended to 
stay at their workplace or home to avoid problems. These migrants knew very little of 
what was going on in their host country because they lacked a social network, were 
unable to understand Thai, were without access to radio or TV, and rarely went out. 
During the floods, information was broadcasted via radio and TV and also spread by 
megaphone in the main streets by volunteers or aid workers. Thus, many migrants 
missed important information. They had a lower perception of the danger. 
The second category refers to migrants who can understand and communicate in 
Thai and are socially better integrated into Thai society. They were better informed 
and demonstrated a stronger awareness of and preparedness for the floods, having 
received the news from various media, from their employers, and other people they 
talked to. Interviewed migrants stated that they thus tried to protect their homes, 
blocking them from the floods. They also tried to secure their valuables and bought a 
stock of food and drinking water beforehand. 
Moving Within Thailand
As the water had begun to submerge their places of residence, the common imme-
diate responses among most respondents included moving (oneself as well as one’s 
belongings) to an upper floor or a friend or relative’s house. Moving was a common 
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approach adopted by migrants who were affected by the flood. While some chose to 
return to their home country at the time of the flood, others moved to other areas in 
Thailand that were not flooded. The different strategies of moving within Thailand 
ranged from moving to a higher floor within the same house or building, moving 
to friends’ houses or apartments in other areas, to moving to available government 
shelters. Some migrants also mentioned using higher elevated areas such as bridges 
as temporary shelter during the flood. 
Experiences of Unequal Treatment and (Fear of) Discrimination
Generally, migrant respondents reported having experienced more discrimination in 
everyday life in Thailand than during the flood. Even though interviewees stated that 
they did not experience discrimination during the flood due to their national, ethnic 
or migrant status, the research team documented cases of denial of assistance by assis-
tance groups and member of the Thai mainstream society dependent on these statuses. 
Discrimination outside the flood context occurred in various everyday life situ-
ations. Interview partners reported daily life situations where Thai people did not 
want to have food with migrant workers, did not want to sit in the bus next to them, 
and generally disrespected them, including situations where they experienced dis-
crimination and unequal treatment in terms of income. 
I tell you the truth that I have been staying here for 16 years; I have never felt 
that I have a citizenship here. … I said the truth that although I and (other) la-
borers are good people, nobody respects us (Male migrant from Vietnam aged 
50).
Although the majority of respondents state that the level of discrimination they 
experienced during the flood crisis was lower than during ‘outside-flood’ contexts, 
some discrimination and unequal treatment based on legal status, national back-
ground, race-physical appearance, and language could be identified: “Yes. (I was dis-
criminated against), the Thai people who came for distributing donations didn’t give 
me the life aid bags because I am a migrant” (Female migrant from Vietnam aged 44).
Especially when personal ‘crisis situations during the flood crisis’ appeared, the 
vulnerability of undocumented migrants became obvious. For instance, an undocu-
mented migrant from Cambodia had her belongings stolen by her landlord during 
the crisis. Due to the combination of being a migrant and lacking documentation/ 
legal status in Thailand, she did not dare to report her case to the police. Moreover, 
Myanmar migrants reported cases of detainment of undocumented migrants who 
tried to cross provincial or international borders during the crisis. 
Crisis as Chance
While the flood created many obstacles for affected migrants, this paper also aims 
to shed light on positive experiences of migrants as well as on migrants’ agency and 
contributions during the crisis time. First, for a few of the respondents, the crisis situ-
ation opened the opportunity for new experiences and even constituted some kind 
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of entertainment, fun or diversion from everyday working life, at least in its initial 
stages. One undocumented migrant from Myanmar knew that there would not be 
any ID checks in his area during the flood situation. Therefore, when the water was 
still high he swam out through the floods to a large supermarket, an area he would 
usually not dare to visit out of fear of arrest by Thai authorities (personal communi-
cation, male migrant from Myanmar aged 26). 
Second, for a minority of interviewees the flood brought about economic benefits. 
Although some migrants were not able to continue working during the flood, some 
even found additional jobs and turned the crisis situation into an opportunity. Before 
and at the beginning of the flood crisis, many migrants were hired to help by moving 
belongings to higher/elevated places where they would not be damaged by the flood. 
And when the flood subsided, they were once again hired to help clean up the houses.
Third, situations of crisis do not only show the vulnerability of migrants but also 
their agency and their contributions to crisis management efforts. Migrants contrib-
uted to tackling the crisis before, after, and during the flood. They supported the 
building of walls that protected houses and factories before the flood and supported 
the clean-up and reconstruction processes after the flood. Furthermore, respondents 
also mentioned that they gained a sense of belonging during the crisis as they were 
able to help Thai people and felt more included.
Do you know, I even helped the soldiers and Thai citizens to make anti-flood 
dams. I lived like a Thai citizen and I felt that I have responsibility to support 
neighbors to prevent the flood (Male migrant from Vietnam aged 50).
However, the same interviewees who mentioned this newfound inclusion or 
sense of belonging also noted that it could not be sustained after the floods. On the 
contrary, these migrants actually perceived a return to old patterns of everyday exclu-
sion from Thai society after the crisis.
CONCLUSION
The present research shows that due to language barriers, lack of social embeddedness 
and underestimation of the impact of the impending floods, migrants were inad-
equately prepared for the crisis. Most of the migrants interviewed stayed in Thailand 
during the emergency as they lacked the means to return to their country of origin, 
feared arrest due to their undocumented status or they did not consider returning 
an option because their livelihoods were based in Thailand. Forms of migrant dis-
crimination were reported before, during, and after the flood crisis. Results also show 
that social relations on local and translocal level help coping with hazards (Greiner & 
Sakdapolrak, 2013).
At the same time, a minority of interviewed migrants turned the crisis into an 
opportunity to earn additional income while their jobs and regular incomes were sus-
pended. Some also felt more included and better embedded into the Thai community 
as they played crucial roles in helping to tackle the flood. The situation had therefore 
increased their sense of belonging and portrayed migrants as not only victims but 
also agents at the time of the flood. 
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Further developments and outputs of the Migrants in Countries in Crisis proj-
ect can be accessed through the project website: http://research.icmpd.org/projects/
migration-governance/micic/

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Qatari Philanthropy and Out-of-School Children in South-
east Asia: An Interview With the Director of Educate A Child
Michael Morrissey
► Morrissey, M. (2017). Qatari philanthropy and out-of-school children in Southeast Asia: An interview 
with the director of Educate A Child. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 10(2), 265-270.
In September 2015, the UN agreed on Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG4), which 
aims to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all” (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 2017). Embedded 
in this broad goal, Educate A Child (EAC) is the only global support program that focuses 
solely on out-of-school children1 (OOSC) across the world, including Southeast Asia. 
EAC is an initiative of the Education Above All Foundation of Qatar. It works through 
co-funding interventions of trusted partners to bring OOSC into quality primary educa-
tion programs. It pairs with organizations to support innovative programs and meth-
ods of education for the most vulnerable children, especially those affected by poverty, 
conflict, natural disaster, and cultural barriers. EAC’s partners range from international 
educational, development, and humanitarian organizations to locally-based groups. It 
currently has around fifty partners, also in Southeast Asia, among others, Aide et Action 
and its 25-NGO consortium in Cambodia, the Monastic Education Development Group 
(MEDG), Save the Children, UNESCO, UNHCR, and United World Schools. Dr. Mary Joy 
Pigozzi is Executive Director of EAC and member of the WISE Prize Committee.
Keywords: Out-of-School Children; Primary Education; Qatari Philanthropy; SDG4; Southeast Asia

Michael Morrissey: Dr. Pigozzi, how did you come to direct the Educate A Child 
program?
Mary Joy Pigozzi: The Educate A Child program was launched in fall 2012 by its 
founder, Her Highness Sheikha Moza bint Nasser. At the time, progress towards 
Millennium Development Goal 2 (MDG2) calling for universal primary educa-
tion by 2015, had stagnated. Early progress during the period 2000-2008 was 
realized by the hundreds of countries that agreed to this goal, however, 60 mil-
lion children world-wide remained out of primary school in 2011 and progress 
towards the goal had slowed. In 2010, Her Highness Sheikha Moza bint Nasser 
was appointed an Advocate for MDG2 by the then UN Secretary General Ban Ki 
Moon. As such, and along with her history of supporting education in Qatar, she 
committed to reaching 10 million out-of-school children and launched the pro-
gram Educate A Child (EAC) to achieve this goal. A new foundation, Education 
Above All, was set up to manage EAC along with other international education 
1 According to EAC estimations, there are currently about 61 million children who have not re-
ceived school education at primary level (Educate a Child, 2017).
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programs of Qatar. Early in 2012, I was approached by a representative from Qatar. 
They knew about some of my accomplishments and considered me as a prospective 
candidate to head the new EAC. Although I was very happy in my former position, 
the more I learnt about the scope, ambition, and potential of EAC, the more attrac-
tive it became. In the end, it was a challenge and an opportunity that I could not 
resist. I arrived in Qatar as Director at the start of the new program in late 2012.
Morrissey: How does EAC determine which countries to prioritize?
Pigozzi: EAC embarked on an extensive analysis of the global OOSC landscape. 
Reaching 10 million children is a daunting goal to achieve in a few years. So we began 
by identifying countries with significant numbers of OOSC according to the UNES-
CO Institute of Statistics data-base. Nevertheless, as a global program, EAC did not 
prioritize any region. Our singular focus remains OOSC. EAC supports activities that 
seek to eliminate the multiple barriers that keep children out of school such as pov-
erty, lack of or distance to education opportunities, challenges resulting from conflict 
or displacement, gender and other forms of discrimination, poor educational quality, 
etc. We co-fund partners who have demonstrated that they understand the barriers 
children face and have identified ways to overcome these barriers and enable OOSC 
to enter and complete a primary education program. It does not have to be formal 
education – we also support a range of alternative modalities to fit the needs of dif-
ferent groups of learners.
Morrissey: Why is Southeast Asia a region of emphasis?
Pigozzi: Southeast Asia made enormous strides in basic education during the period 
of the MDGs. Nevertheless, differences in development levels among ASEAN countries 
remain. Within many Southeast Asian countries, swathes of poverty persist and, as a 
result, several million poor and marginalized children do not have access to primary 
education. Our decision to support countries in this region was based on data that indi-
cated the need. There are also other reasons why this region was of interest. One is that 
EAC is very keen on supporting innovative models that are designed to meet the learn-
ing needs of the most marginalized and bringing them to scale. This region has a good 
record of innovation in education. Another reason is that many of the countries are 
undergoing population growth at quite high rates and we are aware that this will put 
pressure on the provision of primary education. We hope that our work can diminish 
the possible negative impact of this pressure on the most disadvantaged in the region.
Morrissey: How does EAC go about working with countries?
Pigozzi: EAC’s partnership process is based on respect for the knowledge and under-
standing local organizations have of the barriers and challenges that children face in 
sub-regions. OOSC are not uniformly scattered about entire countries but tend to 
be in pockets of geographic, social, and economic strife. This approach is a critical 
aspect of how EAC works. We are a genuine partner who is engaged in the same goal 
to reach OOSC. We are not as a donor or charity prescribing what local organiza-
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tions should do. Therefore, EAC seeks partners who demonstrate success in reaching 
marginalized children at the primary level in a country and invest in broadening and 
scaling up their outreach. EAC has consciously attempted to work with a range of im-
plementing partners. We support multi-lateral organizations, international NGOs, 
and national NGOs. In every case, we expect our partners to align and coordinate 
with national authorities. In Cambodia, for example, the Minister of Education as-
sumed the chair of the coordinating committee of the NGO consortium established 
in response to EAC’s offer of support.
Morrissey: What funding model does EAC use?
Pigozzi: EAC believes that sustainability of any given intervention relies on owner-
ship and investment of the country and local partner. Therefore, the funding model 
is a 50:50 proposition. With Qatari funds covering 50%, the local partner provides 
at least 50% of the total project funding. Not only has this model worked across the 
world, but also partners have become creative in their approach to providing their 
share by tapping into a variety of sources such as donors, host governments, private 
sector, foundations, and individual philanthropists. In addition, to receive EAC fund-
ing a partner must demonstrate that it has a plan to sustain attention to OOSC once 
EAC funding is no longer available.
Morrissey: How is EAC support allocated in the Southeast Asia region?
Pigozzi: EAC is supporting projects in Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Phil-
ippines, and Malaysia, reaching around 300,000 OOSC by 2018. The projects vary 
according to OOSC’s needs. One project in Thailand supports a refugee camp for 
displaced children from Myanmar. The consortium of NGOs in Cambodia is reach-
ing children who face various barriers such as disability and urban poverty. Another 
one focuses on remote ethnic minority children in communities that have never had 
any access to a school. EAC does not allocate specific funding amounts to countries 
or regions. Its financial allocations respond to need as demonstrated in a rigorous ap-
plication process. Thus, several partners may be supported in a single country using 
different approaches and focusing on different barriers faced by OOSC.
Morrissey: How does EAC know it has reached such large numbers of children?
Pigozzi: EAC has a strong and robust monitoring and evaluation system to record the 
number of children reached. Each project we fund must submit extensive technical, 
financial, and monitoring reports every six months. Projects submit an online data 
report on numbers of OOSC reached by each school or alternative education pro-
gram, and whether these children stay in the school or education program over time. 
EAC requires partners to track each individual student it enrolls by ID (not by estima-
tion). This requirement was put in place for two reasons: First, because marginalized 
children are hard to identify and reach, and secondly, because EAC is interested to 
know if our investment is yielding the intended result, namely that OOSC are given 
the opportunity to learn and participate in the full cycle of primary education.
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Morrissey: How does EAC determine if the education the children receive is of high 
quality?
Pigozzi: That is an important question! Quality is as critical as access because the 
goal is for children to learn. EAC has very strict standards and criteria for the selec-
tion of partner organizations. Potential partners must show how their strategies, in-
terventions, models, approaches, and instructional methodologies result in children 
staying in school and learning. Proposals that are not able to demonstrate quality 
education interventions are not funded. We conduct site-monitoring visits to assure 
ourselves of the quality of education the enrolled OOSC are receiving.
Morrissey: What has EAC accomplished so far?
Pigozzi: EAC is supporting 51 projects in 48 countries in Southeast Asia, East Asia, 
the MENA, Africa, and the Latin America and Caribbean regions. The status of the 
program accomplishments is continually being updated, therefore at the point of this 
interview (September, 2017), commitments are in place to reach more than 7.5 mil-
lion OOSC world-wide, with over 5.3 million of them already enrolled. EAC’s finan-
cial commitment to date stands at over USD 548 million, with additional leveraged 
funds of more than USD 817 million in partner co-funding. The total funding for 
EAC projects now exceeds USD 1.3 billion for our entire portfolio.
Morrissey: What do you see as the main challenges to successful program implementation?
Pigozzi: We have been fortunate that most of the partners have been able to exceed 
the targets that they had set for themselves. Having said that, however, there are 
several challenges that partners face. Conflict has broken out in several of the coun-
tries where we work resulting in delays and, in most cases, the need to re-program 
the intended activities to fit the new context. Fortunately, this has not been the case 
in Southeast Asia. A significant proportion of our funding goes to projects for refu-
gees and displaced children. The frequent need for these children to be mobile has 
presented data collection and learning continuity problems. As we require partners 
to monitor and report on individual children, this has been difficult for some of our 
partners who were not used to such rigorous data reporting requirements. Finally, I 
would add that, in some cases, due to challenging or changing financial circumstanc-
es, some partners struggle to maintain their co-funding commitment.
Morrissey: How does EAC communicate information on its program?
Pigozzi: Our portfolio of projects is accessible through the EAC website, www.edu-
cateachild.org.qa. There you will find individual project descriptions, profiles of im-
plementing organizations, a map showing the locations of projects across the world, 
stories of children and how they have been impacted, and news about EAC’s role 
in the global education community. Our funder and patron, Her Highness Sheikha 
Moza, hosts an international conference in Doha every other November – the World 
Innovation Summit in Education (WISE) – where world leaders, academics, partner 
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organizations, and the private sector gather to share ideas and offer solutions to the 
world’s pressing problems in education. Southeast Asia is always well represented. 
EAC also publishes reports, studies, fact sheets, brochures, and success stories. These 
are disseminated at international meetings and conferences and through our website. 
Morrissey: What is the future direction of EAC?
Pigozzi: As you may know, the Millennium Development Goals were set for the pe-
riod of 2000-2015. They have been extended through the Sustainable Development 
Goals, approved by the UN in 2015, and carry the global agenda up to the year 2030. 
SDG 4 focuses on education, and EAC is positioned to extend this focus to marginal-
ized children and their right to a quality basic education. 
Morrissey: What does this mean for the Southeast Asia region?
Pigozzi: EAC funds multi-year projects so our footprint in the Southeast Asia region 
will continue for several more years. In addition, at the policy and advocacy level, 
there is movement towards pan-ASEAN agreements on reaching all OOSC in the 
region.
Morrissey: How can others become involved?
Pigozzi: EAC welcomes implementing partners and funding partners to the table. Re-
search shows that more highly educated populations result in better socio-economic 
and health indicators for the country, and a higher quality of life for individuals and 
communities. There is a page on the EAC website entitled ‘How to Become a Partner’ 
with details on procedures. Investors and organizations are invited to consider par-
ticipating in this worthwhile endeavor.
Morrissey: Thank you for sharing the accomplishment of EAC over such a short period 
of operation! Southeast Asian children have clearly benefited from Qatari philanthropy. 
Pigozzi: It was a pleasure to speak about EAC and the importance of the Southeast 
Asia region in our program. Her Highness, and by extension EAC, are passionate and 
committed about the right of children to opportunities to reach their full potential. 
It is good for them individually, good for their families, good for the community, and 
good for the country. Everybody wins! 

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SEA Junction: Our Venue to Connect on Southeast Asia
Patrick McCormick
► McCormick, P. (2017) SEA Junction: Our venue to connect on Southeast Asia. Austrian Journal of South-
East Asian Studies, 10(2), 271-274.
The Southeast Asia Junction (SEA Junction) is a ‘knowledge venue’, an event 
space, a hub, a gallery, and a library with the goal of fostering understanding 
and appreciation of Southeast Asia, from arts and crafts to the economy, politics, 
and development. As a space, SEA Junction provides knowledge resources and 
promotes exchanges among students, specialists, and the general public. SEA 
Junction opened its doors on 15 May 2016 in the Bangkok Arts and Culture Center 
(BACC) in the Siam area of downtown Bangkok. The BACC holds a strategic 
location close to major universities and is easily accessible to the general public 
and visitors. The physical space is an open library or ‘reading room’ for books in 
English and regional languages; work stations also let visitors use online resourc-
es. The space is not all books: arts and crafts from around the region decorate the 
space and show visitors some of its cultural richness, from papier-mâché figures 
from the Philippines and Burma to the paintings of emerging regional artists. 
Making resources available is the first priority of SEA Junction, an ‘intel-
lectual salon’ open to all and free of charge. Anyone can come and have a cup 
of coffee or tea, take a look at the books, browse art objects, and participate in 
activities such as lectures and workshops. Staff and volunteers operate the read-
ing room six days a week (from Tuesdays to Sunday). So far, the library features 
more than 1,300 books, most of which have been catalogued, in addition to a 
sizeable e-library. SEA Junction maintains an online presence through its website 
www.seajunction.org, which also provides a space for photographic essays and 
opinion pieces. Through the website, Facebook, and twitter, SEA Junction gath-
ers and shares information on conferences, courses, and fellowships of interest to 
academics and practitioners. Underlying SEA Junction is the idea of networking: 
both for users and for people who share their knowledge and experience through 
lectures, books or other modes of communication. This is a space for all kinds of 
people to make personal contacts, whether they are artists, intellectuals or repre-
sentatives of groups and organizations, from the region itself or from elsewhere. 
A great priority of SEA Junction is on events; from photographic exhibitions 
to panel discussions, to show the richness of the region and also the challenges 
it faces. SEA Junction is thus neither wholly about arts and culture, nor about 
development, politics, or economics. Being in Bangkok provides a central loca-
tion within Southeast Asia for exchanges amongst people from the region and 
beyond. Music performances and film screenings have profiled emerging artists, 
intellectuals, and practitioners from the region, while Southeast Asia-related 
events have featured both ASEAN-wide phenomena, such as migration, medical 
tourism, human rights, and country-specific events which would normally be 
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difficult to find outside their countries of origin. The larger meeting spaces of the 
BACC also allow SEA Junction to offer more formal programs, including meetings, 
seminars, lectures, and large exhibitions. 
In the last year alone, SEA Junction has held public lectures, including: ‘In Search of 
Social Justice along the Myanmar and China Oil and Gas Pipeline’, ‘Chinese Tourism 
in Southeast Asia: A Blessing for All?’, and ‘LGBT Rights Under Siege in Indonesia’. 
Photo exhibitions have included ‘Harsh Life on Shore: Migrant Workers in the Thai 
Fishing Industry’, and ‘Facing Trance in Indonesia’. For music, there were angklung 
classes and a concert of the Bang Khnai music band. One of the documentary screen-
ings was of ‘Pulau Buru: Tanah Air Beta’ (‘Buru Island: My Homeland’) and involved 
talks by director Rahung Nasution and producer Whisnu Yonar. Other events includ-
ed potluck parties, mini book fairs, and book launches, while some such as classes for 
students fell under the rubric of ‘outreach’. Recently a group from a nursing school in 
Indonesia came to SEA Junction and gave a class on the impact of regional integra-
tion on health. 
Behind SEA Junction stands the anthropologist and international development 
specialist, Dr. Rosalia Sciortino, or ‘Lia’, who has lived and worked in the region for 
the past twenty-five years. Before starting SEA Junction, Lia worked extensively in 
the foundation and development world, including as regional director for Asia at the 
Rockefeller Foundation in Thailand, the International Development Research Centre in 
Singapore, Senior Advisor to AusAID in Indonesia, and as a Ford Foundation officer in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. She has held managerial positions for projects through 
the Canadian and Australian governments, working on issues of health and migra-
tion. More recently, she has been teaching as an associate professor at the Institute 
for Population and Social Research (IPSR) at Mahidol University in Bangkok, and is 
also a visiting professor for the Master Course in International Development Studies 
(MAIDS) at Chulalongkorn University. During her work and decades-long experience 
in Southeast Asia, Lia has seen the need for a center of exchange for the region. She 
has observed how those centers that do exist are only inside universities and are usu-
ally not open to the general public, Lia says. 
Through my years working with the Ford Foundation, IDRC and the Rocke-
feller Foundation and the many programs to better understand and address 
emerging challenges in the region, I felt there was a gap between the produc-
tion of knowledge in academic centers, international and government agen-
cies and civil society groups and the distribution to intended beneficiaries. A 
lot of Southeast Asia centers are in universities, but they are not accessible to 
the public. More importantly, the knowledge is not shared widely to ensure in-
formed public debates. 
The few open venues in the region do not have a special focus on Southeast Asia 
and do not encourage conversations and exchanges on regional concerns between 
all the people involved. After the ASEAN Economic Community was launched in 2015, 
Lia saw how crucial it was to share knowledge about regional processes and their 
impact to ensure greater awareness. The emergence of the Economic Community 
represents a gradual shift among the countries and peoples of the region, who have 
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started thinking about their regional neighbors instead of distant, powerful countries 
in Europe and North America. The long-term disconnect means that people in any 
one country often do not have a clear understanding of the realities in the countries 
next door. Decades of ideology, popular media, textbooks, and curricula that empha-
size historical grievances, often further distort the picture of one’s neighbors. 
The vision to create the SEA Junction was not Lia’s alone. She shared her passion 
for the region, its people, and its arts and cultures with her husband O’ong Maryono, 
an instructor and practitioner of the Indonesian martial art, pencak silat. They saw the 
need to preserve the diversity of cultural expression that was threatened by national-
ism and extremism. The two of them had also amassed a sizeable collection of local 
art and furniture, a reflection of their multicultural vision, and they sought a suitable 
venue to display it. Then O’ong died of appendix cancer in 2013. Partly to re-engage 
with the world after her loss, but also to commemorate her late husband and their 
life together, Lia decided to manifest their shared passion for the region with a place 
where people could experience the richness of Southeast Asia and its arts and crafts, 
while also learning about its realities and challenges. “Making the SEA Junction was a 
crucial part of the grieving process,” Lia said recently. 
Support from like-minded individuals has been crucial; SEA Junction is sustained 
through a system of ‘founding partners’ who donated USD 2,500 each or pledged 
USD 900 a year for 3 years. They come from different countries and backgrounds, but 
share a common interest in Southeast Asia and a readiness to share their knowledge, 
expertise and extensive and varied networks. SEA Junction has also benefitted from 
the generosity of smaller donations from individuals known as Friends of SEA Junction, 
and grants from Partners Asia, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, and the Kennedy Foundation 
of Thailand. The book collection has been built through the donation of books from 
many people, especially Alan Feinstein, Executive Director of the American Indonesian 
Exchange Foundation in Jakarta, who is also a former colleague and family friend. 
Today SEA Junction stands as a symbol of collective efforts and shared values. 
Reflecting Lia’s own interests and networks, many of the events have focused on 
Indonesia, providing a rare opportunity for people of Thailand and the rest of Mainland 
Southeast Asia to be exposed to their Island neighbors. At the same time, Lia is very 
much interested in expanding coverage of the region in all areas, and is always looking 
for experts and practitioners both from inside and outside the region for events. Lia, 
her staff, and all the founding partners of SEA Junction would like to extend a warm 
welcome to everyone to come and visit, make use of the library and other resources, 
take part in events, consider holding a lecture or workshop, or contribute to its run-
ning and activities. Anyone interested is encouraged to contact SEA Junction directly. 
Address:
SEA Junction
Room 408, 4th Floor
Bangkok Arts and Culture Center (BACC)
939 Rama 1 Road, Pathum Wan
Bangkok 10130, Thailand
Email: southeastasiajunction@gmail.com
Website: www.seajunction.org
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Reflection on the Special Gender Stream: 2017 Timor-Leste 
Studies Association Conference
Sara Niner
► Niner, S. (2017). Reflection on the special gender stream: 2017 Timor-Leste Studies Association 
Conference. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 10(2), 275-279.
The special gender stream of the 6th Timor-Leste Studies Association (TLSA) 
Conference was co-convened by Dr Sara Niner of Monash University and Theresa 
Tam of the National University of Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL) where the conference 
was held over two days from 29 to 30 June 2017. This report summarizes some 
of the 25 presentations which represent the key issues of political participation, 
gender-based violence, development, and health that are crucial for the pursuit of 
gender justice in Timor-Leste and how the local women’s movement and aligned 
NGOs are attempting to achieve this. Gender equality and gender relations are 
growing fields of research in Timor-Leste, undertaken by a mix of academics, 
activists, government officers, and development practitioners (Niner, 2017) that 
were represented at the conference. A well-documented gender inequity is evident 
in post-conflict Timor-Leste as is the case in most post-war societies. Women have 
higher levels of malnutrition and illiteracy than men and overall women earn low-
er salaries, receive fewer benefits and opportunities to advance in their profession-
al careers. The 2010 National Demographic Survey reported that a third of women 
have experienced physical violence from a current or former husband or partner 
(National Statistics Directorate [NDS], 2010). However, the acceptance of gender 
equality as a general principle in Timor-Leste is documented, although the deeper 
social change required to have equal opportunities in everyday lives is a ‘work in 
progress’, as the following report shows.
Gender relations apparent in contemporary Timorese society are the result of 
complex political and historical circumstances. The dominance of men in Timorese 
history and politics, and the legacy of militarization and conflict with neighboring 
Indonesia during the national struggle for independence (1974-1999), are signifi-
cant issues in contemporary Timorese society that pose enormous challenges for 
the women’s movement (Niner, 2017). In the contested world of modern Timorese 
history, the crucial and unique role of women during the conflict has not yet been 
fully acknowledged and this affects women’s full and active participation in society 
today. Timorese women accepted that the struggle for women’s rights established 
in the early 1970s was not possible during their long war, but the struggle depended 
upon women’s substantial contributions and sacrifices therefore creating a pool of 
highly skilled and motivated women who no longer accepted the status quo. The 
post-conflict period has been significant for women and the struggle for gender jus-
tice in Timor-Leste. While women face cultural and political pressure to conform to 
patriarchal demands, after the war ended, key women leaders and women’s groups 
have resisted this and the conference papers discussed here are evidence of that.
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The opening panel, which set the agenda for the rest of the gender stream, 
sketched out the key political issues for women and gender relations in contemporary 
Timor-Leste. The panel was opened by Maria ‘Micato’ Domingas Fernandes Alves, a 
senior woman representative of Timor’s nationalist struggle, who provided a histor-
ical perspective on the women’s movement. As the Portuguese news agency LUSA 
reported: “Experts considered today that violence against Timorese women remains 
high, with patriarchal society that perpetuates gender inequality and prevents wom-
en from having access to development opportunities” (LUSA, 2017). ‘Micato’ Alves 
was only a teenager when Timor was invaded by Indonesia in 1975 and she worked 
behind the front lines training resistance cadres with the first East Timorese women’s 
organization, the Popular Organization of Timorese Women (Organização Popular da 
Mulher Timorense – OPMT), which was founded as part of the Revolutionary Front for 
an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN). She went on to resist Indonesian occupation 
in many ways and was a founder of the first women’s NGO in Timor FOKUPERS (cel-
ebrating its 20th Anniversary in 2017).1 The ongoing discrimination and inequality 
faced by Timorese women from Portuguese colonization to OPMT’s efforts during 
the Indonesian occupation was highlighted in her paper but her major focus was on 
women’s contemporary solidarity and advocacy, including the establishment of the 
women’s network, REDE FETO Timor-Leste in 2000, and the strategic successes of 
the women’s movement.2
Many of these issues were reiterated by the next speaker, Nurima Alkatiri (who 
was running for parliament with FRETILIN) focusing on the “high prevalence of vi-
olence against women and children, chronic malnutrition, one of the highest birth 
rates in the world, high rates of maternal and child mortality and low rates of women 
participation in the work force”. She explained how “violence against children is seen 
as a parenting educational mechanism, and marital rape is not even understood as 
a concept.” She advocated for increased programs for survivors of violence and the 
establishment of a new mindset that does “not accept violence and gender inequality 
as normal” (Alkatiri, 2017). The youngest member of the panel Berta Tilman, who 
had recently established, Timor’s first Feminist Network, spoke about how women 
are marginalized from the process of national development, giving the example of 
the inadequacy of programs such as the Bolsa da Mae (Mother’s Purse). The USD 5 
per month provided per child to poor, often female headed households (about USD 
9 million in total in the annual budget) was too little to shift families out of poverty, 
as compared to the approximately USD 100 million spent per annum on projects 
for war veterans. Tilman presented a graph demonstrating how public funds spent 
on government vehicle maintenance outweighs money invested in human resourc-
es. Evelina Inan and Mira Fonseca from local women’s NGO the Alola Foundation, 
1 After national independence, Micato Alves became the advisor on gender to the Prime Minister and 
established the national Office of the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality (SEPI) which produced 
several significant texts on women’s participation in the independence struggle. She became Minister for 
Social Solidarity but her next appointment as Minister of Defense in 2012 was rejected by the Commander 
of the national army.
2 These were gender equity instruments/mechanisms recognised in the constitution, CEDAW and 
UNSCR 1325 ratification, 2010 Domestic Violence Law, the National Action Plan on Gender Based 
Violence, women’s formal political participation ensured by quota system and most recently, the 
introduction of the social welfare payment for poor, often female headed households, the Bolsa da Mae.
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continued with more positive research undertaken on ‘Women and Leadership’, 
giving suggestions on how to increase women’s participation in suco (local council) 
leadership, through training. This research was deliberately driven and conducted 
by Timorese women, active as co-researchers, process designers and informants en-
suring contextual and cultural relevance while building research skills and ensuring 
‘ownership’ over the findings. 
While the East Timorese women’s movement has been highly successful at achiev-
ing strategic aims (such as the laws and quotas mentioned by Micato Alves), meeting 
the basic needs of women has not been as successful, particularly for poor rural wom-
en. Several presentations showed the complex challenges to improving rural women’s 
health and wellbeing and how entrenched customary practices might be addressed. 
Roumaldo Amaral and Domingos Aquino Brandao of HAIM Health discussed increas-
ing nutrition and empowering rural women through cultivation and consumption of 
the new ‘superfood’ moringa and Joana Gusmão and Sherry Ryan discussed how the 
Timorese NGO Empreza Di’ak (good enterpise) is reviving cultural traditions with ru-
ral women to develop livelihoods in a culturally safe way. Conference co-convenor 
Therese Tam of UNTL analyzed the challenges of introducing and adopting healthier 
and more environmentally friendly stoves in the face of adherence to the customary 
practice of cooking over wood burning fires which have added benefits of warmth, re-
pelling insects and integration with a local belief system. Although the women cooks 
might want to adopt technology because it would lessen their work burden, along 
with added health benefits, this significant household purchase also requires the fam-
ily support of husbands and mothers who may not appreciate these benefits.
High population growth and fertility rates in Timor-Leste are linked to high rates 
of child and maternal mortality, making this a key issue in improving women’s status 
and several presentations offered insights into these challenges. Laura Burke inter-
rogated local understandings of reproduction and how they intersected with nation-
al and international perceptions about population growth. While big families were 
viewed positively as assets that increased household productivity and agricultural 
production, rapid population growth was also a reaction to the loss of life during the 
war and as a way to maintain knowledge systems and create a pool of good citizens 
for future national development. These deep insights will assist more broadly but 
a more pragmatic approach proffered was Health Alliance International’s Liga Inan 
(connecting mothers) program which uses SMS technology to lower mortality rates 
by increasing safe birthing practices and post-natal visits. Ruben Lopes, Olinda Bap-
tista, and Sarah Meyanathan reported that while the program was associated with 
these positive behavior changes, other key practices and powerful cultural beliefs 
had remained unchanged demonstrating the limitations of the methodology and the 
need for deeper understanding.
The other key issue to improving women’s status is reversing the high prevalence 
of domestic violence. Brett Inder and Amy Duong’s statistical modelling of nation-
al survey data (NDS, 2010) revealed the links between violence and men’s behavior 
described in survey responses. Men who displayed controlling behaviors and patri-
archal beliefs were significantly more likely to perpetrate domestic violence, while 
women who accepted domestic violence were more likely to experience it. These in-
sights were clearly linked to other findings in the gender stream. Xian Warner, Justino 
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Sarmento Amaral, and Tamara Failor also presented a re-analysis of data from the 
Nabilan (to shine) survey (Asia Foundation, 2016). Clear and distinct links were found 
between both the experience and perpetration of violence and poor mental health 
such as depression and suicide. Increasing awareness of these links along with cam-
paigns to reduce mental health stigma and ‘promote non-violent ways of being a man 
and reduce social acceptability of men’s use of violence’ were suggested. A more prag-
matic solution to assisting victims was presented by Guilhermina de Araujo and Livio 
da Conceicao Matos, from the Midwifery Department at UNTL, and Australian ac-
ademic Kayli Wild, who addressed the socio-cultural context for midwives respond-
ing to violence against women in clinical settings. Although midwives offered their 
clients ‘security from below’ they themselves needed greater support to deal with 
the tensions between ensuring victims’ rights and respecting families. Midwives sug-
gested they needed a ‘whole health facility’ approach encompassing training, strong 
leadership, and links to communities integrated into the undergraduate health cur-
riculum at UNTL and Ministry of Health policy.
However, the most penetrating insights into the culture surrounding gendered 
violence in Timor was provided from the qualitative research by Deborah Cummins 
and Mira Fonseca who reported on the experiences and understandings of young 
teenage mothers. From these narratives, the researchers concluded that young 
women have a lack of knowledge, choice, and agency in first sexual experiences lead-
ing to sexual abuse, unplanned pregnancies, and unhappy marriages. They found 
the concept of consent largely absent, with some young women unaware that their 
consent was even required. The acceptance of forced sex has also been found in pre-
vious studies (Asia Foundation, 2016; Niner, Wigglesworth, dos Santos, Tilman, & 
Arunchalam, 2013). The rights of the less powerful was another issue reported on by 
Anna Yang who sketched out the high rates of child abuse (over 70% for both men and 
women) and presented two case studies of extreme physical abuse and neglect. The 
vulnerability of children in informal adoption arrangements and the powerlessness 
of NGO’s to protect the children while encountering the obstruction of government 
officials is a reminder of the patriarchal hierarchies of power within institutional set-
tings that must be challenged if vulnerable people including children and women are 
to be protected in Timorese society. An informal discussion followed about other 
contexts of child abuse in Timor beyond the family, such as in schools, churches, and 
clubs which is another area in need of much more attention. 
A general observation from the conference from both Timorese and internation-
al participants was that it provided a safe, secular space for intellectual discussions 
about challenging issues. The issues of gender relations discussed were crucial ones 
for peace, democracy, and equality in the new nation, particularly in the middle of an 
election campaign. TLSA has held a bi-annual conference in Dili since 2007 and many 
Timorese have taken up the opportunity to present at an international conference for 
the first time. Conference panels are presented in a mix of Timor-Leste’s two national 
languages Tetun and Portuguese, and also in English and Bahasa Indonesian. The 
outcomes of the conference include peer reviewed published proceedings. This body 
of work now provides an archive of research material on Timor-Leste for use by all 
and it is freely available on their website (as below) and these proceedings are due out 
early 2018. The Timor-Leste Studies Association was established in Melbourne, Austral-
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ia in 2005 to provide a network for academic researchers interested in Timor-Leste 
and is affiliated with the Asian Studies Association of Australia. For more information 
please visit http://www.tlstudies.org/ and for the full 2017 Program and abstracts 
please visit: http://www.tlstudies.org/Conference.html/ 
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